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This article advocates opening up international securities regulation
to greater regulatory competition than the scant competition that
exists at present. After sketching the contours of an international
regime of regulatory competition in securities laws and the reasons
why such competition is desirable. the article provides a detailed
response to objections that have been raised to a proposal for a
competitive securities regime that was principally focused on the
United States, objections that would accordingly also be raised against
this article sproposal. These include whether the U.S. securities regime
is directed at mitigating problems regarding disclosure of interfirm
externalities and whether international competition will result in a
regulatory race to the lowest level of disclosure. Because the analysis
in support of regulatory competition in securities law draws upon the
learning regarding competition across U.S. states over the production
of corporate law. which has been successful in creating a regime that,
on balance, benefits shareholders, the article concludes by indicating
that recent critiques of the efficacy of state-charter competition are
unfounded.
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Stephen Choi, Robert Daines, Allen Ferrell, Henry Hansmann, Marcel Kahan, Ehud
Kamar, Michael Klausner, Jonathan Macey, Paul Mahoney, and participants at the
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Although there is a significant international regulatory regime for banking
institutions, I there has been no successful effort at international harmonization
of the regulation of securities transactions. This article contends that the
absence of a uniform international regulatory scheme is, however, a benefit
for investors in securities because it allows for some competition among
securities regimes. Moreover, elaborating on a position that I have previously
advocated with respect to U.S. securities laws,2 the article maintains that
international securities regulation should be opened up to even greater
regulatory competition than the scant competition that exists at present.
The contention that competition in securities regulation would be for the
better has been questioned by some commentators.3 This article responds
to those commentators. Notwithstanding assertions, there is no evidence
supporting the claim that competition would result in a race to the bottom,
with issuers choosing the lowest level of disclosure possible. Indeed, there is
uncontroverted data to the contrary, that issuers subject to choice frequently
disclose more information than required. In addition, there is an absence of
evidence in support of the rationale for a single national regulator offered by
some opponents ofcompetition, that the content ofthe disclosure mandated by
the single regulator regime in the United States includes significant interfirm
externalities.
The article proceeds by sketching the contours of an international regime
of regulatory competition in securities laws and the arguments why such
competition is desirable for investors, an analysis that I have made in greater
detail in the context of recommending that the U.S. securities regulator,
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), should be exposed to
The regime, established in 1988 under the auspices of the Bank for International
Settlements and known as the Basle Accord, fixed capital requirements for
international banks based on a formulaic treatment of credit risk. For one of the many
articles assessing the efficacy of the Accord, see John D. Wagster, Impact of the
1988 Basle Accord on International Banks, 51 J. Fin. 1321 (1996). The regime has
been subsequently amended to include in the required level of capital an adjustment
for market risk. Bank for Infl Settlements, :\mendment to the Capital Accord to
Incorporate Market Risks (1996), available at http://www.bis.org/publlbcbs23.pdf.
2 Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulatioll, 107 Yale LJ. 2359 (1998).
3 See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer
Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1335 (1999); James D. Cox,
Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1200 (1999).
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competition in a significant domain of its activities-the regulation of issuers
of securities.4 The article then rebuts the objections that have been raised to
that proposal. Because the analysis in support of regulatory competition in
securities law draws upon the learning regarding competition across U.S.
states over the production of corporate law-which has been remarkably
successful in creating a regime that, on balance, benefits shareholders-the
article concludes by demonstrating that recent critiques of the efficacy of
state-charter competition are unfounded.
II. THE DESIRABILITY OF COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL
SECURITIES REGULATION
Most people, and not simply economists, find the statement that consumers
are protected from producer exploitation by competitive product markets
prosaic and intuitively obvious. But a number of legal commentators blanch
at the suggestion of applying this wisdom to securities regulation. Upon
analysis, however, the analogy is entirely apt. In today's global financial
markets, which are dominated by sophisticated institutional investors,
competition among securities regulators would not only protect investors,
both large and small, but also would provide a superior regulatory regime.
A. Regulatory Competition in International Capital Markets
1. The Need for Competition in Securities Regulation
In competitive capital markets, issuers of securities have incentives to select
regulatory regimes that protect investors from exploitation by insiders,
because such choices lower the cost of capital. Even though individual
investors may be poorly informed regarding what level of disclosure or
other protective mechanisms are necessary, because the distribution of
equity returns is pro-rated by share ownership and there is one price for
shares, informed institutional investors dictate the regulatory choices of
issuers and less-informed investors are thereby also protected.5 There is no
realistic conflict between the informational requirements of institutional and
4 Romano, supra note 2.
5 To the extent that there might be segregated investor markets for certain small stocks,
individual investors would be protected by a disclosure requirement regarding the
issuer's domicile's regime as discussed at infra text accompanying notes 36-39.
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individual investors. Institutional investors rely on public information6 and
prefer its disclosure. For example, in the private debt market, in which the SEC
permits lower disclosure because it is restricted to sophisticated (institutional
and wealthy individual) investors, such investors demand disclosure of
approximately the same information as is required to be disclosed in the
public debt market.7 Similarly, in the European equity issues market, the
level of disclosure for international-style offerings whose purchase is limited
to institutional investors is higher than the disclosure required by European
countries.s
In the context of sophisticated consumers of securities regimes, providing
issuers with a choice of regulatory regimes-a market-is a mechanism
superior to a single regulator or a regulatory cartel of internationally
harmonized regimes for ascertaining what information disclosure is in
investors' interests (Le., the information that satisfies a cost-benefit
calculation). This is because there will be a net flow of capital to firms
operating under the regimes investors prefer and, hence, a feedback
mechanism for regulators to ascertain which rules are cost effective.
This input is especially important in the international regulatory setting
because there are plausible reasons for concern that the product of
international negotiations over regulatory cooperation will be even less
responsive to investor interests than domestic legislation: as Paul Stephan
notes, international lawmakers do not stand for election and hence
are more susceptible to rent-seeking because they are subject to less
political discipline compared to national legislators.9 While Stephan's
examples are the international agreements and model laws drafted by
international organizations that he considers "private legislatures," whose
nation-state members send representatives to periodic conferences to review
and approve the work of task forces, and of other international bureaucracies
that have adjudicative functions,1O the international regulatory organizations
6 The best evidence that institutional investors do not trade on private information
is their inability to outperform the stock market. See, e.g., Stephen A. Ross et aI.,
Corporate Finance 330 (5th ed. 1999).
7 See, e.g., Luis F. Moreno Trevino, Access to U.S. Capital Markets for Foreign
Issuers: Rule 144A Private Placements, 16 Hous. 1. Int'I L. 159, 195 (1993).
8 See Howell Jackson & Eric Pan, Regulatory Competition in International Securities
Markets: Evidencefrom Europe in 1999,56 Bus. Law. 653,684-85 (2001).
9 Paul B. Stephan, Regulatory Cooperation and Competition: The Search for Virtue
(University of Va. Sch. of Law Working Paper No. 99-12, 1999).
10 In separate articles, he elaborates this point by reference to specific examples of
such organizations. Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization
in International Commercial Law, 39 Va. 1. Int'I L. 743, 753-57 (1999) (discussing
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associated with securities law-lOSCO (the International Organization of
Securities Commissions) and IASC (the International Accounting Standards
Committee)-have similar features. Neither is comprised of elected officials
of the nations they represent, and any uniform rules or harmonization schemes
they devise are not typically presented to national legislatures for approval.
Present-day international securities regulation, however, offers firms only
a limited choice of regime. Regulation follows the location where the
securities trade. This jurisdictional rule does provide some firms with some
choice: the regulatory regime for the many Israeli high-technology firms
that have chosen to list on the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), for
instance, is that of the United States, administered by a U.S. government
agency, the SEC, rather than an Israeli government agency. It is not obvious
whether these firms list on the NYSE precisely to obtain the U.S. regulatory
regime as a means of quality commitment to investors I I or whether the U.S.
regime is simply a cost borne in order to access the deeper U.S. capital market
and, in particular, to obtain coverage by U.S. financial analysts, a group far
more numerous than the Israeli analyst population and with considerably
more exposure to technology stocks, which produces improved investor
information about the firms. 12 But an Israeli firm cannot trade in the U.S.
examples of international private legislatures, such as the Hague Conference on
Private International Law and the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law); Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules,
Rents and Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J. Int'I L. & Bus. 681,684-85 (1996-1997) (discussing
examples of international adjudicative bureaucratic bodies, such as the International
Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization).
II See, e.g., Oren Fuerst, A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Investor Protection
Regulations Argument for Global Listing of Stocks (1998) (unpublished working
paper, on file with author) (providing bonding argument for issuer choice of exchange
listing); Edward B. Rock, Securities Regulation as a Lobster Trap: A Credible
Commitment Theory of Mandatory Disclosure (1999) (unpublished working paper,
on file with author) (providing bonding explanation for securities regulation). Israeli
firms listing in the United States did not also list 011 the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange
because they did not want to comply with two sets of disclosure requirements. See
William A. Orme, Jr., lsrae.lis Ask if Their Exchange Is an Endangered Species,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 29,2000, at C4. This requirement was recently removed, see infra
note 34. Because the Israeli regime entails stricter disclosure than the U.S. regime
on some dimensions, id., the bonding rationale for a U.S. listing by Israeli firms,
see Fuerst, supra, Rock, supra, is an open question.
12 See, e.g., Eli Amir et a\., What Value Analysts? 3 (Paine Webber Working Paper
Series No. PW-99-12, Nov. 1999) (examining analysts' earnings forecasts over
1982-1997 for a total of over 18,000 firm/year observations, they find contribution
of financial analysts to equity valuation is largest in high-tech industries), available
at http://www.columbia.edulculbusiness/wp/99/pw-99-12.htm.
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and remain subject solely to the Israeli regulatory schema; it automatically is
subject to the U.S. regime upon listing on a U.S. exchange.
Furthermore, the choice to come under U.S. law is a one-way street: U.S.
firms cannot opt for non-U.S. coverage. That is, a U.S. firm is unable to
sidestep the authority of the SEC by listing on the Tel Aviv exchange and
selling those shares to U.S. investors, for example, because a firm with a
substantial U.S. presence (as measured by business activity and investor
residence) is subject to U.S. securities law no matter where its securities
are purchased. 13 As U.S. firms and U.S. investors comprise a large proportion
of the international capital market, regulatory competition is thus severely
circumscribed.
To create a truly competitive regime of securities regulation, present
restrictions on regime choice must be removed. This requires that issuers and
investors be able to choose their regulators independent of firm or investor
residence or securities transaction location, that is, independent from where
they are raising capital. The central proposition is this: only when parties
to a securities transaction are able to select their regulatory regime without
restriction will government authorities be subject to meaningful competitive
pressure. This is because in such circumstances, if firms and investors find
a particular regulatory regime burdensome, they can select another one
without undoing their financing choice.
2. The Benefits ofEstablishing Regulatory Competition
Regulatory competition subjects government agencies to fluctuating inflows
and outflows of regulated entities as firms transfer their activities to come
under the jurisdiction of the regulator whose regime they prefer. Such
competition is desirable because it reduces the possibility that a regulator will
be able to transfer wealth across different regulated entities or redistribute
13 See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should
Regulate Whom?, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2498, 2610-11 (1997) (discussing the current
U.S. approach in which U.S. jurisdiction is triggered by sale of securities in United
States or by status as a U.S. issuer). It cannot be doubted that the SEC would assert
jurisdiction over a foreign-exchange-listed domestically-incorporated firm with a
substantial number of U.S. investors, despite its current emphasis on U.S. markets
over U.S. investors in conceptualizing its transactional jurisdiction. See. e.g., Stephen
J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American
Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 207,221 (1997) (criticizing long-standing
extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities law and noting SEC's announced shift in basis
for jurisdiction, from domestic investors to markets, when promulgating Regulation
S relating to offshore public offerings).
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wealth from the regulated sector to preferred individuals or organizations. 14
The U.S. securities regime, for instance, has historically transferred wealth
across constituents, the most notable example being the SEC's longstanding
acceptance of fixed commission rates, which benefited individual investors
and exchange members at the expense of institutional investors. 15 Firms'
ability to engage in regulatory arbitrage and switch regulators to a lower cost
regime in a competitive regulatory environment restricts regulators' ability to
engage in such implicit taxation.
Regulatory competition also more quickly corrects for policy mistakes
than a single regulator can, because in a competitive market, there is
a built-in self-correcting mechanism, as the actions of numerous actors
aggregate information efficiently. Namely, the flow of firms and investors
into and out ofparticular regulatory regimes provides information concerning
which rules are thought to be more desirable by investors; this is an
instance of the concept from consumer demand theory referred to as
"revealed preference." 16 When two products are both available for purchase
(that is, affordable) to a consumer, the consumer's choice is an indication
that the utility she obtains from the selected product is greater than what she
would have obtained from the product that was not selected: observed choices
are evidence of unobservable preferences. The transaction flows provide a
feedback mechanism to regulators regarding the efficacy of their regime;
under the plausible assumption that regulators prefer to have within their
jurisdiction more rather than fewer regulated firms and transactions,17 when a
regulator finds that its jurisdiction is subject to a net outflow, it will reassess its
regulatory regime so as to stem the decline in its jurisdictional sphere. Where
the choice of regime is bundled with the source of capital, in contrast, the
signal regulators receive from transaction flows regarding the desirability of
their legal regimes is much more attenuated, because issuing firms must trade
off the adequacy of the regimes against access to capital.
In addition, regulatory competition can be expected to foster innovation,
14 See, e.g., Edward Kane, De Jure Interstate Banking: Why Only Now, 28 J. Money,
Credit & Banking 141 (1996).
15 See Susan M. Phillips & 1. Richard Zecher, The SEC and the Public Interest 72,
88-89 (1981).
16 For a technical discussion of the theory of revealed preference, see Marcel K.
Richter, Revealed Preference Theory, in 4 The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of
Economics 167 (John Eatwell et at. eds., 1987).
17 For the classic theoretical contribution on regulatory behavior that makes such
an assumption, see William A. Niskanen, Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative
Government 38-41 (1971).
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since the feedback mechanism of interjurisdictional flows that reduces the
possibility of regulatory error also provides an incentive for regulators to
improve their regimes. 18 Further feeding back into that process, when the
choice of jurisdiction is restricted to products meeting particular criteria,
regulated firms have incentives to devise new products to come under
the preferred regulator. In the United States, for instance, wherever there
has been regulatory competition, there has been significant innovation in
products,19 institutional practices,2o and in legal rules.21 Indeed, the SEC
has eliminated specific disclosure requirements for issuers where it has
encountered competition-foreign equity issues and domestic debt issues (the
18 Susan Rose-Ackerman develops a model in which local governments may not
innovate because they cannot capture the benefits of an innovation as other
governments can freely copy it (legal reforms are not patentable). In her model,
risk-averse local politicians, to ensure their reelection with risk-averse voters,
therefore do not take on the risk of innovation. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking
and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. Legal Stud. 593 (1980).
Although one condition that decreases politicians' incentives to innovate in her
model, restricted mobility of voters, is not present in charter competition and would
not be present in securities regulation competition, since corporations are far more
mobile than voters because a domicile change entails solely a paper filing and no
physical relocation, even if the model was fully applicable, Rose-Ackerman does not
maintain that a single government would innovate more than multiple governments.
Rather, she suggests that a national government might adopt programs to encourage
innovation by local governments (such as through subsidies to innovators) and
notes that the same political incentives dulling risk-taking will be present at both
government levels, as the same citizens elect both sets of officials. Id. at 615-16.
19 For instance, much of the extraordinary growth in financial derivatives can be
attributed to the competitive regulatory regime. See, e.g., Edward Kane, Regulatory
Structure in Futures Markets: Jurisdictional Competition between the SEC, the
CFTC, and Other Agencies. 4 J. Futures Markets 367, 380 (1984); Merton H.
Miller, Merton Miller on Derivatives 52-53 (1997); Roberta Romano, The Political
Dynamics of Derivative Securities Regulation, 14 Yale J. Reg. 279, 370, 382-83
(1997).
20 See, e.g., Paul H. Kupiec & A. Patricia White, Regulatory Competition and
the Efficiency of Alternative Derivative Product Margining Systems (Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Finance & Econ. Discussion Ser. No. 96-11,
June 11, 1996) (describing the impact of regulatory and market competition on
development of an optimal margining system for options).
21 In the competition for corporate charters among U.S. states, Delaware, the leading
incorporation state, engages in significant, and continual, legal innovation. See, e.g.,
Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1
J.L. Econ. & Org. 225, 240 (1985).
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Eurobond market)-but not where it has exclusive jurisdiction--domestic
equity issues.22
Finally, if there are significant differences in firm characteristics such
that the most suitable regulatory regime differs considerably across firms,
then when firms and investors can choose their regulatory regime, they can
self-select the more appropriate regulatory schema.23 There are alternatives
to competition to achieve regulatory diversity: although securities regimes
today consist of mandatory rules, which offer no appreciable diversity for
public issuers, a shift to an enabling regime could have the effect of firms
opting out of the default regime and result in regulatory diversity.
Jurisdictional competition would, however, be preferable to a single
regulator with an enabling regime. First, it could reduce issuer transaction
costs. If significant diversity in regulation were desirable, there would be
many firms opting out of the single regulator's default regime. With multiple
regulators, each could offer a different regulatory package and firms could
adopt one of those packages rather than have to craft their own.24 This is
22 Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law 97 (1993). For a detailed
discussion of this trend and a proposal advocating that the SEC use its exemptive
power to make the disclosure regime for new domestic issues optional, see Alan
R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 Colum. Bus.
L. Rev. I. Palmiter advocates an SEC exemptive approach because he does not
believe that states will offer effective disclosure regimes given past experience with
state securities regulation and corporate law's use of ex post liability for fiduciary
duty violations rather than ex ante disclosure requirements. Id. at 107. Because
prior experience with state securities regimes did not occur under a competitive
regime due to a non-domicile-based choice-of-Iaw rule, there is no reason to assume,
as does Palmiter, that the states will be incompetent in competing for securities
registrations. In addition, it is difficult to draw conclusions from corporate law's
emphasis on ex post liability over ex ante disclosure, because the federal disclosure
regime preempted state action on that front. Of course, competitive federalism does
not guarantee any state's regulatory success: if states are ineffectual competitors
compared to the SEC, then federal registrations will predominate.
23 For an analysis favoring regulatory competition because of firms' need for diversity
in regimes, see Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity:
Rethinking the International Reach ofSecurities Regulation, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 903
(1998).
24 One critic of the need for diversity in securities regimes defends his position
by means of an example with two countries, in which he does not obtain the
desired diversity in regimes, by manipulating the number of firms desiring particular
rules in the two countries. Fox, supra note 3. With more than two regulators,
this claim is problematic, because a smaller number of firms will be sufficient
to support a regulatory regime. Even if there were significant network effects in
securities regulation to justify a two-country example, networks serving speciality
or niche-markets need not be disadvantaged by a small number of users (Le.,
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not a determinative consideration, however, in that the single regulator could
offer a menu of default regimes from which issuers could choose, and in
such a scenario, transaction costs might not be appreciably higher. Second,
if the optimal regulatory mix consists of some mandatory and some enabling
components, a single regulator would have greater difficulty ascertaining
the optimal mix compared to a competitive regime, in which issuer choice
across regime packages provides a ready and reliable source of information
concerning investor preferences.25 Again, a single regulator adopting a menu
of regimes could achieve diversity of regime choice. But it is doubtful that
a single regulator following a menu approach would be subject to the same
feedback mechanism offirm inflows and outflows that facilitates identification
ofthe desirable amount ofregime diversity by competing sovereigns. Namely,
since all firms would be under the single regulator's jurisdiction regardless
of the number of choices it offers, the single regulator would have less of an
incentive to be as responsive to changing business conditions in devising
alternative regime choices and updating its menu than would competing
regulators, who can increase the number of regulated entities under their
jurisdictional reach by innovation.
The potential need for regulatory diversity as a justification for facilitating
securities regulation competition, as is true of most arguments in support
of competition, is also an argument against regulators' top-down efforts
to effect international regulatory harmonization.26 In fact, if substantial
regulatory diversity is not preferred by issuers and investors, then competition
by network effects) to sustain product use. See Stan J. Leibowitz & Stephen E.
Margolis, Network Effects and Externalities, in 2 The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics and the Law 671, 673 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). For a discussion of
network effects, see infra Part lV.C.
25 It should be noted that while Lucian Bebchuk suggests that there must be a single
federal regulator to have mandatory rules, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism
and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law,
105 Harv. L. Rev. 1435 (1992), there are, in fact, mandatory rules in corporation
codes that are subject to state competition, such as the liability of directors and
officers for breach of the duty of loyalty. However, as I have maintained in greater
detail elsewhere, these rules are only mandatory in the sense that if investors did
not desire the presence of such rules, they would not be in the codes, that is,
they are non-binding constraints. Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question:
The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1599, 1601
(1989).
26 For the development of such an argument in the private (corporate llJld commercial)
law context, see Uriel Procaccia & Uzi Segal, Thou Shalt Not Sow Thy Vineyard
With Divers Seeds? The Case Against the Harmonization of Private Law (2000), at
www.econ-pol.unisi.itlscdbanc/CONFERENZAlFILE_PDF/12-Procaccia.pdf.
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will produce uniform regulatory outcomes without a need for governmental
agreements mandating harmonization. In the United States, for instance, there
is considerable uniformity across state corporate law, notwithstanding the
competition for corporate charters.27
It should further be noted that the proposal for regulatory competition
should assist the development of capital markets in small emerging-market
nations that do not have the requisite resources to engage in effective
securities regulation: their domestic corporations will be able to subject
themselves to a developed nation's regime. The potential to so benefit
is not purely speculative. Some scholars have contended that differences
in the securities regimes between Poland and the Czech Republic led to
significant financing difficulties for Czech issuers and the contraction of its
capital market, as well as losses to investors.28 Had corporations in the Czech
Republic been able to select their securities domicile, this problem would have
been mitigated, for they would have been able to select a more stringent regime
and thereby raise capital more effectively, because investors would have been
able to infer firm quality (here, propensity for self-dealing by management)
by the domicile choice. An increase in registrants from emerging markets
would, no doubt, place an additional burden on developed nations' regulators,
as the emerging market issuers would be registering with a regulator without
necessarily listing on a market within the regulator's geographic borders.
Higher registration fees could be charged such registrants to defray the
increased regulatory cost. In addition, private enforcement ofcompliance with
securities laws could also absorb some of the potential regulatory burden.
3. Feasibility of International Competition
It is not possible, however, to establish a fully competitive international
regime without multilateral government action. Nations must agree to alter
their present territorial jurisdictional approach to securities regulation and
recognize instead a statutory securities domicile, as selected by an issuer.
Although regulatory agencies enter into cooperative agreements, such as
the SEC's numerous memoranda of understanding with foreign regulators
concerning the sharing of information and enforcement operations29 or
27 See, e.g., William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev.
715,729-34 (1998); Romano, supra note 22, at 47.
28 See, e.g., Edward Glaeser et aI., Coase Versus the Coasians, 116 Q.J. Econ.
(forthcoming 2001).
29 See, e.g., SEC, Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of Switzerland,
1982 SEC LEXIS 2631 (Aug. 31, 1982) (insider trading law enforcement
cooperation agreement); Canada-United States: Memorandum of Understanding on
Administration and Enforcement of Securities Laws, 27 I.L.M. 410 (1988) (MOU
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the Basle Accord on capital requirements signed by central banks, ceding a
territorial jurisdictional rule is not a matter that is unambiguously within an
agency's purview. In the United States, for example, such rules are legislative
orjudicial in origin. Mutual recognition of statutory securities domicile would
therefore have to be effectuated by a treaty or other executive agreement
approved at a higher governmental level than the securities agency. This
undoubtedly complicates the implementation of a competitive international
regime.
There are avenues for circumventing implementation of a statutory
domicile, and, hence regulatory competition at the treaty-level, by agency-
level action, such as the SEC's recent proposal to consider permitting foreign
firms to list on U.S. exchanges without complying with U.S. accounting
standards.30 The SEC could, in fact, unilaterally implement a competitive
system for U.S.-listed securities under its general exemptive authority, which
permits it to "unconditionally exempt any person, security or transaction, or
any class or classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from any provision
or provisions" of the securities laws.31 But such action would not seem to
between SEC and Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia Securities Commissions
on cooperation in enforcement matters).
30 See SEC Release No. 33-7801, 17 c.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 2000 SEC LEXIS 256.
(Feb. 16, 2000). The firms will be permitted to comply with international accounting
standards instead. It is not clear whether this proposal will be adopted. U.S.
issuers are expected to object to competitors being permitted to follow different
accounting standards, and other opponents fear that it will lead to a weakening
in U.S. accounting standards, as domestic firms lobby to be subject to the same
lower standard as foreign listings. The SEC had long opposed any substitution of
international for U.S. accounting standards; the change expressed in the release
is most likely a result of the recent decision to change the organization of the
entity determining international accounting standards, the International Accounting
Standards Committee (IASC), in which the SEC expects to exert greater influence
over decision-making. The approach in this release stands in contrast to the more
limited reach of the SEC's heretofore broadest mutual recognition agreement,
the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System accord it signed with Canadian securities
regulators, which permits Canadian firms to list in the United States while complying
solely with Canadian disclosure rules, but mandates the reconciliation of their
financial statements with U.S. accounting standards. Multijurisdictional Disclosure
and Modifications to the Current Registration and Reporting System for Canadian
Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 6902, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,036 (July I, 1991).
31 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 36, 15 U.S.C. § 78mm (2001); Securities Act
of 1933, § 28, 15 U.S.c. § 77z-3 (2001); see Palmiter, supra note 22, at 89-91
(advocating that the SEC should, and could, use its statutory. exemptive authority
to permit corporations to select their own disclosure schemes for new issues, but
not extending his proposal to ongoing disclosures). Congress imposed only one
constraint on the use of that authority, that no exceptions could be made regarding
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be in the realm of the politically probable: with the notable exception of the
Civil Aeronautics Board, which enthusiastically put itself out of business
when it deregulated the airline industry in the 1970s, federal government
agencies have not voluntarily abandoned their regulatory domain, and the
SEC's past behavior is no exception to that general rule. It has consistently
sought to expand its authority over equity derivatives,32 and its new proposal
considering relieving foreign firms from following U.S. accounting standards
would actually expand its jurisdiction by attracting more foreign listings onto
U.S. exchanges. Moreover, that release contained not even a hint that it would
ever reconsider the accounting standards applicable to domestic firms, and it
has only increased, not decreased, the ongoing disclosure requirements for
those firms.
The discretionary power of non-U.S. regulators to implement regulatory
competition without a treaty is undoubtedly more limited than that of the
SEC. European Union regulators, for example, must recognize Member
States' firms trading in their jurisdictions under their home states' regime,
but a series of directives has mandated minimum standards of harmonization
across the EU, and mutual recognition does not extend to firms from non-EU
nations.33 Non-U.S. regulators may also not wish to endorse a competitive
approach, regardless of their statutory authority. In Israel, for instance, Israeli
firms trading on U.S. exchanges did not cross-list on the Tel Aviv exchange in
order to avoid having to comply with additional requirements of the domestic
disclosure regime, because the Israeli Securities Agency did not provide an
exemption for compliance with U.S. disclosure requirements.34 Hence, resort
the regulations applicable to government securities brokers and dealers, 15 U.S.c.
§ 78mm(b), a limitation not relevant to competitive securities regulation for private
issuers. Otherwise, the agency has the sole discretion to issue exemptions that are
"necessary or appropriate in the public interest" and "consistent with the protection
of investors," 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3; 15 U.S.c. § 78mm(a)(l), criteria that the proposed
regime of securities regulatory competition would easily satisfy.
32 See Romano, supra note 19, at 354-69.
33 Council Directive 87/345, 1987 OJ. (L 185) 81 (directive requlOng mutual
recognition of a listing approved by any Member State's competent authority
if the listing meets the EU's minimum standards for securities regulation); Council
Directive 80/390, 19800.1. (L 1(0) I (directive setting forth minimum disclosure
standards); Council Directive 79/279, 19790.1. (L 66) 21 (directive setting forth
minimum requirements for exchange trading of a security).
34 See Orme, supra note 11. The Israeli legislature changed the law to permit such cross-
listings in luly 2000, and the regulatory authority issued implementing regulations
in December 2000. See Amir N. Licht, Managerial Opportunism and Foreign
Listing: Some Direct Evidence 15 (2001), at SSRN Electronic Paper Collection,
http://papers.ssrn.comlpaper.taf?abstract-id=256653. It appears that the push for this
HeinOnline -- 2 Theoretical Inq. L. 400 2001
400 Theoretical Inquiries in Law [Vol. 2:387
to action at the agency-rather than treaty-level is only a partial, less than
ideal solution. As negotiating multilateral treaties on securities regulation
may well be time-consuming, certain unilateral action could jumpstart the
process. In particular, given the importance of the U.S. market, if Congress
were to alter the jurisdictional rule for securities regulation to eliminate the
SEC's monopoly over issuers and adopt a statutory domicile approach for all
firms issuing public shares in the United States, this would be a significant
step toward introducing competition in international securities regulation.
An additional benefit from regulatory competition for U.S. firms, which is
not relevant in many other nations, is that it would permit the integration of
corporate and securities law, as a firm could select the same domicile for both
regimes.35
In conclusion, it should be noted that a shift from the present system
of territorially based jurisdiction to a statutory securities domicile regime,
which is at the heart of the competitive approach to securities regulation,
is not a farfetched proposal for international securities regulation, as it
may initially appear. In the new world of electronic and Internet trading,
territoriality is rapidly becoming an empty concept. Physically-located
centralized securities exchanges are also on their way to becoming relics. The
most well-known example of this phenomenon involves trading in futures on
German government bonds: the creation of an electronic futures exchange
in Frankfurt eliminated the longstanding dominant physical London market
for the instrument, and as a result, the London futures exchange itself went
electronic. Given such sweeping technological change, regulation by issuer
domicile is more viable than regulation by trading location, as it will become
far more problematic to identify a territorial location for a transaction.
change to recognition of U.S. listings was not solely related to the Tel Aviv Stock
Exchange's loss of high-technology firm listings but also to rebellion over the new
national corporations law that led Israeli firms to reincorporate in Delaware; the
new corporations law was also revised at the time of the securities law change. As
might be expected, the Israeli Securities Agency was not the prime mover behind
the diminution of its authority.
35 For a discussion of the desirability of this possibility, see Romano, supra note 2,
at 2409-10. International competition would have the opposite effect for firms in
other nations that trade domestically in that it would permit them to select a foreign
securities regulator when presently the same national sovereign regulates both the
securities and corporate laws under which they operate. But foreign firms trading in
the United States are in a position similar to that of U.S. issuers, in that competition
will permit them to be under the same national sovereign for securities transactions
as they are for corporate law.
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B. Investor Protection Concerns under International Competition
To be sure, a non-territorially based securities regime may create new
complications for investors. An investor purchasing a security listed on
an exchange in his or her own state will no longer be assured that the
home state's securities rules apply to the transaction and subsequent acts
by the issuer. This uncertainty over the applicable regime raises three key
issues: will investors be able to discern a security's regime (a premise of
the effectiveness of regulatory competition); will they be able to enforce
their legal rights under a non-domestic regime; and will they be exploited
by insiders' changing securities regime midstream? To minimize these
investor-protection concerns, two procedural requirements are proposed as
preconditions for effective regulatory competition: disclosure of the relevant
securities regime and investor approval of a change in securities regime.
A third requirement, directed at local judiciaries rather than issuers, is also
proposed: recognition offorum selection-including arbitration--elauses for
the resolution of private securities lawsuits. These requirements would best
be effected by inclusion in the multilateral treaties creating the international
competitive regime.
1. Disclosure of the Securities Regime
To minimize any potential investor confusion concerning what regime
governs a purchased security, in my proposal to inject competition into the
U.S. regime, I advocated requiring disclosure of the applicable regime at the
time of a security purchase, by the issuer in an initial public offering ("IPO")
and by the broker in a secondary market transaction.36 This disclosure
must make plain that the domestic civil and criminal liability regimes do
not apply to the transaction. In the international setting, such a requirement
should be included in the treaties establishing competition as a condition
for mutual recognition, to be implemented, correspondingly, in each nation's
conforming legislation. A domicile disclosure rule could, however, also be
effectuated by exchanges as a listing requirement. Adopting such a policy
would be advantageous for an exchange because by reducing the transaction
costs of determining domicile, it would be of value to investors and thereby
increase trading volume.
In addition to disclosing the securities domicile, if, in the remote event
that a domicile has no issuer liability for fraud or no financial disclosure
requirement, disclosure of these features of the regime's content should
36 Id. at 2413-15. The requirement was to be effectuated as a condition to opt out of
the federal regime in the federa11egis1ation authorizing competition.
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also be required.at the time of purchase under the international agreements
establishing regulatory competition. Disclosure of a regime's lack of capacity
to prosecute issuers violating disclosure laws or otherwise engaging in
fraud should be required as well.37 The disclosure requirement concerning
a regime's content is limited to the notice of the thoroughly aberrant case
of no fraud liability or no financial disclosure requirement in order to
minimize the possibility of significant litigation over whether appropriate
disclosures regarding a regime's content were made at the time of a securities
transaction. The disclosure regarding the regime's capacity to prosecute
violators is necessary to eliminate an obvious means of circumventing the
content disclosure requirement: a regime with an antifraud provision that
cannot be enforced is equivalent to a regime with no such provision.
It is inconceivable that a securities regime would have no liability for
fraud or no financial disclosure requirement when investors have even a
modicum of sophistication, as such individuals would not invest in securities
under such circumstances (or they would pay a trivial sum for shares). More
important, as no reputable issuer would register under such a regime, it
would not be adopted in a nation with public or multinational corporations
that desire domestic registrations. A deviant regime with regard to fraud and
disclosure regulation would therefore be imaginable only in a small country
catering to small firms with unscrupulous promoters targeting exclusively
unsophisticated investors, that is, firms trading in a segmented equity market
in which institutions do not participate. This hypothetical regime would be
the international market analogue to penny stocks in the U.S. domestic
setting. Promoters of this sort presumably would choose such a regime in
order to defraud unsophisticated investors. In this regard, regime content
disclosure under regulatory competition is a safeguard that is unnecessary
for the vast majority of public stock issues, where markets are not bifurcated
for institutional and individual investors.
The problem relating to antifraud protection under a regime of regulatory
competition is limited to small firms whose equity is not purchased by
37 No such disclosure requirements were contained in my proposal for introducing
competitive federalism into U.S. securities regulation because their absence from
any state securities regime is not in the realm of the probable. For example, all U.S.
states have antifraud statutes, and competition will not alter this regime feature as
no state competing for charters has eliminated the analogous type of misconduct
in the corporate law setting-the duty of loyalty. It admittedly may be difficult to
measure enforcement capacity; expenditures below a minimum level of resources
allocated to government enforcement activity, adjusted for market size, number of
listings, or population, are possible benchmarks.
HeinOnline -- 2 Theoretical Inq. L. 403 2001
2001] The Needfor Competition in International Securities Regulation 403
institutions or sold in the regulating state and whose promoters can thereby
choose a regime facilitating fraud on the assumption that the targeted
individual investors would be unaware of, or otherwise misperceive, the
characteristics of the relevant securities regime. Two general approaches
could be taken to mitigate this problem: mandatory disclosure of an
investment's securities regime and the prohibition of specified (foreign-
regulated) investments.
The protection of individual investors through the provision of
information, a requirement of disclosure of the regime at the time of
securities sales, follows the approach of U.S. securities regulation that
disclosure, rather than product quality restriction, is the most appropriate
mechanism for government intervention in capital market transactions.
The notice investors receive when informed that their investments will be
regulated by an obscure nation, particularly one with no rule against fraud
or no resources allocated to enforce an antifraud law, should temper gullible
individuals' purchases, which will reduce the profitability from offering
and, hence, deter the emergence of deviant regimes catering to unscrupulous
promoters. Moreover, under regulatory competition, only regulators whose
regimes appeal to institutional investors will succeed in obtaining numerous
registrants and thereby be engaged in issuer, as well as broker, regulation.
Because many regulators will have a marginal role concerning issuers-none
or very few firms will be registered with them-these regulators' efforts
at individual investor protection will therefore necessarily be focused on
broker, rather than issuer, regulation and, they can focus particularly on
assuring that brokers comply with the disclosure rule regarding the features
of the domicile of the securities that they are hawking. This shift in regulatory
focus would certainly be beneficial for small nations with limited regulatory
resources. It should also aid unsophisticated investors by directing agency
resources toward what is the more common source of such investors' losses,
broker misconduct. 38 The abuse in small stock offerings, for example, as Alan
38 Although casebooks emphasize antifraud (insider trading and disclosure) cases,
complaints against brokers are a more significant source of individual investor
losses than the texts would suggest. The leading casebooks have at most one
chapter on broker issues and sometimes no coverage at all, see, e.g., Richard W.
Jennings et ai., Cases and Materials on Securities Regulation (7th ed. 1992);
David L. Ratner & Thomas Lee Hazen, Cases and Materials on Securities
Regulation (5th ed. 1996); James D. Cox et ai., Cases and Materials on
Securities Regulation (2d ed. 1997). In contrast, the SEC allocates considerable
enforcement time to broker misconduct, often more than it does for issuer
misconduct. See. e.g., SEC, 1998 Annual Report: Program Areas 1-6, 10 (the
vast majority of what the agency deemed "significant enforcement actions" for
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Palmiter notes, is by securities professionals, not issuers, evidenced by the
fact that the SEC's enforcement initiative against small-stock fraud "focused
on penny-stock brokers, not issuers. "39 There is no reason to assume that the
situation would differ in the international securities setting.
Required disclosure of the absence of rudimentary investor
protections-liability for fraud and financial disclosure-should alert even
unsophisticated individuals of the danger entailed in making an investment in
a company subject to such a regime and deter unscrupulous promoters from
preying on the unwary. Apart from prohibiting specified citizens' investment
opportunities to, for example, domestic firms or firms domiciled in regimes
with specific protections, a state cannot undertake more regulation in the
case of a foreign issuer besides regime disclosure to protect unsophisticated
investors without generating significant costs for the overwhelming majority
of investors (who, it must be recalled, in the most developed public markets
are institutions) and reputable firms, who have the capacity to select the
most appropriate foreign regime. Even a senior SEC official has candidly
acknowledged that there are limits to what the government can do to prevent
investors from inappropriate trading (and this is, of course, investment under
what is considered to be the most stringent securities regime in the world).
In an interview, Laura Unger, an SEC commissioner who has been active in
the agency's activities regarding online trading, was asked and responded:
Interviewer: "For example, let's say I'm signing up for an account
with a brokerage firm, I don't have a job, and I want to trade away
the only $5,000 I have in the world-I can probably do that. Do you
think I should be able to?"
Unger: "I do think you should be able to. I wish you wouldn't but the
industry and the commission are not here to guarantee that everyone
is going to make money in the stock market. ,,40
1998 involved broker-dealer activities and not issuer disclosure or insider trading
cases, and the over 50,000 investor complaints to which the Agency responded,
recovering over $1 million, involved broker-dealer claims), formerly available at
http://www.sec.gov/annrep98/ar98main.htm; SEC, 1999 Annual Report 1-10, 140
(approximately half of what the Agency deemed "significant enforcement actions"
for 1999 involved broker-dealer activities and not issuer disclosure or insider trading
cases; by percentage, broker-dealer cases were 20% and newsletter cases were 6%,
compared to 18% for issuer/financial statement cases and 11 % for insider trading
cases; securities offering cases, which can involve both brokers and issuers were,
24%), available at http//www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep99/ar99full.pdf.
39 Palmiter, supra note 22, at 37.
40 Stacy Forster, The Cop: An SEC Commissioner Talks about the Challenges of
Battling Online Fraud, Wall St. J., June 12,2000, at R18. Palmiter further contends
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Such reasoning is equally applicable in the context of trading in foreign
securities. Indeed, quite apart from being ineffective, investor protection
regulation beyond minimal regime disclosure could communicate to
unsophisticated individuals the false impression that unscrupulous promoters
have been eliminated from the market, creating perverse, unintended
consequences of moral hazard, in which individuals adopt higher-risk
investment strategies because they believe that the regulatory apparatus
will protect them from possible loss.
Countries could restrict individuals' investment choices to securities
registered in domiciles with minimum regime content or enforcement
capacities, to protect the unsophisticated from unscrupulous promoters.
There are two severe and, in my judgment, fatal problems with such an
approach, compared to the regime disclosure requirement advocated here.
First, there is a substantial danger that such an approach would become, in
due course, a transnational regulatory regime with all the costs associated
with such a regime. National policies that restrict citizens' investments
to issuers registered under regimes with specified content are undesirable,
in short, because they provide an avenue for regulators to undermine
competition by specifying requirements that are not cost-effective for the
investors whose preferences under competition direct issuers' choice of
regime.
Second, successful crafting of adequate investment prohibitions would
be problematic. The regulator must determine what foreign investments
to prohibit and to whom the restrictions apply, classification choices that
will inevitably generate definitional problems of over- and under-inclusion.
In addition, because financial markets are dynamic, investment restrictions
will need frequent updating, or investment flexibility will be lost and
investors' returns will suffer. Experience confirms this concern, as the use
of investment prohibitions has not been a successful regulatory strategy. For
instance, U.S. states have abandoned restrictions on private trust and public
sector investments,41 and the performance of public funds operating under
that individual investors are not as unsophisticated or in need of protection as
proponents of regulation make out and that they are not systematically less capable
of prudential investments than intermediaries. Palmiter, supra note 22, at 18-20.
41 See John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust
Investing, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 641 (1996) (detailing change in state law regulating
private trusts from restricting specific investments to following general fiduciary
standards, as modern portfolio theory changed the concept of a suitable investment
by altering the conventional understanding of investment risk); Roberta Romano,
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investment restrictions that were difficult to amend has suffered.42 Moreover,
restricting investments to locally-regulated issues could create additional
problems, as legal lists can be employed for political purposes that can have
unintended adverse financial consequences: in the United States, for example,
some public pension funds that were directed to engage in socially responsible
investments favoring local investments experienced sizeable losses on those
investments.43
Undoubtedly, there is a cost to implementing a regime disclosure
requirement over regulators' use of investment prohibitions as the
mechanism of investor protection under regulatory competition: both the
gains and losses on investment strategies could be higher for unsophisticated
investors when their investment choices are not restricted by the government,
and they can end up purchasing a security registered under a regime that
facilitates fraud. But even when investors are limited to issues regulated by
the SEC, which is considered the most stringent securities regime in the
world today, they have not been immune to fraud. In truth, the SEC has not
eliminated, and it is questionable whether it or any government regulator ever
could eliminate, all investment fraud. In fact, in one of the most spectacular
contemporary fraud cases, the insurance Ponzi scheme undertaken by
Equitable Funding Corporation of America, the SEC ironically "repeatedly
missed opportunities to investigate Equity Funding" and instead sued the
investment analyst who uncovered the fraud for insider trading.44
A better solution to the problem of unsophisticated individuals' investing
in inappropriate financial instruments under regulatory competition than
Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 Colum. L.
Rev. 795, 800 (1993) (noting state approaches to public pension fund investments).
42 South Carolina prohibited public funds from investing in equity, and it was estimated
that its pension fund would have earned an additional $5 million per day between
1994 and 1997 had it been permitted to invest 40% of its assets in stocks, or $1 million
per day had the equity allocation been 10%. Susan Barreto, Lost Opportunities:
South Carolina Ends Long Day's Journey into Equity, Pensions & Investments, May
3, 1999, at 35. The South Carolina restriction was in the state constitution; similar
restrictions in other states were repealed prior to 1997 because, located in statutes,
they were undoubtedly easier to change.
43 Romano, supra note 41, at 803-08.
44 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 652 n.8 (1983). In particular, the analyst began
investigating Equity Funding in March 1973 on a tip from an insider and within
weeks verified and disclosed the fraud, leading to regulatory action against Equity
Funding and its bankruptcy filing. Yet "as early as 1971, the SEC had received
allegations of fraudulent accounting practices at Equity Funding," but failed to take
action or otherwise uncover the fraud. Id. at 650 n.3.
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enacting investment prohibitions is, in conjunction with the regime
disclosure approach, for national regulators to encourage those individuals,
through educational programs and information campaigns, to use the
expertise of financial intermediaries, such as by investing through mutual
funds, rather than to engage in their own stock-picking. Encouraging
individuals to use intermediaries not only will provide them with greater
investment opportunities than restricting their securities purchases to firms
registered under specific regimes, but also will place less of a burden on a
national regulator to monitor continuously and minutely the status of other
regimes to determine whether they are acceptable domiciles for citizens'
investments. It also will reduce the burden of domestic broker regulation,
which is an important component for enforcing the regime disclosure
requirements, as well as reduce the benefits to issuers of locating in deviant
regimes; for as individuals shift to institutional funds for their investment
vehicles, informed investors-intermediaries such as mutual funds-will be
the ones examining securities' regimes before their purchase. At the same
time, by not impeding the flow of firms under regulatory competition, it
will maximize the probability of those informed investors obtaining the
securities regime they prefer.
2. Litigation Rights
Another difficulty for investors under a competitive international regime is
the enforcement of individual legal rights against a firm whose securities'
domicile is not the state in which they are traded (that is, where the investor
resides).45 The question is where would the investorbe able to sue, for a lawsuit
prosecuted abroad is obviously more costly than a domestic one. V.S. investors
could, for instance, bring actions in V.S. courts, which would apply the foreign
domicile's law rather than the law of the forum. This is a disadvantage in that
V.S. judges will not be well-versed in another nation's law and the investors
will need legal counsel with foreign law expertise, which may be expensive if
there are not sufficient profits from bringing such suits domestically to induce
the creation of a specialized local bar. Of course, few federal judges are well
versed in domestic securities regulation, so this disadvantage can easily be
exaggerated. V .S. judges will, nonetheless, be better able to obtain and master
the relevant V.S. legal sources as opposed to foreign law.46
45 Government enforcement is less of a problem: eXlstmg agreements between
regulatory agencies, see, e.g., supra note 29, call for information sharing and
cooperation across agencies in enforcement actions, and there is no reason to expect
the abandonment of such arrangements in a competitive international regime.
46 There is a further disadvantage with local enforcement: it splits the legislative and
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In addition, if a firm has no other contacts in the United States besides
its listing, for such a lawsuit to proceed, the firm might have had to agree
to be sued in the United States.47 This is not a worrisome problem, however,
for it can be expected that foreign-domiciled firms selling shares in the United
States will contractually agree to such a requirement in their offering and
listing documents in order to induce U.S. investment. If there is sufficient
cause for concern that firms will not voluntarily contract to permit local
litigation, consent to service of process and personal jurisdiction, analogous
to the requirements in U.S. corporation codes that foreign firms wishing to do
judicial authority of the securities domicile, and this could limit the efficacy of
competition. Regulatory competition is most effective when these two functions are
under the same sovereign. Canada, for instance, has not developed vigorous charter
competition across its provinces in large part because the provincial governments
do not control the adjudication of corporate law disputes: securities administrators
of any province and the national Supreme Court share that authority with the
incorporation province. See Ronald J. Daniels, Should Provinces Compete? The
Case for a Competitive Corporate Law Market, 36 McGill LJ. 130, 182-84
(1991). This renders it impossible for a province to guarantee a responsive legal
regime to prospective incorporators, a key factor in U.S. charter competition, see
Romano, supra note 22, because other authorities can impose obligations on firms
countermanding provincial laws. Although under securities competition, the U.S.
courts would be applying foreign law and thus not directly in a position to impose
their own law, with less expertise than the relevant foreign court, they might issue
disparate rulings from those of the foreign adjudicator. This would have an adverse
affect not only on the litigants but also on other parties until the foreign sovereign
could act to reverse the U.S. court's action by legislation or by the fortuity of its
own court hearing a case posing the same issue. This potential difficulty would
be mitigated if U.S. courts were to certify the issue to the foreign court and the
latter were willing to accept the certification and promptly decide the legal issue.
In addition, in the international securities regulation setting, the cost advantage to
investors of litigating localIy may welI offset the potential cost to them of less
perfect competition from this action. But if this were not the cost-benefit calculation
made by the majority of investors, issuers could prevent a minority from bringing a
securities claim in a court located outside of the securities domicile by inclusion of a
forum selection clause in the corporate charter and securities purchasing agreements.
To the extent that the validity of such clauses is an issue in some legal systems,
the multilateral accord on regulatory competition should include a requirement that
national laws implementing the agreement instruct local courts to respect forum
selection clauses.
47 It is, however, quite plausible that the sale of a security would be sufficient under the
Supreme Court's "minimum contacts" doctrine to justify in personam jurisdiction
over a firm. For a general discussion of the jurisdictional question in corporate law,
see, e.g., Harry G. Henn & John R. Alexander, Laws of Corporations 209-14 (3d
ed. 1983).
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business in a state must designate a local agent for service of process,48 could
similarly be mandated by the treaties and conforming legislation establishing
mutual recognition of securities domicile.
Issues regarding litigation rights against foreign-domiciled firms should
be similarly resolvable in other countries. If they are not, it could limit the
effectiveness of international competition, as firms might have to select the
listing site as their domicile to satisfy the concerns of such nations' investors
over litigation rights. But because securities litigation is far less pervasive
and recoveries are smaller outside of the United States, litigation rights are
less likely to be a significant issue for investors elsewhere.
Given the difficulties of enforcing litigation rights cross-border, a superior
approach to liability issues, were regulatory competition to become firmly
established internationally, would be the development of a specialized system
of international securities arbitration substituting for securities lawsuits.
This is not a novel idea. In international business transactions, arbitration
is already the dominant mechanism of dispute-resolution. Arbitration
eliminates problems surrounding litigation rights, and it comes with a further
important advantage: arbitration judgments are more readily enforceable
internationally than those of courts, because virtually all nations have
signed the international convention recognizing arbitration awards, while
there is no such global treaty on the enforcement of judgments.49 For
arbitration to replace securities litigation on a global level, however, other
nations would have to follow a policy similar to that enacted by Congress
and endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court that explicitly permits the use
of arbitration to resolve securities disputes.5o In addition, some features of
U.S. securities litigation practices might need to be adapted to the arbitration
process for it to be an adequate substitute for litigation, such as the use of
representative actions, because despite the lower cost of arbitration compared
to litigation, the profitability in most securities lawsuits comes from the ability
of an attorney to aggregate claims. But since it is not clear-cut whether under
present rules, arbitration or litigation would be preferred by most investors, the
48 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 371 (2001) (in order to qualify to do business
in the state, a foreign corporation must designate a registered agent in the state to
accept service of process).
49 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Litigation and Arbitration 332 (1993).
50 For the change in U.S. doctrine resulting in validation of arbitration clauses to
resolve securities law disputes, see Rodriguez v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987);
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. 427 (1953).
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most appropriate mechanism for ensuring the availability of litigation rights
under regulatory competition is to require instead, in the international accords
adopting the competitive regime, all states to recognize forum selection
clauses, including those selecting arbitration over litigation, for the resolution
of private securities disputes.
3. Investor Approval ofMidstream Regime Changes
A final potential concern for investors under competition might be that after
they acquire their securities, the firm changes its securities domicile, to
their disadvantage, such as by moving to a regime with a lower level of
required disclosure. The concern is that if the change was not anticipated
at the time of the stock purchase, the price the investor will have paid for
the shares will not reflect the firm's lower value under the new regime, and
opportunistic insiders can thereby change domicile and transfer wealth from
investors to themselves. This is not, however, a severe problem. Because
investors will be aware that a domicile change can be effected midstream,
they will discount the shares for the potential opportunism, and hence
management will bear the COSt.51 Indeed, management will have an interest
in guaranteeing that they do not engage in subsequent opportunistic behavior
regarding domicile, in order to lower the cost of capital when they issue
shares. Moreover, appropriately structured incentive compensation aligns
managers' and shareholders' interests, reducing further the benefit from such
opportunistic behavior. In this regard, one study found that the extent of
firms' discretionary disclosure policies is positively related to the proportion
of salary received in stock by the chief executive officer.52
Besides relying on management's self-interest to draft securities contracts
that restrict any subsequent domicile change or on stock-based incentive
compensation to align management's and shareholders' regime choices,
the potential for midstream opportunism can be mitigated by requiring
shareholder voting approval before a domicile change is effected as
a condition of mutual recognition under the treaties establishing the
51 For evidence that shares subject to opportunism have lower values, see infra text
accompanying notes 65-66.
52 See Venky Nagar et aI., Compensation Policy and Discretionary Disclosure
20-21, 23-24 (2000) (frequency of voluntary earnings forecasts and analyst
ratings of disclosure quality, controIling for other determinants of disclosure,
are significantly positively correlated with proportion of CEO compensation
dependent upon stock prices, and concluding this evidences optimal contracting
between shareholders and managers), at SSRN Electronic Paper Collection,
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=224143.
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competitive international regime.53 Managers would therefore not be able
to switch to a regime with a lower level of disclosure unless their investors
prefer such a regime and vote for the move, which would be compelling
evidence that the regime shift did not adversely affect them. Although such a
voting requirement may not be necessary to protect investors from midstream
regime changes adverse to their interest--competing regulators would include
such a voting requirement in their regimes if it were desired by issuers and
investors, or individual issuers' corporate documents would contain such
a requirement-its inclusion in treaties establishing securities regulation
competition could make policymakers who are unfamiliar with regulatory
competition because they do not operate in a federal system more comfortable
with the proposed regime change.
Some commentators contend that shareholder voting is not an effective
safeguard against insider opportunism because an individual shareholder's
cost of becoming informed in order to vote his or her interest outweighs
the pro-rata benefit he or she will receive from a correct outcome.54
As I discussed in my prior article, with respect to the United States, this
contention is erroneous.55 In a capital market dominated by institutional
investors holding portfolios of stock, issues are repeatedly raised across
the investors' portfolio firms, reducing the information cost significantly for
anyone vote. Moreover, organizations have developed in the United States
that provide institutional investors with considerable information regarding
how to vote on proxy issues, such as Institutional Shareholder Services and
the Investor Responsibility Research Center, further reducing the cost of
becoming an informed voter. In addition, many institutions have websites
publicizing how they vote their shares, and some even encourage use of their
sites to facilitate individual shareholder participation in an activist agenda.56
53 My proposal for regulatory competitIOn in the United States includes such a
requirement. See Romano, supra note 2, at 2415-16.
54 See. e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure ofCorporate Law, 89 Colum.
L. Rev. 1549, 1575 (1989).
55 Romano, supra note 2, at 2416, 2416 n.181.
56 See New Websites Post Proxy Voting Activity, 10 IRRC Corp. Governance Highlights
65 (Apr. 16, 1999) (Domini Social Investments, a socially responsible investment
fund, is posting how its Equity Fund has voted shares in its 400 firms, as well as
adding an investor activism center with information on social issue proxy proposals
and permitting e-mail to CEOs of targeted firms); Steve Hemmerick, Internet Helps
Link Shareholders, Pensions & Investments, July 27, 1998, at 3 (discussing how
networking on the Internet has linked individual and institutional shareholders
on corporate governance issues). Large organizations with websites detailing their
corporate governance activities include the California Public Employees Retirement
System (CaIPERS), the AFL-CIO, and the Council of Institutional Investors, an
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Hence, as with the initial domicile choice, in the absence ofbifurcated investor
markets, less-informed individual shareholders will be protected by informed
voters.
Shareholder activism surrounding the voting process is more developed
in the United States than in other countries where there are fewer
institutional investors, particularly pension funds, which are the most
activist institutions in the United States. This suggests that voting rights
may be a weaker protection for non-U.S. investors against opportunism.
But there are trends indicating that shareholder voting is developing in
other countries, approaching that of the United States.57 In particular, U.S.
institutions are investors in many non-U.S. firms, and the leading activist
investors among U.S. institutions have adopted global corporate governance
guidelines, mirroring for foreign firms their policies toward U.S. firms. 58
Indeed, shareholder activism in the EU has increased in direct conjunction
with U.S. institutions' greater equity investments.59 But U.S. institutions are
not the only active investors. The major pension funds from around the
world created the International Corporate Governance Network, which has
met annually for several years to devise global governance standards and
develop governance strategies of concern to institutional investors.60 These
activities are beginning to have an impact: shareholder proposals at non-U.S.
firms have increased in recent years.61 Moreover, non-U.S. firms have started
to respond to these developments: some Japanese firms, for instance, have
scheduled their annual meetings on a date different from all other firms and
organization of public and private pension funds that serves as a clearinghouse for
the funds' corporate governance activities.
57 For a view that the Gennan system will evolve toward a proxy-voting system
similar to that in the United States with the adoption of registered shares by major
companies, see Gregor Bachmann, Registered Shares, Proxy Voting, and German
Corporate Governance, 53 Wertpapiennitteilungen 2100 (Oct. 1999), abstracted on
Legal Scholarship Network, Corporate Law Abstracts, 2(8) Fin. & Corp. Gov. L.
Accepted Paper Series (June 16,2000).
58 See TlAA-CREF Follows CalPERS Lead to Adopt Global Guidelines, XVIII IRRC
Corp. Governance Bull. Feb.-Apr. 2000, at 23.
59 See, e.g., Steve Hemmerick, CalPERS Takes New Active Role in U.K., Pensions &
Investments, Jan. 12, 1998, at 2.
60 Carolyn Brancato & Michael Price, The Institutional Investor sGoals for Corporate
Law in the Twenty-First Century, 25 Del. J. Corp. L. 35,68-69 (2000) (comment of
Dr. Carolyn Brancato of the Conference Board).
61 Decline in Capital Proposals, Continued Increase in Other Proposals Mark Global
Proxy Season 2000, XVIII IRRC Corp. Governance Bull., May-July 2000, at 13.
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have moved toward better disclosure of executive compensation, in order to
stem institutional investors' voting protests over those issues.62
It is altogether possible, if not probable, that shareholder activism and
the exercise of voting rights are less developed outside of the United
States because in other countries, the level of shareholder rights is lower
than in the United States. In such circumstances, while voting may not
provide significant protection against midstream opportunism, the shares
will already be steeply discounted and opportunism over the choice of
securities domicile would be a far less important concern than more direct
forms of expropriation under corporate law, illustrated by some nations'
courts' apparent lack of scrutiny of controlling shareholders' self-dealing
transactions in corporate assets.63 Indeed, in addition to the lower level of
shareholder rights in many countries other than the United States and United
Kingdom, in those nations a substantial number of publicly traded firms have
controlling shareholders unlike their U.S. and U.K. counterparts.64
To the extent that the presence of controlling shareholders makes
opportunism regarding a change in securities domicile to the minority's
detriment more probable, this is no different from the higher probability of
expropriation of a minority by such shareholders under existing domestic
corporate and securities law. Similarly, the potential for such opportunistic
behavior will be impounded in the stock price. There is, in fact, suggestive
evidence that shares trade at a substantial discount in the presence of
controlling shareholders and the absence of legal protections for the minority,
with significant variations in the discount across countries depending upon
the legal opportunities for self-dealing. For instance, the difference in price
of the low- or non-voting shares in dual class stock firms compared to
the voting shares is substantially larger in countries that provide less legal
protection for the minority shareholders (countries where the private benefits
of control are large).65 In addition, firms in countries with greater shareholder
62 Japan's Proxy Marathon 2000 Shows Hints of a Sea Change, XVlII IRRC Corp.
Governance Bull., May-July 2000, at 17.
63 See, e.g., Simon Johnson et aI., Tunnelling, 90 Am. Econ. Rev. 22 (2000) (describing
various forms of permissible expropriation by controlling shareholders in the EU).
64 See Rafael La Porta et aI., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. Fin. 471,
491-95 (1999).
65 See Luigi Zingales, The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock
Exchange Experience, 7 Rev. Fin. Stud. 125, 125-26 (1994) (the premium on
voting shares of dual-class firms in Italy is over 80%, compared to premia of
5%-20% in the U.S., England, Canada, Sweden, and Switzerland, and the difference
is due to higher benefit of private control in Italy, that is, to greater ability of
controlling shareholders to dilute minority property rights); Tatiana Nenova, The
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protection trade in deeper capital markets and therefore have better access to
external finance. 66
The possibility of benefiting from minority expropriation (by, for instance,
receipt of non pro-rata distributions) distinguishes controlling shareholders
from institutional investors, whose presence protects individual investors
regarding regime choice because institutional and individual investors share
cash flows equally. Controlling shareholders' initial and midstream regime
choices may therefore not be the same as those of institutions: they may
prefer to trade-off greater secrecy against the price received for shares
sold to the public since they obtain benefits from the firm independent of
cash dividends. This difference would be eliminated if controlling shares
were excluded from the domicile vote, as the securities domicile would
then be selected according to the preferences of outside shareholders. But
there are two reasons for not mandating such an approach. First, a domicile
voting rule excluding controlling shares would, in all likelihood, not be a
feasible requirement for an international accord on securities competition,
given the political influence controlling shareholders are likely to wield in
the many countries in which group control is the predominant corporate
ownership structure. Second, individual investors are not likely to be harmed
by the difference in securities regime choice made between controlling
shareholders and institutions, because stock prices will be discounted for
the insiders' choices, just as prices are presently discounted according to the
opportunity for insiders to obtain private benefits under existing corporate
and securities laws. Since the controlling shareholders bear the cost of
potential opportunism, they could, if they wish to increase the price paid for
public shares, seek to commit to not changing domicile opportunistically,
by placing in their charter a supermajority domicile voting rule, locked-in
by a supermajority vote for repeal, or by otherwise contracting to vote their
shares in proportion with the votes of outside shareholders.
Value of Corporate Votes and Control Benefits: A Cross-country Analysis (Harvard
Univ. Mimeo, Sept. 2000), available at SSRN Electronic Paper Collection, http://
papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstracUd=237809 (estimated value of control
for 661 dual-class stock firms in eighteen countries, based on model of predicted
takeover premia, ranges from 0% to 50%, and 75% of cross-country difference is
explained by quality of minority investor protection). See also Andrei Shleifer &
Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. Fin. 737, 748 (1997)
(collecting studies indicating dramatic differences in average voting premia across
countries).
66 Rafael La Porta et aI., Legal Determinants ofExternal Finance, 52 J. Fin. 1131 (1997)
(across forty-nine countries, firms in nations with greater shareholder protections
have better access to external finance, i.e., capital markets are larger and deeper).
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To the extent that either supermajority charter provisions are not
permissible or voting agreements are not enforceable in particular countries,
controlling shareholders would not be able to commit to only value-
enhancing domicile shifts. Although the public would not bear the cost
of opportunism over domicile changes in this situation, there would be a
welfare loss, as both sets of shareholders would be better off if commitment
were possible and share prices were higher. However, if the politically
influential controlling shareholders have a preference for commitment
devices that are not achievable under domestic corporate law, they could
lobby their governments either to sign treaties with provisions that facilitate
pre-commitment strategies, such as excluding controlling shares from voting
on domicile changes, or to revise domestic law to enable the use of effective
commitment devices.
Voting is not a foolproof protective mechanism against a midstream
domicile change, whether or not there are controlling shareholders. But
voting approval of domicile changes is undoubtedly preferable to the
alternative of prohibiting midstream changes in a firm's securities domicile.
Prohibition has obvious disadvantages, for as business conditions change, so
do firms' needs, and an initial domicile choice may no longer be the optimal
regime. Moreover, unless firms can choose a different regime for each
security issue to circumvent the prohibition of a domicile change, an option
that could unduly complicate the regulatory regime, such a prohibition
will seriously undermine the efficacy of regulatory competition. This is
because such a restriction reduces the type of firms available to influence
transaction flows across regimes to only newly-traded firms and thereby
greatly attenuates regulators' incentives to adapt their regimes in response
to investor preferences (the number of firms they could attract by being
responsive would be small).
III. CRITICISMS OF REGULATORY COMPETmON
Critics of competition in securities regulation often blur the true issue by
referring to their position not as a defense of a single regulator but as a defense
of mandatory disclosure, on what is, in my judgment, a fantastic premise,
that there would be no significant disclosure component in a competitive
international regime. Objections to competition have, accordingly, often been
inseparably intertwined with a defense of the SEC's mandatory disclosure
regime. In order to promote the goal of achieving regulatory competition,
this Part therefore addresses the efficacy of the SEC's regime.
The two principal rationales that have been offered against regulatory
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competition and in defense of the SEC's monopoly over U.S. issuers (as
well as over foreign firms selling shares in the United States) are that
there are significant interfirm externalities regarding information, such that
investors will not want their firms to disclose the socially optimal amount,
and that choice of regime will result in a "race to the bottom" with minimal
or no disclosure. At the time of the enactment of the federal securities laws
in the 1930s, there was a further argument for regulation at the national
level: concern that fraud could not be prosecuted across state lines.67 This
concern is not relevant under modem long-arm jurisdictional doctrines, and
there is a pattern of well-established cooperation in enforcement actions by
state authorities; correspondingly, it has not been the focus of critiques of
regulatory competition and is not discussed in this article.68
Among critics of regulatory competition, Merritt Fox has most strenuously
questioned the proposal I advanced to open up U.S. securities regulation to
competition.69 Fox emphasizes the interfirm externalities rationale for a single
regulator. The race-to-the-bottom rationale endorsed by advocates of the SEC
regime70 is in essence a restatement ofthe view ofcompetition, advanced most
67 See Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure
System, 9 J. Corp. L. 1,21 (1983).
68 For a discussion of the antifraud rationale for the SEC and the data regarding the
SEC and investor protection against securities fraud, in relation to the need for
retention of a single regulator in the United States, see Romano, supra note 2, at
2368-69,2381-83.
69 See Fox, supra note 3; Fox, supra note 13.
70 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 3, at 1233-36; Fox, supra note 13, at 2626-27 (contending
that nations competing for securities transactions will engage in a race-to-the-
bottom due to political pressures to reduce disclosure); Fox, supra note 3, at 1410
(contending that under competition managers will choose "as Iowa level of periodic
disclosure as possible"); Joel P. Trachtman, Regulatory Competition and Regulatory
Jurisdiction in International Securities Regulation, in Regulatory Competition and
Economic Integration 289 (Daniel C. Esty ed., 2001) ("under [competition] some
state, such as the Cayman Islands or Mongolia, would move to the reductio ad
minimum: imposing no substantive obligations"), available at SSRN Electronic
Paper Collection, http://papers2.ssrn.comlpaper.taf?ABSTRACT_ID=193688. In
addition to his express "race to the bottom" criticism of regulatory competition
regarding managers' "self-interested" behavior quoted above, which he maintains
will not be checked by investors, Fox, supra note 3, at 1411, Fox's externalities
argument entails a "race-to-the-bottom" form of objection to competition because
his rationale for regulation is that issuers disclose less than the optimal level
and therefore competing regulators who are responsive to issuers will necessarily
reduce the level of mandated disclosure, beyond what they would otherwise require.
Merritt Fox, The Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in
a Globalizing Market for Securities, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 696, 796 (1997) ("given the
preferences of the persons making these choices [choices of securities regime under
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prominently by William Cary, to describe Delaware's dominance in U.S.
corporate law, as a "race to the bottom" in which managers select regimes
that facilitate their exploitation of shareholders.71 Both of these objections
to regulatory competition-the importance of interfirm externalities and a
race to the bottom over disclosure policy-were addressed briefly in my
prior article.72 Fox thereafter published a lengthy article in criticism of the
arguments in my article that questioned the information disclosure rationale
for a single regulator. This Part responds in detail to Fox's critique, as well
as to critics espousing the race-to-the-bottom characterization ofcompetition,
demonstrating that the case for a single regulator is deeply problematic.
A. The Information Failure Rationale for a Single Regulator
The conventional economic explanation for governmental intervention in
the allocation by markets of goods and services concerns conditions under
which market pricing will not produce the optimal output because the
product's marginal cost and benefit cannot be properly equated by private
parties. These cases include the presence of externalities, where costs and
benefits accrue to parties other than the contracting parties and thus are
not internalized or priced in a market transaction, and public goods, whose
marginal cost of production is zero and hence the value to additional users
is not captured by the producer under the pricing mechanism of a market.
Firm information used in investment decisions has often been
characterized as a public good, although whether it is under- or overproduced
is subject to debate. The conventional public goods analysis suggests
that information about a security will be under-produced by the issuer,73
but because sizeable trading gains can be captured by the first person to
discover private information about a firm, such information may instead
be overproduced.74 Both explanations can be used to advocate government
regulatory competition] issuers will generally choose regimes requiring a lower than
socially optimal level of disclosure").
71 See William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
Yale LJ. 663 (1974).
72 Romano, supra note 2, at 2368, 2374-75, 2380-81, 2420-21.
73 See William H. Beaver, The Nature of Mandated Disclosure, Report of the Advisory
Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the SEC, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
74 See Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward
to Inventive Activity, 61 Am. Econ. Rev. 561, 565-66 (1971).
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intervention to mandate disclosure at the optimal level, but supporters of
securities regulation typically rely on the underproduction rationale.75
It is, in fact, implausible that there would be a significant underproduction
of firm information in the absence of a single securities regulator, that
is, under a competitive regime in which firms have a choice among
disclosure regimes. Firms have a strong incentive to distinguish themselves
by providing information about their projects to obtain capital. Firms with
unfavorable information also are forced to disclose information about their
projects, because an adverse signal will be drawn by investors concerning
firms that do not disclose information (no news is bad news).76 Fostering this
phenomenon is the principle of conservatism in accounting: the preference of
accountants to "require a higher degree ofverification to recognize good news
as gains than to recognize bad news as losses. 1177 This preference is not simply
one held by regulators but also a preference of market participants: a study
of departures from U.S. accounting standards in private debt covenants, for
instance, reports that all such departures were conservative.78
The signaling hypothesis regarding information disclosure is a plausible
scenario in today's capital markets in which the majority of investors
are sophisticated institutional investors. Despite varying assumptions, the
formal models of the disclosure that is made in signaling equilibria conclude
that information will not be under-produced if a sufficient number of
investors understand the significance of nondisclosure.79 It is therefore
theoretically difficult for advocates of mandated disclosure to maintain their
normative claims, as they cannot advance a supportive formal model. They
75 E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 Va. L. Rev. 717 (1984).
76 The classic signaling model of securities disclosure is Stephen A. Ross, Disclosure
Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications of Modem Finance Theory and
Signaling Theory, in Key Issues in Financial Regulation 177, 185-89, 213 (Franklin
Edwards ed., 1979).
77 Sudipta Basu, The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of
Earnings, 24 J. Acct. & Econ. 3, 7 (1997). Basu provides empirical support
for this view of the effect of conservatism in tests of the relation between stock
returns and earnings, which indicate that firms' earnings reflect bad news more
quickly than good news.
78 Richard Leftwich, Accounting Information in Private Markets: Evidence from
Private Lending Agreements, 58 Acct. Rev. 23 (1983).
79 See, e.g., Ronald A. Dye, Investor Sophistication and Voluntary Disclosures, 3 Rev.
Acct. Stud. 261 (1998); Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Mandatory
vs. Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers
(Kellogg Graduate Sch. of Mgmt. Working Paper No. 233, Aug. 1999).
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can, however, seek to revive their position empirically, by disputing whether
there will be a sufficient number of investors who will interpret silence as
indicative of adverse information for a signaling equilibrium to emerge. But
this line of analysis is not terribly promising either, because it is not a credible
contention in today's institutional marketplace. Hence, the underproduction
of information rationale for securities regulation does not provide a reason for
opposing the introduction of regulatory competition.
In contrast to other defenders of the status quo in securities regulation,
Fox, in his critique of my position, does not rely on the conventional public
goods rationale to advocate the need for a single regulator. Rather, he adopts
the position suggested by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, which is
an information failure with a twist. If there is a problem regarding the
voluntary production of information about securities, in this perspective
it does not concern information of interest to the firm's investors-that
information will be optimally produced by the firm voluntarily-but, rather,
concerns information that is of value to third parties not investing in the
firm: the firms' competitors.8o Fox maintains that social welfare requires the
disclosure of such information; his premise is that the lower welfare of the
disclosing firms and their investors is offset by the increased welfare of the
disclosing firms' competitors. Because disclosure is unambiguously bad for
the disclosing entity in this scenario, firms will not voluntarily disclose such
information and there is a market failure calling for government intervention.
Although Easterbrook and Fischel were the first to offer the third-
party externality rationale for federal securities regulation,· in contrast
to Fox, they are, in fact, agnostic concerning the efficacy of the SEC's
mandatory disclosure regime. In particular, they, as do I, find the empirical
data more damaging to the sEe81 than Fox does. In addition, they put
forth the third-party externalities argument more as an aside and a possible
explanation for the U.S. status quo, among other explanations,82 whereas Fox
80 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate
Law 290-91 (1991).
81 Id. at 314.
82 It should also be noted that a key factor underlying Easterbrook and Fischel's
thesis was the belief that a competitive regime could not resolve jurisdictional
problems such that only one state's rules would govern a firm's disclosures, as
is true of a firm's "internal affairs" (the statutory domicile approach of corporate
law). Their concern here appears, however, to be different from Fox's regarding
the disclosure of information to rivals: they fear interstate exploitation without a
national regime. Namely, in their example, an investor in a firm incorporated under
an efficient disclosure regime of state D sues in her home state N for the firm's
noncompliance with N's inefficient disclosure rules, and state N can thus extract
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rejects other explanations and uses interfirm externalities as a centerpiece
to develop a proposal regarding the appropriate regime for international
securities regulation that would lessen the scope of the SEC's jurisdiction
over foreign issuers, by allocating jurisdiction to the regulator of the issuer's
physical domicile, rather than the listing site.
B. Why the Information Failure Rationale Does Not Make for a
Successful Case against Regulatory Competition
Fox adopts Easterbrook and Fischel's rationale for the SEC's monopoly
over U.S. issuer regulation, but without the caveats they raise concerning
its persuasiveness. He maintains that the presence of significant interfirm
externalities regarding information about a firm's projects requires the
SEC's mandatory disclosure regime and that disclosure of such information
cannot be duplicated by a competitive regime. I noted three objections
to this contention in my prior article, which Fox found inadequate.83 I
therefore elaborate upon them here. First, theoretically, the presence of such
externalities does not render a mandatory regime optimal, compared to a
voluntary regime. Second, in practice, a majority of investors hold diversified
portfolios and will, in contrast to issuers, therefore be able to internalize
the externalities with which Fox is concerned, such that a single regulator
regime will not clearly dominate multiple regulators. Third, even if there
were a theoretical basis for advocating a mandatory disclosure regime due
to interfirm externalities, this does not mean that such a regime could be
effectively implemented. There is no evidence that the information the SEC
requires is of the substantive sort that Fox envisions is significant for rivals'
competitive position, and there are highly suggestive data that the SEC, in
fact, does not require the disclosure of such information.
a wealth transfer for its citizens from the firm's investors in the other forty-nine
states. /d. at 301-02. If, as an effective competitive securities regime requires, a sole
securities statutory domicile is recognized, this objection concerning the possibility
of interstate exploitation under competition disappears. It is somewhat puzzling but
not a complete surprise that Easterbrook and Fischel did not consider this simple
solution to their hypothetical problem-the possibility of changing the choice-of-Iaw
rule for securities transactions. The overarching concern motivating their book was
to rationalize the existing regime where possible, and as I discussed in my earlier
article, it would most likely require an act of Congress to implement securities
regulation competition and change the jurisdictional rule, see Romano, supra note
2, at 2411, action that would undoubtedly encounter substantial political resistance
by state securities regulators and the plaintiff's bar, as well as the SEC.
83 E.g., Fox, supra note 3, at 23 ("Romano does not explain her assertion").
HeinOnline -- 2 Theoretical Inq. L. 421 2001
2001] The Need/or Competition in International Securities Regulation 421
1. Does the Presence of Interfirm Externalities Require Mandatory
Disclosure?
Ronald Dye has modeled the policy choice between voluntary and mandatory
disclosure in the presence of interfirm externalities, precisely the context
motivating Fox's (and Easterbrook and Fischel's) theory of securities
regulation.84 The model indicates that mandatory disclosure is not always
superior to voluntary disclosure and would, in fact, be difficult for a regulator
to implement optimally. It thus is a serious challenge to the persuasiveness
of Fox's position. I referred briefly to Dye's model in questioning Fox's
position in my prior article, and Fox thereafter spent considerable time and
effort critiquing the model. Fox's objections to Dye's model are, however,
insubstantial. In addition, a more recent model by Anat Admati and Paul
Pfleiderer of disclosure policy in the presence of interfirm externalities avoids
several of Fox's criticisms ofthe limitations of Dye's model, but has the same
key result, namely, that mandatory disclosure regulation does not always
improve social welfare.85
a. Dye s model of optimal disclosure policy in the presence of interfirm
externalities. Dye's model distills the choice of disclosure policy to the
following simple timeline: the insider manager or entrepreneur chooses a
disclosure regime, which is stylized as a revelation of the entrepreneur's
estimate of the precision (which is the reciprocal of the variance) of the
firm's expected cash flow; and next the estimate of the firm's expected cash
flow is revealed and the firm is sold to investors, who then receive the
realized cash flow. Thus, it is a single-period model in which investors do
not obtain information on their own.
Within this setup, Dye considers two types of externalities: financial
externalities, where the disclosing firm's information affects solely investor
perceptions of the value of other firms; and real externalities, where the
disclosed information affects actual value (that is, the cash flows) of other
firms. The latter type of externalities is the sort of information emphasized
by Fox as requiring regulatory intervention. The model has the following
results. When externalities are financial, voluntary disclosure and optimal
mandated disclosures virtually always coincide; when externalities are real,
84 Ronald A. Dye, Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosures: The Cases of Financial
and Real Externalities, 65 Acct. Rev. I (1990).
85 Anat Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure
Regulation and Externalities, 13 Rev. Fin. Stud. 479 (2000).
HeinOnline -- 2 Theoretical Inq. L. 422 2001
422 Theoretical Inquiries in Law [Vol. 2:387
however, there is a divergence in firms' disclosure under a mandatory
compared to a voluntary regime.86
The nature of the divergence depends upon the relation across firms'
returns (that is, upon how the specified disclosure affects the returns of
other firms as well as that of the disclosing firm). If the firm's private return
from a disclosure is negative and the market-wide return (the return to other
firms) is positive, then mandatory rules increase disclosure; if the situation
is reversed and the firm's private return is positive while the market-wide
return is negative, then there is greater disclosure under a voluntary regime.87
For a mandatory disclosure regime to produce the optimal disclosure level, a
regulator must possess a priori knowledge of the relation between private and
market returns concerning specified disclosures. In fact, this is information a
government regulator cannot possibly know at the time its disclosure policy
is established. The point of this extensive discussion of Dye's model is that
it makes plain a serious analytical flaw in Fox's normative position: it is
not theoretically unambiguous, as Fox maintains, that in the presence of
interfirm externalities, a mandatory disclosure regime will improve social
welfare.88
Fox does not question the specific results of Dye's model; they follow
from the setup of the model. Fox instead criticizes the realism of the model
on a number of dimensions and thus its relevance for policy analysis. Of
course, all models abstract from reality and are therefore unrealistic on
some dimension; that is why they are called models. The relevant question
is whether the model has abstracted away crucial institutional elements to
render the analysis uninformative or misleading.
b. Is Dye's model's timeline an accurate representation ofsecurities sales
and the selection ofa disclosure policy? Dye's model adopts the following
timeline of events: the entrepreneur selects a disclosure policy before he has
complete information about the value of the firm and before he sells shares to
investors. Fox objects to this timing of disclosure as unrealistic.89 Selecting
a disclosure policy prior to the receipt of information about the firm and the
sale of securities is, however, quite consistent with the operation of securities
markets. As Dye notes, in the real world, firms commit to a disclosure regime,
86 Dye, supra note 84, at 15, 18-19.
87 [d. at 18-19.
88 It should be noted that whether a competitive regime would approximate voluntary
or mandatory disclosure levels is not patently obvious, despite Fox's clear opinion
regarding the former; this depends on investor preferences, as discussed in infra
Part III.B.2.
89 Fox, supra note 3, at 1347-49.
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which includes a commitment to making subsequent disclosures, before they
have the information that will subsequently be disclosed about them;90 this
occurs in the decision to list on a particular stock exchange or to go public and
be subject to the SEC's continuous disclosure regime (or under the proposed
competitive securities regulation approach, in the choice of regulator). This
decision is made before specific information about the firm is known; it cannot
be otherwise, because the firm is an ongoing entity that continues to operate
after the disclosure regime is chosen.
A concrete example of the stickiness of accounting policy choices that
indicates the aptness of the model's structure of a disclosure choice
as a pre-commitment device involves the selection of the frequency of
segment reporting. Over the past decade, once firms decided to disclose
segment data on a quarterly basis, which was a voluntary disclosure
because such reporting was mandated only on an annual basis, they
continued to do so and did not abandon the practice.91 In addition,
accounting rules typically require consistency over time, whereby once a
firm has committed to specified disclosures, it is prevented from changing
that disclosure, despite receipt of new information concerning operations that
might render it desirable to alter the information being provided to investors.
Again, segment accounting provides an illustration: the original segment
accounting rule required consistency in segment definition, such that once
a firm committed itself to a specific set of segment disclosures, it could not
alter its segment reporting based on new information rendering a different
definition desirable.92
In addition, presale disclosure is, of course, precisely what happens in
the real world of equity investments: in an IPO, investors do not buy shares
prior to receiving information about the firm (whether there is an SEC
mandating such disclosure prior to purchase or not). Indeed, whenever an
investor buys a security, the purchase is made, and the price is set, on the
basis of existing information about the firm and knowledge of what its
future disclosure policy will be, not on the basis of the specific content
90 See Dye, supra note 84, at 5.
9! See Christine A. Botosan & Mary S. Harris, Motivations for Changes in Disclosure
Frequency and its Consequences: An Examination of Voluntary Quarterly Segment
Disclosures, 38 J. Acct. Res. 329 (2000).
92 See Financial Accounting Standards Bd., Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 14: Financial Reporting for Segments of a Business Enterprise
(1975). As discussed at infra note 444, this rule was changed to require segment
reporting that was consistent with internal evaluations, which eliminated the need
to require time-consistent definitions.
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of future disclosures. It cannot, of course, be otherwise; neither insiders
nor investors are clairvoyant or omniscient. Fox cannot truly object to this
timeline construction.
However, to demonstrate that Dye's assumption on disclosure occurring
before a sale is unrealistic, Fox states that before an issuer goes public, it has
no reason to disclose any information.93 This claim completely misses the
mark. The sale of a security is not simultaneous with information disclosure:
investors decide to purchase shares after receiving information about a firm.
This is the very timeline of decision-making in the model. The firm makes a
decision regarding disclosure in the model because it has decided to sell shares.
Thus, Fox's objection to modeling disclosure occurring before sale because
a firm would not make disclosures before it sells shares is misplaced. Once
the firm is going to sell shares, it will adopt some form of disclosure before
the sale is undertaken. If Fox is correct and a firm does not disclose any
information at all, including information about future disclosure policies, it
could not induce investors to purchase its securities at a price at which the
owner would be willing to sell, because such securities would have little
value to outside investors. Fox is correct that a firm that has no intention of
seeking outside investors will, in all likelihood, not disclose any information;
but such a firm is not in the universe of firms of interest to the model or to
anyone thinking seriously about securities regulation.
Either recognizing that his objection is a nonstarter or arguing in the
alternative, Fox next states that if a firm does disclose information before
selling shares, there can be no commitment to a truthful disclosure policy
if the manager does not know the content of disclosure to be made under
the policy, and hence the model is still unrealistic.94 This, of course, is an
admission that dispenses with the objection that Fox had previously made
regarding the realism of the model's timeline with respect to disclosure and
sale. But this new objection is also a groundless objection. The mechanism of
commitment is not technically necessary for Dye to analyze further, because in
his model, there is no private information-after the entrepreneur's disclosure
policy is chosen, he reveals the information and the information is public,
commonly known to both the entrepreneur and investors, so there is no
truthfulness problem.
Dye uses the convention of public information to be able to investigate
the disclosure policy choice in the simplest setting, eliminating the need
to model a more complicated signaling game.95 As Dye notes and as I
93 Fox, supra note 3, at 1348.
94 ld.
95 The Admati-Ptleiderer model of third-party effects, discussed in infra Part I1I.B.I.e.,
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have already mentioned, the signaling literature shows that firms have an
incentive to disclose truthful information to avoid adverse selection problems,
so abstracting away the possibility of inside information is not a serious
limitation, because retaining it does not raise an interesting modeling issue.
Dye's setup is comparable to a disclosure policy choice, which firms make all
the time, such as their selection of an accounting rule that will be applied over
the years of the firm's financial reporting in the future, without knowing what
the actual financial results will be when the rule is applied.
Given that he questions the model's assumption regarding the
entrepreneur's ability to commit, rather than its lack of signaling
capacity, Fox's objection to Dye's setup implies that in the absence of a
mandatory disclosure regime, commitment to truthful subsequent disclosure
is impossible and firms will make false statements with impunity. Assuming
that a mandatory disclosure regime is equivalent to a rule against fraud is not
only incorrect but it begs the entire question of interest in the model: What
is the appropriate disclosure regime when interfirm externalities are present?
More important, the assumption of the unavailability of commitment and
the identification of mandatory disclosure with an antifraud regime does
not comport with any world in which we can imagine investors transacting.
In all the states of the worlds in which one would model stock purchases,
there will be a rule against fraud and hence there will be a mechanism for
commitment regarding the accuracy of disclosed information prior to the
specific disclosure.
In Fox's setup, firms disclose information and are sued if the information
they provide is false; but this is not the only possibility regarding disclosure
practices. Firms can also commit to following specific disclosure policies in
the future and can be sued if they do not do so, for the failure to disclose
the promised items could be considered a fraud on the purchaser (either a
material misstatement or omission). Fox's contention that it is impossible
to make a commitment to engage in future disclosure without knowing the
content of the disclosure is implausible given real-world disclosure practices,
and hence his corollary, that Dye's model is irrelevant, is incorrect. To repeat,
a pre-commitment to disclosure without knowing the content is typically
the form that a firm's selection of its accounting disclosure policy takes.
Commitment explanations of behavior, in which one party to a transaction
is closer to a signaling model as the firm has private information, and it does
not produce dramatically different results with respect to the determinateness of
normative conclusions regarding mandatory disclosure. But this model also assumes
that all disclosures are truthful and that the chosen signal does not depend on the
realized value of the firm. See infra text accompanying notes 124-25.
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commits to following a course of action without advance knowledge of the
details and effects the course of action will have except that it will require
subsequent disclosure, and in which another party (or parties) reasonably
relies on that commitment, are in fact, quite common, the most relevant
application being commitment explanations of firms' listing decisions.96
Fox also recognizes that accountants can certify financial statements;97
this again indicates that the claim that the model has no connection to the
real world because there would be no means to commit to information
in the absence of a mandatory disclosure regime is incorrect. For such a
commitment is exactly what the firm is making when it agrees to provide
audited financial statements to investors. Fox then qualifies his objection to
the commitment feature of the model by stating that accounting certification
violates the assumption in Dye's model that the insider does not have specific
information before committing to a disclosure policy. Here too, Fox is
wrong. The commitment to use a certified accountant occurs prior to the
knowledge of the firm-specific information that will be certified (it occurs,
for example, when a firm lists on an exchange that requires audited financial
statements or subjects itself to a disclosure regime that does so or adopts a
specific accounting method in the many instances entailing a choice and this
method is maintained into future years). The use of accountants to certify
financial statements is thus not an example of a mechanism outside of the
model or a "stretch," as Fox claims;98 it is a straightforward commitment
device within the model's setup.
Finally, Fox objects that the model is unrealistic because the commitment
to a disclosure policy regarding the accuracy of the estimate of the firm's
expected return will not affect the price investors pay, as it does not provide
information about the price.99 This objection is mistaken. Fox has simply
misunderstood the timeline. In Dye's model, after commitment to a disclosure
policy, investors learn the value of the firm as estimated with the precision the
manager has chosen in advance, and then they set the price they will pay for
the firm, which depends upon the estimate and, hence, the disclosure policy
(the precision) chosen. 100
96 See, e.g., Fuerst, supra note 11; Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class
Common Stock and the Problem ofShareholder Choice, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 2 (1988)
(discussing NYSE listing as a commitment device to following a one-share one-vote
rule).
97 Fox, supra note 3, at 1348.
98 ·/d.
99 /d. at 1349.
!oo Technically, the firm's future cash flows have a normal distribution with an unknown
mean J!, the entrepreneur's disclosure is represented by x, an unbiased estimate of
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A more problematic feature of the model's timeline is that it is a one-period
model, while firms operate and, hence, engage in disclosures over many
periods. This is not, however the concern that Fox has articulated. A
multi-period model would surely be more realistic than Dye's single-period
model, and the results of multi-period models can differ significantly from
those of a single-period model. But the possibility that a multi-period model
might produce different results from a single-period one does not mean
that no insight can be derived from the latter model. To the contrary, the
most famous finance model, the capital asset pricing model ("CAPM"), is a
single-period model. Researchers have used the CAPM model for decades
for the insights it provides into portfolio selection and stock pricing, despite
its theoretical limitation. More important, there is no reason to believe
that a multi-period version of the model would further Fox's position, as
such models are typically far less tractable than single-period models and
hence even less apt to produce determinate results. WI In any event, to the
extent that we conceptualize the choice ofa disclosure regime-such as occurs
with the choice of going public or the choice of an accounting method-as
a one-time event, which is a plausible interpretation given the stickiness in
firms' accounting choices as well as reporting consistency requirements, a
single-period model is entirely appropriate.
c. Fox's objections regarding the stylized transaction in Dye's model.
Fox raises two objections to the structure of the disclosure choice in Dye's
model, unrelated to the model's timeline of events. First, he contends that the
model is irrelevant because the entrepreneur, rather than the firm, is selling
the shares. 102 Second, he contends that the model is irrelevant because its
~, and his disclosure policy consists of a specification of the precision, r, which is
the inverse of the variance of the sample estimate, x. Because there is no private
information in this model, the choice of precision r and the realized sample estimate
x are publicly known; the only information the entrepreneur receives about ~ is the
sample estimate x. The two extreme choices of a disclosure policy are r = 0 (no
disclosure) and r =00 (full disclosure). If the entrepreneur chooses r =00, he must
reveal ~, and if he chooses r = 0, his disclosure reveals nothing and will not affect
investors' beliefs about the distribution of cash flows. Dye, supra note 84, at 4.
101 One of the better-known examples of the complication resulting from the extension
of a single- to a multiple-period model is the prisoner's dilemma in non-cooperative
game theory, in which a multi-period structure without a known final period
produces numerous equilibria in contrast to the unique equilibrium of the single-
period game. See, e.g., Robert J. Aumann, Game Theory, in 2 The New Palgrave:
A Dictionary of Economics, supra note 16, at 460, 469. See also infra text
accompanying note 130.
102 Fox, supra note 3, at 1348.
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disclosure policy concerns information regarding the riskiness of returns and
the transfer of risk between entrepreneurs and investors, and in the particular
setup, investors are risk-averse. 103 Both of these objections, on inspection, are
insubstantial.
There is, in fact, nothing unrealistic about a model in which an insider
sells his ownership of a firm to public investors. Many IPOs are accompanied
by insider sales. For example, in a sample of 310 firms that went public
over 1994-1997 studied by Robert Daines and Michael Klausner, insiders
sold shares in 40% of the IPOS. 104 Hence, Dye's model is capturing a large
number of transactions. Moreover, Fox does not limit his normative argument
regarding the need for mandatory disclosure to IPOs that do not include
insider sales of securities, nor would it make sense to do so. Accordingly, it is
puzzling why Fox would think that a model ofsuch transactions is irrelevant to
disclosure regulation. In addition, given the model's other structure regarding
the timing of the choice of disclosure, information release and sale of
securities, modeling a partial sale would not illuminate anything important
beyond that provided for in the model's complete sale setup, with respect to
the issue regarding the efficacy ofa mandatory disclosure regime. Finally, Fox
does not provide any theoretical or empirical basis for expecting the results
of the model to change in any significant way if the seller of the shares was
denominated the "issuer" rather than an "entrepreneur."
Beyond calling this feature of the model-modeling the transaction as a
sale of the insiders' shares-unrealistic, Fox suggests that sales of securities
that transfer control are not as important to the economy as those that
fund new projects. 105 But there is evidence to the contrary. For instance, a key
explanation for the extraordinary success in the most vibrant and innovative
103 ld. at 1348-49.
104 The study is Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do [PO Charters Maximize
Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in [pas, 17 lL. Econ. & Org. 83 (2001)
(information concerning insider sales provided by Robert Daines to the author).
In Daines and Klausner's study, the average percentage of shares sold in the IPO
by the firm was 35%, with the average percentage shares sold by insiders 12%,
and the CEO's ownership declined on average 7% after the offering. [d. at 93
(Table I, Panel B). In another study of 1019 IPOs issued over 1988-1992, the
average percentage of shares offered as a fraction of outstanding shares was 32.5%
and the average shares offered by insiders as a fraction of shares offered was
15.5%. See Laura Casares Field & Jonathan M. Karpoff, Takeover Defenses at
IPO Firms 31 (Aug. 3D, 1999) (Table 1), at SSRN Electronic Paper Collection,
http://papers.ssm.comlso13/papers.cfm?abstracUd=236043.
105 Fox, supra note 3, at 1348 (referring to sales in which the insiders do not sell
shares as a "transaction more vital to the economy").
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sector of the U.S. economy, the high-technology sector, compared to other
countries, is the ability ofentrepreneurs and their financiers to sell their shares
by going public. 106
The full-ownership sale is a simplification consistent with the model's
single-period assumption. A more complex model involving multiple periods
would facilitate the modeling of partial control sales and would certainly be
of value. But to assume, as does Fox, that a more complex model would
demonstrate that interfirm externalities are only positive and optimally
resolved by the SEC's regime is farfetched. Fox's attempt at distinguishing
issuers and entrepreneurs has no bearing on this issue. To underscore the point
made earlier, the more complicated the model, the greater the probability
that the results will be ambiguous. Hence, it is most plausible that a more
complex model than Dye's model would not further Fox's position because
it would require even more restrictive parameter assumptions for a regulator
to get the disclosure regime right in order to increase social welfare.
Fox also objects to Dye's modeling investors as risk-averse. 107 However,
because Dye indicates that the results regarding the relation between real
106 See Bernard S. Black & Ronald 1. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure
of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. Fin. Econ. 243 (1998).
Although most venture capital firms do not sell their shares directly in the IPO,
undertaking a "lockup" agreement to refrain from selling for several months and
then distributing the shares in kind to their investors, who resell the shares in
the open market, primarily to avoid SEC restrictions, see Paul Gompers & Josh
Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle 266 (1999), without the ability to reap the profits
from a successful public offering, Black and Gilson suggest that these investments
would not be undertaken in the first place. While venture capital sell-outs are not
accomplished by means of the simple one-step sale of the Dye model, this does
not diminish the analytical point that insider sales are as crucial as firm-level sales
for capital formation and economic growth.
107 Fox objects to modeling investors as risk-averse because the CAPM suggests that
investors should not be concerned about firm specific risk, Fox, supra note 3, at
1349, an objection that is inconsistent with other arguments in his article. For
example, while he relies on the behavior of investors predicted by the CAPM
to object to Dye's stylistic set-up, when it is inconvenient for his position, he
reverses course and rejects the CAPM in order to dispute my assertion regarding
the behavior of institutional investors with respect to the choice of disclosure
regime that undermines his contention regarding the need for a single regulator's
mandatory disclosure regime. It should also be noted that CAPM is premised on
risk-averse investors. In fact, in Dye's model, investors diversify their holdings
across the firms in the economy, as do CAPM investors; Dye does not, however,
separate firm and market risk, which is a key contribution of the CAPM to finance
theory and the motivation for Fox's line of argument. Of course, the premise
of the U.S. disclosure regime that Fox is defending in his article is inconsistent
with CAPM, as it is directed to disclosure of firm-specific information and not
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externalities and mandatory disclosure are unchanged if investors are risk-
neutral,108 this is a mistaken objection. The assumption of investor risk
aversion does not affect the model's results.
Finally, Fox objects to the stylistic choice to model disclosure policy
as a choice regarding the precision of the information to be disclosed that
affects the distribution of risk across firms and investors. Fox elaborates
on this objection by characterizing it as an assertion that disclosure only
concerns risk reduction and risk shifting, and he thus dismisses the model
as irrelevant. 109 The objection, however, is false. First, there is absolutely
nothing unusual about modeling insiders selling shares in their firms to public
investors in order to reduce their risk. The foundational article on the theory of
the firm by Michael Jensen and William Meckling, for example, advances this
as the explanation for the separation of ownership and control in the modem
U.S. corporation,110 and their theory ofagency costs is one on which Fox relies
in building up his argument regarding the optimal regulatory regime, as well
as in questioning Dye's article. lll Diversification is the essence of modern
capital markets, and that is what the entrepreneur uses the capital market for
in Dye's model. Second, as already noted, modeling investors as risk-averse
is not critical to Dye's conclusion that mandatory disclosure in the presence of
interfirm externalities need not increase disclosure compared to a voluntary
regime, the conclusion that goes to the heart of Fox's rationale of mandatory
disclosure. Of course, underlying modern finance theory is the behavioral
assumption that investors are risk-averse; that is why diversification is
important. Thus, as a matter of theory, the model's assumption of risk-averse
investors and entrepreneurs is entirely unobjectionable.
Treating the firm's disclosure choice as a commitment to the accuracy
of subsequently disclosed information and hence as a risk-shifting device
also is not a completely unrealistic assumption. Fox is surely correct that
the components of a disclosure policy can be manifold, and Dye's model,
to be tractable, models only one such possibility, which may not be the
infonnation about the finn's sensitivity to market risk. It is thus puzzling, to say
the least, that Fox raises this particular objection to Dye's model.
108 Dye, supra note 84, at 19.
109 Fox, supra note 3, at 1348-49.
110 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior; Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).
11l E.g., Fox, supra note 13, at 2545-48 (relating securities disclosure to reducing
agency costs in relation to the market for corporate control); Fox, supra note 3, at
1355 (discussing agency costs); id. at 1349 (citing agency costs theory to criticize
Dye's model).
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principal component of the SEC's regime. It is a sensible object of a
disclosure policy in the context of a risk-shifting game, where insiders, who
are making the disclosure choice, as well as investors, use the capital market
to perform its essential function to diversify their holdings (that is, to reduce
risk). While Dye's specific entrepreneurial investment game may be too
stylized to be generalizable to all disclosure settings, Fox offers no basis for
believing that a model of disclosure policy in which securities transactions
are undertaken for reasons other than risk-shifting would produce a result
different from Dye's model. Moreover, the risk that is reduced by disclosure
in Dye's model is systematic risk (that is what an interfirm externality is
all about-one firm's disclosure affects the value of all other firms in the
economy) and not, as Fox mistakenly contends, unsystematic risk. Hence,
disclosure policy in Dye's model effects prices. It is therefore difficult to
fathom Fox's claim that Dye's risk-shifting modeling choice invalidates
the model. 112 Disclosure policies that relate to risk reduction and risk shifting
when that risk is systematic and therefore affects stock prices are relevant in
the real world, and hence the model is as well.
d. Is the interfirm externality from disclosure a positive externality?
Besides his objections regarding the model's structure, Fox claims that
the direction of the correlation in returns from disclosure is not open-
ended, as it is in Dye's model. ll3 This is a key objection for Fox because
it is the open-endedness in the direction of the correlation that produces the
model's result regarding the ambiguity in the efficacy ofmandatory disclosure,
and this result is the basis for my reference to the model as suggesting that
112 Fox, supra note 3, at 1347-49. Indeed, Fox contradicts himself at this point, as
he later contends that reduction of risk was the essential benefit provided by the
mandatory disclosure regime created by the U.S. government in the 1930s. E.g., id.
at 1375. I discuss whether this is an accurate interpretation of the data on the effect
of the federal securities laws in infra Part III.C. Fox's mistaken interpretation of
those data is integrally related to his mistaken conclusion concerning the realism
of Dye's disclosure model, which, as noted in the text, is a mix-up between
firm-specific risk and market risk in Dye's model. The reduction of risk in Dye's
model is not related to Fox's subsequent argument concerning the impact of the
1933 and 1934 Acts because in the model, the disclosure policy involving the
accuracy of the estimate of returns affects stock prices (i.e., the risk in Dye's
model is market risk), and this results in shifting risk across investors (insiders and
outsiders). The disclosure policy of the 1930s legislation did not affect stock prices
and only affected the variance of total returns (unsystematic or firm-specific risk).
Fox rightly points out that firm-specific risk is not of interest to investors under
modem finance theory, but he ignores this same point in discussing the impact of
the federal legislation.
113 Fox, supra note 3, at 1350 n.25.
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Fox's position is not theoretically well-grounded. Fox asserts that the effect is
always negative on the firm and always positive on the market (in the model, a
positive externality), which is the one case in Dye's model in which mandatory
disclosure does better than voluntary disclosure. 1I4 Notwithstanding Fox's
assertion that the direction is always positive, it is also quite possible that the
market-wide effect is negative and the effect on the disclosing firm could be
either negative or positive.
Without the benefit of a formal model such as Dye's, it is exceedingly
difficult to pinpoint the source of Fox's position regarding the efficacy
of mandatory disclosure as dependent upon an assumption regarding the
direction of the correlation of returns of firms with respect to a disclosure.
Fox does not formally model the relation and instead provides a plot of
private and social marginal cost and benefit curves in which the social
cost curve always lies below the private cost curve and inversely for the
benefit curves. 115 There is no unambiguous theoretical basis for this location
of the curves; this location is correct only if it is assumed that the interfirm
externality is positive. The difficulty with Fox's diagram can be illustrated with
two simple examples involving a regime requiring disclosure of information
regarding new product discoveries and future business plans.
When Computerco announces that it has patented a new microprocessor
that will make its computers thirty times faster than existing machines, this
announcement will increase the stock price of Computerco and reduce the
stock price of its competitors. This piece of information has higher private
benefits than social benefits. When Steelco announces that it has acquired
property in West Virginia on which it plans to build a large production plant
that will triple its capacity, regardless of the effect of this information on
Steelco's stock, it will deter competitors' entry or similar expansion into
the steel market (and if that would have been a profitable course of action,
it will result in a decrease in their stock prices).116 Although this disclosure
114 ld. at 1350.
115 ld. at 1345.
116 There is an extensive economic literature regarding firms' use of credible
commitments in the form of sunk costs that expand capacity in order to limit
competition. See. e.g., B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, Capital. Commitment
and Entry Equilibrium, 12 Bell 1. Econ. 593 (1981). The liability rules for fraudulent
disclosure under the securities laws materially assist firms in engaging in such a
strategy: if Steelco has no intention of building the plant, it can be sued for
substantial damages under the securities laws. For an excellent discussion of such
an effect of the securities laws-how firms can exploit the disclosure rules to
gain strategic advantages over competitors-see Marcel Kahan, Games, Lies, and
Securities Fraud, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 750, 780-82 (1992).
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is the epitome of an interfirm externality-it provides crucial information to
competitors-its release will have an adverse impact on social welfare by
reducing competition and thereby raising steel prices. Fox's diagram rules out
these cases because he chooses to define interfirm externalities as information
that benefits other firms rather than information that can have either a positive
or a negative effect on other firms.
If Fox is truly interested in formulating a securities regime that maximizes
social welfare in the context of interfirm externalities, then he must factor
in all externalities, positive and negative. Maximizing social welfare when
the impact of all externalities is considered does not lead to a policy that
maximizes the amount of disclosure as Fox's analysis suggests. Rather,
it will require restricting disclosures such as Computerco's discovery that
have a negative impact on other firms that is greater than the benefit to
the disclosing firm's shareholders, even though the information would be
important to investment decisions regarding shares in the affected firm,
as well as prohibiting preemptive disclosures that will reduce competition,
such as Steeleo's plant expansion plans. Although this is a result surely
counterproductive from the conventional understanding of the goal of a
disclosure regime (disclosure of material firm-specific information to assist
in the decision to invest in the firm's shares), it would be the appropriate
outcome under Fox's regulatory approach, which requires consideration
of interfirm externalities in the formulation of policy. Therefore, it is
intellectually incoherent for Fox to ignore negative externalities and consider
only positive externalities ifthe regulatory goal is, as he states, social welfare
maximization and not simply maximization of the amount of information
disclosed by firms.
I have so far provided only hypothetical examples of a negative externality.
I have done so to suggest that notwithstanding Fox's claim that "it is hard
to imagine how, as an ordinary matter, a disclosure by one issuer would
have a negative effect on the aggregate cash flows of all the other firms," II?
there are quite common scenarios in which the disclosure of information
regarding one firm can drive down the value of all of the firms in the industry.
Moreover, such scenarios are not merely hypothetical. Empirical support for
this contention regarding the direction of the externality can be found in stock
price studies that indicate disclosure ofadverse events experienced by one firm
in an industry, such as product tampering, airplane crashes, product liability
litigation or product recalls, on occasion have negative stock price effects on
rival firms. liS It is therefore not at all "out of the ordinary," as Fox contends, to
117 Fox, supra note 3, at 1350 n.25.
118 See, e.g., Mark L. Mitchell, The Impact of External Parties on Brand-Name
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consider that there can be negative, as well as positive, externalities from one
firm's disclosures.
Although expending a great deal of effort, Fox provides no explanation
why it should be assumed that the information that is relevant to third
parties that will be disclosed under a mandatory regime will constitute only
good news to rivals (such as information indicating wide profit margins and
hence market opportunities), as opposed to bad news (such as information
indicating the business is not as profitable as believed). Just because Fox
defines an interfirm externality to be a positive externality does not make
Capital: The 1982 Tylenol Poisonings and Subsequent Cases, 27 Econ. Inquiry 60 I,
616 (1989) (documenting substantial stock price losses to Tylenol manufacturer
after product tampering, as well to all over-the-counter drug marketers); Severin
Borenstein & Martin B. Zimmerman, Market Incentives for Safe Commercial
Airline Operation, 78 Amer. Econ. Rev. 913, 931-32 (1988) (small but significant
negative price effect and demand effect after ten large plane crashes on rival
firms); David Prince & Paul H. Rubin, The Effects of Product Liability Litigation
on the Value of Firms (Emory Univ. Dep't of Econ. Working Paper No. 00-08,
Apr. 2000) (finding product liability litigation for firms in automobile industry had
negative stock price effect on competitors, whereas such litigation for firms in
pharmaceutical industry did not); Gregg Jarrell & Sam Peltzman, The Impact of
Product Recalls on the Wealth of Sellers, 93 J. Pol. Econ. 512, 521, 532 (1985)
(finding drug and auto recalls have negative stock price effects on stock prices
of competitors of producer of defective product); David Dranove & Chris Olsen,
The Economic Side Effects of Dangerous Drug Announcements, 37 J.L. & Econ.
323, 331 (1994) (significant negative stock price effect on competitors as well as
manufacturer of recalled drugs in the 1960s). However, some researchers have not
found statistically significant spillover effects from product recalls in contrast to
Jarrell and Peltzman's findings. See George E. Hoffer et aI., The Impact ofProduct
Recalls on the Wealth of Sellers: A Reexamination, 96 J. Pol. Econ. 663 (1988)
(finding no price effect on firm subject to recall or on competitors for a subset of
Jarrell and Peltzman's automobile recalls they considered cleaner because recall
overlaps were eliminated as were government actions not deemed true recalls);
Brad M. Barber & Masako N. Darrough, Product Reliability and Firm Value: The
Experience ofAmerican and Japanese Automakers. 1973-1992, 104 J. Pol. Econ.
1084 (1996) (examining automobile recalls over a longer period than Jarrell and
Peltzman and including Japanese firms and finding negative price effect on firm
subject to recall but no effect on competitors). Although Dranove and Olsen find
significant negative stock price effects on competitors from drug recalls in the
1960s, they do not find a decline in competitors' actual drug sales after the recalls,
and examining only a subset of Jarrell and Peltzman's drug recalls in the 1970s (7
of 26), they find the negative return to competitors is insignificant. This leads them
to conclude that the competitor stock price effect is due to investors' anticipation
that the cost of compliance with drug-testing regulation would increase in the
1960s and not a true spillover effect.
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it so. Disclosure of information regarding costs or policies that bear on a
firm's profit margins cannot be assured to have a positive, as opposed to
negative, impact on competing firms' returns.
Finally" it is altogether possible that in the case of a positive externality,
the harm to the disclosing firm would be greater than the benefit to rival firms
from disclosing information. If this were the situation, then the social welfare
maximizing policy would not be to mandate disclosure. In this scenario, Fox
should not call for disclosure, although this conclusion is far from certain
because he has defined away such possibilities. To the extent that this is
true, however, Fox's analysis does not provide a reason why a government
regulator would be able to make this laborious calculation correctly for each
piece of information for each firm. Moreover, real-world disclosure regimes
do not prohibit the disclosure of information that could adversely affect
other firms. I will return to flesh out this theme-the inadequacy of U.S.
disclosure regulation as a means of correcting interfirm externalities-as an
empirical matter. 119 The point here is to explain why Dye's article is pertinent:
It indicates that Fox's regulatory rationale works only if the externality is in
the direction that he posits for all information for all firms. Dye's model thus
highlights the enormous burden Fox's position would place on a regulator. A
regulator would have to be able to estimate the impact that information will
have on the returns of the disclosing firm and all other firms, in order to get a
mandatory disclosure policy right.
Without question, firms have stronger incentives to release voluntarily
information generating negative rather than positive externalities. Although
Fox insists that there is only one direction (positive) in which interfirm
externalities can arise, he could have taken the position that a mandatory
regime cannot solve the negative externality problem of over-disclosure by
firms of items that harm rivals (unless it prohibits such disclosures), but
can do something about the positive externality problem of under-disclosure
by firms of items that benefit rivals. However, even if he had adopted
this position, recasting his thesis along these lines would not avoid the
extraordinary burden placed upon a regulator from the interfirm externalities
rationale: disclosure policies still cannot be uniform for firms (as they are
under current regimes), but have to require different issuers to reveal
specified items, according to their impact on competitors. It is difficult to
conceive of a functioning regulatory scheme so finely honed to mandate
disclosure solely of positive externalities.
119 See infra Part III.B.3. (analyzing whether the SEC regime effectively discloses
infonnation bearing on competitors' positions).
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e. Even if the interfirm externality is positive, is disclosure regulation
always welfare-improving? The formidable difficulty of a regulator getting
disclosure policy right in the context of interfirm externalities is also the
source of the ambivalent normative position on mandatory disclosure in the
article by Admati and Pfleiderer, the only other article I could find that models
disclosure in the context of interfirm externalities. 120 Admati and Pfleiderer's
objective is precisely to model Easterbrook and Fischel's suggested rationale
for a mandatory regime-the presence of an externality not internalized by
individual firms (represented as in Dye, by a correlation in firm values)-that
would justify a role for disclosure regulation. 121 In their model, Admati and
Pfleiderer assume that the correlation is positive,122 but they obtain similar
results to Dye's model that make it impossible to conclude that disclosure
regulation can be designed that will unambiguously improve social welfare,
even if the externality is, as Fox maintains, only in one direction, positive.
In addition to the assumption that there are interfirm externalities
of relevance to disclosure policy, Admati and Pfleiderer's model has
the following features: disclosure is costly,123 and in particular, there are
economies of scale in disclosure such that there is a discontinuity or threshold
effect that causes firms' disclosure to jump from nothing to a lot; and there
are information asymmetries between firms and investors that reduce firm
value-that is, in contrast to Dye's model, there is private information.
As does Dye, they abstract away the possibility of false disclosures and
assume any disclosed information is truthful. They justify the assumption
of truthfulness similarly to the rationale offered concerning the realism of
120 Admati & Pfleiderer, supra note 85.
121 Id. at 480.
122 Because in their model, the absolute value, rather than sign, of the correlation
coefficient affects firms' interactions, although they treat the correlation coefficient
as if it were positive throughout the article, technically their results would hold as
long as the correlation coefficients have the same absolute value. /d. at 493.
123 It should be noted that in this regard, their model is more realistic than Fox's
argument, which never seriously ascribes a cost to firms' disclosure. Fox provides an
extended discussion of the social benefits of disclosure, but gives no consideration
to the possibility that there is a social cost to disclosure; there is only a reference,
passed off in a paragraph, that disclosure entails solely "private" costs, which are
asserted to be lower than the social gain, and thus he never discusses the need for
a tradeoff; disclosure is assumed always to entail a net benefit. Fox, supra note 3,
at 1345-46, 1356-59. In an earlier article, he also emphasized the social benefits
of disclosure, considered the costs as essentially private, but added a perfunctory
sentence at the end of the discussion that the proper calculation of the welfare
effects includes balancing all benefits and costs. Fox, supra note 13, at 2552.
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Dye's commitment assumption: rules against fraud are enforced, and third
parties for whom a truthful reputation is important, such as accountants, often
make the disclosures.1 24 Finally, like Dye's model, theirs is a single-period
model.
Admati and Pfleiderer's model has, however, two important differences
from Dye's model that should render it more acceptable to Fox. First,
investors are modeled as risk-neutral, and second, the benefit of disclosure
is not risk-shifting but reduction in information asymmetries between the
firm and investors. 125 Both of these features eliminate objections that Fox
directed at Dye's model: Dye's treatment of the benefit from disclosure as
the transfer of risk between entrepreneurs and investors and his modeling of
investors as risk-averse. 126
Admati and Pfleiderer first investigate a voluntary disclosure game in
which firms decide what to disclose. As in Dye's model, disclosure policy
involves the level of precision at which the firm will provide information
about its value, and it is selected before the firm knows its value. 127 This
timeline assumption is also interpreted non-temporally: the disclosure choice
is made independent of value such that the firm cannot change its disclosure
choice when it learns its value. In contrast to Dye's model, however, the
firm alone knows its own true value; the disclosed signal is the only credible
information the firm can provide to investors concerning its value. As Admati
and Pfleiderer note, the model could be extended to a situation in which the
firm does not learn the true value of its cash flows, but obtains a signal of
that value instead, without affecting the results. 128 Although firms' disclosure
choices are unaffected by their knowledge of their valuations, their stock sales
are not; if investors will not pay a sufficient price given the signal, a firm does
not sell its shares.
This feature of the model-the choice of disclosure before knowledge
of firm value or, alternatively, the treatment of the disclosure choice as
independent of firm value-would presumably be unsatisfactory to Fox, as
he finds such a setup objectionable in Dye's model. Admati and Pfleiderer
justify the notion that the firm cannot change its chosen disclosure policy
given the realization of its value as reasonable by noting that it is costly and
time-consuming for a firm to create a disclosure system, such as hiring an
124 Admati & Pfleiderer, supra note 85, at 481. They also note that this is the standard
assumption in the economics literature on disclosure.
125 [d. at 483.
126 Fox, supra note 3, at 1348-49.
127 Admati & Pfleiderer, supra note 85, at 484.
128 [d. at 484 n.8.
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accountant "to produce a report or certify the disclosure made by the firm." 129
They further note that ifthe choice ofdisclosure is modeled as dependenton the
firm's value, then the resulting complex signaling game is not easily solvable:
there are no pure strategy equilibria; and if there are equilibria, they have
unintuitive properties, and in such a context one cannot analyze disclosure
regulation, such as setting minimum precision requirements. 130
The core result of the model is that regulation is not always optimal. The
level of individual firms' disclosure when disclosure is voluntary is less than
the socially optimal disclosure level when the correlation of firm values is
high, suggesting a role for regulation that sets a minimum disclosure level. 131
But when the correlation in value is low, the level ofvoluntary disclosure does
not differ from the social optimum, and hence there is no role for regulation. I32
Moreover, the result regarding the benefit of regulation holds unambiguously
only when firms are identical (that is, when they are symmetrical in sale
value and disclosure cost). If symmetry does not hold (so that the costs and
benefits ofdisclosure vary across firms), then while it is still generally true that
voluntary disclosure is optimal for low correlations and regulation is superior
for high correlations, the disclosure requirement must, in fact, be specific to
the different firms in order for regulation to produce a higher level of welfare
than voluntary disclosure. 133 This is because the socially efficient outcome
is no disclosure for some firms and disclosure for other firms, depending on
their varying costs of disclosure. If, as occurs in the real world of securities
regulation, the disclosure standard must be uniform across all firms, then
because all firms are not identical in the costs and benefits that they accrue from
disclosure, regulation will not necessarily improve the situation compared to
voluntary disclosure and may, in fact, be unambiguously worse. 134
Admati and Pfleiderer next examine an alternative form of government
intervention to mandatory disclosure regulation: provision of uniform cash
subsidies to firms, which reduce the cost of disclosure and, hence, alter
firms' incentives to disclose. They provide an example, in the context of
asymmetrical firms, in which subsidies can move firms to the socially
optimal level compared to voluntary disclosure and disclosure regulation,
129 ld. at 485.
130 ld. at 485 n.9.
131 ld. at 499-500.
132 ld. at 500. In addition, the role for regulation is greater as the number of firms
increases, for at lower numbers, the externality is small and the social optimum
may not call for disc1osure.ld. at 501-03.
133 ld. at 503-04.
134 [d. at 505-09.
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if the subsidies are chosen appropriately.135 This is a big if, however. The
result does not hold generally, and while in some cases subsidies can improve
social welfare, in others they cannot. 136 Admati and Pfleiderer thus conclude
that they are unable to recommend one form of government intervention over
the other. 137 Their nuanced position is, again, sharply at odds with Fox's claim
that interfirm externalities require mandatory disclosure.
I have devoted considerable space to discussing the formal models that
have investigated the choice of disclosure regime in the presence of interfirm
externalities. This is not because the models are precise portraitures of the
world; they are not. The modeling issues would become intractable were all
institutional complexities-such as endogeneity in the choice of signal, the
number of shares to be issued, and the value of the firm-introduced. But
models that incrementally add complexity invariably increase the ambiguity
of the results of simpler models, because as earlier noted, the greater the
complexity of a model, the more restrictive must the assumptions be to obtain
any equilibria, the more likely is the possibility of multiple or no equilibria,
and hence the less probable it is that the model will be able to produce
any determinate policy conclusions. This is what Admati and Pfleiderer
found to be the case in preliminary efforts to extend their model on only
one dimension, namely, conditioning the choice of signal on firm value. 138
There is, accordingly, one conclusion that can be drawn assuredly from the
results of the two models of disclosure policy in the context of interfirm
externalities, and this is the reason for reviewing the models in considerable
detail: it is inappropriate to assert with any appreciable confidence, particularly
the certainty that Fox conveys, that government intervention to mandate
disclosure in order to remedy interfirm externalities will always maximize
social welfare. Fox has committed a common fallacy of disclosure market-
failure proponents, which Harold Demsetz terms "the grass is always greener
fallacy" and which, he explains, occurs because the proponents assume that
the government alternative achieves the optimal output without examining
that government alternative as closely as they scrutinize market outcomes. 139
2. Diversified Investors and Interfirm Externalities
Institutional investors holding diversified portfolios could internalize any
135 Id. at 509-12.
136 Id. at 512.
137 Id.
138 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
139 See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. &
Econ. 1 (1969).
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relevant interfirm externalities so that a competitive regulatory regime
could successfully resolve interfirm externalities were that the rationale for
securities regulation. Fox attempts to refute this contention, which supports
regulatory competition under his rationale for securities regulation, by
asserting that investors do not hold more than one firm in an industry. 140 He
is incorrect. Many individual as well as institutional investors, including the
major market players, such as TIAA-CREF, the California Public Employees
Retirement System ("CalPERS"), and the largest funds in the Vanguard Group
of investment funds, hold substantial portfolios indexed to the Standard and
Poor's 500 and Wilshire 5000 indexes, which include numerous firms in
each industry sector of the United States, not to mention the many sector
funds that specialize in specific industries. Therefore, in contrast to an issuer,
investors can internalize information externalities regarding disclosure policy,
just as a regulator can. That is, investors who hold portfolios will desire a
regime requiring such information's disclosure (if Fox's disclosure rationale
is correct) because by the definition of a positive externality, the loss on their
shares in the disclosing firm will be offset by the gain on their shares in the
discloser's competitors.
Fox further asserts that portfolio diversification is irrelevant to an
investor's assessment of the disclosure regime for a firm initially going
public ("IPO" firm).141 He provides an example in which there are investors
140 Fox, supra note 3, at 1352. After making this assertion, citing a textbook by Gilson
and Black for the proposition that a judicious choice of twenty stocks achieves
efficient portfolio diversification for support (although there is no evidence that
any diversified institutional investor holds only twenty stocks or only one firm
in any industry sector), Fox states that the only investors who would internalize
externalities would be index-funds and they "are notoriously passive concerning
corporate governance." Id. at 1352 n.30. Fox is again incorrect. Four of the five
most active institutional investors in corporate governance are the pension funds of
the State of California and New York City, TIAA-CREF, and the State of Wisconsin
Investment Board; the first three institutions are mostly indexed funds, while only
the last one, the State of Wisconsin Investment Board, is an active stock picker. See
Diane Del Guercio & Jennifer Hawkins, The Motivation and Impact of Pension
Fund Activism, 52 J. Fin. Bcon. 293, 297, 301 (1999). Moreover, more recent work
suggests that investors need to hold significantly more than 20 stocks, between 50
and 100, to achieve portfolio diversification, given the increase in market volatility
since 1960. See Lynn Cowan, Unwise Wisdom: A 20-Stock Portfolio Gives You All
the Diversity You Need, Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 2001, at RI6 (citing several finance
studies finding 50 stocks necessary to achieve portfolio diversification to match
risk posed by holding 20 stocks 30 years ago and over 100 stocks necessary to
achieve portfolio whose risk is within 5% of average risk).
141 Fox, supra note 3, at 1351.
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in only one of two firms, an IPO firm (firm "A") and a trading rival (firm
liB"), and maintains that in these circumstances the investors in the IPO firm
cannot be benefited by the impact of its disclosure on the rival firm because
this will hurt A's stock price. But he does not advance any explanation for
why B investors, who would ostensibly be benefited by A's disclosure more
than A would lose, a criterion for this to be a social-welfare maximizing
disclosure, would not buy the A shares to guarantee that it makes the correct
disclosure choice. Fox simply posits that B shareholders cannot purchase A
shares and thereby affect the disclosure regime because it is a public securities
market. Furthermore, the premise of the example is odd because institutional
investors do not hold the shares of only one IPO firm (which would be a
foolhardy strategy) or only one non-IPO firm, nor would a disclosure regime
be likely to be applicable only to one firm under regulatory competition. In
addition, Fox is assuming that the externality benefit goes only one way, from
firm A to firm B (that no information about firm B could ever benefit firm
A). If it goes both ways, then the diversified investors (who, in the two-firm
economy, will hold both firms' shares) should want both firms to select the
same, interfirm externality-revealing disclosure regime.
Moreover, underwriters and the institutional investors to which they sell
shares are, in contrast to Fox's hypothesized investors, repeat players in the
new issue market, as well as active players in the secondary trading market.
An IPO placement is not an anonymous market transaction; underwriters
test the market for an IPO with numerous institutional investors in advance
of setting a price to guarantee the issue will sell. As a consequence, the
choice of a securities regime will be negotiated by underwriters, who
must be responsive to their repeat institutional customers, and issuers, just
as the choice of statutory domicile is of interest to them in the current
regime. 142 Thus, in the environment of a competitive securities regulatory
142 Firms that go public move in overwhelming numbers to Delaware before the
stock issuance; surveyed firms indicate that the move was suggested by outside
counsel and, to a lesser extent, investment bankers, and venture capitalists and
leveraged buyout specialists appear to prefer Delaware. See Romano, supra note
21, at 250, 274 (data on reincorporation before going public and survey of
reincorporating firms); Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?
16 (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Studies in Law & Econ. Working Paper No.
159, Nov. 1999) (data on incorporation choices of initial public offerings and
of venture capitalists and leveraged buyout firms), available at SSRN Electronic
Paper Collection, http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstracCid=195109.In
discussing the question whether domicile choice was of concern to a venture
capital-supported firm about to go public, participants from the venture capital
industry at the University of Pennsylvania Law and Economics Institute Roundtable
on May 12, 2000, indicated quite unambiguously that it was desirable for the
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regime, institutional investors and market intermediaries will consider the
impact of the disclosure regime on all of their investments, not only for one
IPQ investment, and their valuations of the different regimes will be reflected
in the firms' stock prices. If, in fact, in a competitive regime, investors do
not prefer regulation that mandates disclosure of the kind of information that
Fox deems relevant for interfirm externalities, then that would be suggestive,
due to revealed preferences, that Fox is mistaken and has miscalculated the
cost-benefit calculation; that is, the cost to a disclosing firm is greater than the
gain to its competitors.
Fox also claims that investors in secondary markets have "tenuous"
influence over management, being overwhelmed with "vast information
asymmetries" and "collective action problems." 143 This is another mistaken
contention. Perhaps this was true of the 1934 stock market when the federal
securities laws were enacted, but this is certainly not true today. The stock
market is dominated by institutional investors who are sophisticated repeat
players, and there are organizations that coordinate policies on corporate
company to be incorporated in Delaware for the offering. Moreover, as previously
noted, many of the most activist investors in corporate governance are primarily
indexers, such as the California Public Employees Retirement System, California
State Teachers Retirement System, New York City Employees Retirement System,
and TIAA-CREF. See Del Guercio & Hawkins, supra note 140, at 297, 301
(CaIPERS, CaISTERS, NYCERS, SWIB, and CREF sponsored 18% ofall corporate
governance proposals submitted in 1987-1993; only SWIB is an active stock picker).
All of these facts are inconsistent with Fox's claim that because indexed funds
"notoriously" do not engage in corporate governance, they would not care about
the choice of legal regime. Fox, supra note 3, at 1352 n.50.
143 Fox, supra note 3, at 1352. Alan Palmiter raises a similar concern, distinguishing
secondary trading from initial offerings, because he thinks managers are less
responsive to investor demands in that context, in justification of his proposal
to permit the choice of disclosure regime for new issues but not for the regime
applicable to those issuers' ongoing disclosures. Palmiter, supra note 22, at 91,
106. As discussed in the text above and infra Part III.CA., similar incentives exist
for managers to respond to investor preferences concerning information production
in secondary markets as in initial offerings. For instance, disclosing the information
that investors desire will avoid large-scale selling by institutions that would depress
the firm's stock price and could thereby attract a hostile takeover bid (or avoid
the personal discomfort managers experience from the pressure applied by the
proxy activism of non-selling indexed institutional investors). It is also a mistake
to distinguish, as Palmiter does, across the disclosure regimes in secondary and
initial trading markets under regulatory competition, because the investors who
direct the choice of the IPQ regime will be aware that the same regulator's ongoing
disclosure policy will apply to the firm. Consequently, the choice of the ongoing
disclosure regime will be embedded in the choice of the regime for the IPQ.
HeinOnline -- 2 Theoretical Inq. L. 443 2001
2001] The Needfor Competition in International Securities Regulation 443
governance for institutional investors that largely mitigate potential collective
action problems regarding information gathering and action with respect to
firms. Moreover, the sources of information in today's markets for investors
are extensive: besides substantial internal resources for private research,
financial analysts and other information services abound, and there is a
growing amount of investment information available on the Internet, making
it accessible even to individual investors. It is not credible to conclude that in
this context institutional investors are at a severe disadvantage in assessing
the value of a firm such that they cannot possibly correctly assess the value
of a legal regime under which a firm chooses to operate. Nor is it credible
to assert that the development of this infrastructure is dependent upon the
SEC's disclosure policy and would therefore vanish in the absence of a single
regulator.
Fox concludes his critique of the contention that diversified investors
can internalize interfirm externalities with two strange arguments. He first
contends that it would be a breach of fiduciary duty for managers of firms
to choose a disclosure regime that benefits a rival firm. 144 This contention is
groundless. Since investors prefer the regime, by choosing it, the firm reduces
its cost of capital, and there would be no basis for a lawsuit. As a doctrinal
matter, the choice of a disclosure regime is a matter of business judgment,
as there is no self-interest (breach of loyalty) issue involved in the selection
of a regime that includes items relating to interfirm externalities. Moreover,
purchasers of IPO or secondary market shares buy shares in a firm already
operating under a particular regime. Consequently, they would not have a
valid claim of fiduciary breach for reduced share value due to the preexisting
regime choice: the "breach" occurred before they purchased their shares, and
hence they have no standing to bring a derivative claim. Indeed, because
investors know the regime under which the firm is operating at the time of
purchase, if the regime reduces the value of their investment, they will pay
less for the shares. Hence, even if a shareholder could circumvent the standing
144 Fox, supra note 3, at 1352 n.31. Given this cntlCISm, then, the regime
that Fox contends is the present SEC disclosure regime is one that requires
managers to breach their fiduciary duty. I seriously doubt that either the SEC or
Congress perceives the regime in this light, an intuition that suggests that Fox's
characterization of the objective of the SEC's regime is misguided (and not simply
that his argument is unfounded). Indeed, if his contention regarding management's
duty were correct, at least under a competitive regulatory regime, investors would
agree to the misconduct by their choice of a regime requiring such disclosure, in
contrast to Fox's approach, which imposes on investors the regime that results in a
breach of duty.
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issue by contending that the claim is not derivative in nature, there would be
no damages.
Second, Fox contends that if it is correct that the disclosure of interfirm
externalities will be priced by investors and, therefore, as resolvable by a
competitive securities regime as by a single regulator, then the necessary
conclusion is that there must be no sanctions for patent and contract breach by
firms because such behavior negatively affects other firms. 145 This argument
is a non-sequitur. Perhaps under Fox's approach ofmaximizing social welfare,
cross-holdings of investors should be factored in when determining liability
in such cases. But this is irrelevant to the hypothesis that diversified investors
will be able to internalize the costs and benefits of interfirm disclosures as well
as Fox's preferred single regulator. Institutional investors' ability to perform
the cost-benefit calculation on corporate disclosure just as well as the SEC
has absolutely no implication for the liability rules for patent infringement
and contract breach, and it is a mystery how Fox could possibly make
such a connection. The contention that investors can internalize disclosure
externalities follows from the point that it is investor preferences that dictate
regime choices under regulatory competition and that in contrast to issuers,
investors are in a position to behave identically to Fox's single regulator and
internalize the social costs and benefits of an individual firm's disclosures. 146
145 [d. at 1353.
146 It is exceedingly odd that Fox thinks that the claim regarding the equivalency
of disclosure choices in multiple and single securities regulator systems where
investors are diversified somehow dictates how judges should decide patent or
contract claims. The patent regime is not directed at maximizing investor welfare
but at maximizing innovation, and it is premised upon providing incentives to
invention by guaranteeing inventors a return on their efforts through a monopoly of
limited duration, in exchange for public disclosure so that their ideas can be used by
other inventors. See generally Edmund W. Kitch, Patents, in 3 The New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics and the Law, supra note 24, at 13. Whether investors in
the inventor's firm also hold shares in the infringer is irrelevant to this statutory
objective and hence would not be judicially cognizable. If there were enforceable
competition in patent regimes, investors might take a broader view of infringement,
but the desirability of competition in securities regulation does not translate into
its efficacy for other legal regimes where there may be substantial third-party
effects not internalized by the selectors of regimes, which is not the case of equity
investors and securities law. In other words, maximization of shareholder welfare,
which would be the objective of a competitive regime selected by investors, may
not maximize innovation or, to be more precise, social welfare in the context
of innovation policy. It is impossible to discern what Fox has in mind when he
claims that the abandonment of sanctions for breach of contract follows from the
thesis that a single regulator is not superior to competition when investors can
internalize the costs and benefits at stake in the disclosure of interfirm externalities.
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Were society to determine that the aim of the patent and contract regimes
should be to maximize shareholder welfare, then corporate choice of those
regimes might make sense; providing corporations with these regimes'
choices under the reformulated objective would depend upon whether there
are significant third-party effects that would not be included in the cost-benefit
calculus undertaken by diversified investors.
In sum, the source of Fox's error in concluding that only a monopolist
government entity can internalize the costs and benefits of disclosure
involving interfirm externalities is his exclusive focus on the incentives
of issuers rather than those of investors, whose holdings are diversified
and whose preferences will dominate the choice of securities regime under
regulatory competition. In a competitive securities regime, issuers' choices
of their securities domicile are guided by investor preferences, as this reduces
their cost of capital. Consequently, if disclosure of interfirm externalities is
cost-effective (the gain to rival firms exceeds the cost to the disclosing firm),
then investors will desire such disclosures and they will be a component
of the prevalent securities regime. While it is possible that some investors
might overvalue the harm to a disclosing firm compared to the gain to
its competitors in that cognitive psychology suggests losses figure more
Investors do not choose the regimes that govern firms' business contracts-this is
a matter of ordinary business judgment in management's discretion-nor would
they desire to make such a decision, as they would not have any expertise on the
relevant issues. They do, however, choose a firm's securities law in a competitive
regulatory environment, because firms that disregard investor preferences will have
a higher cost of capital. Perhaps Fox is suggesting that investors' welfare would
be maximized by firms' selecting for their business contracts a jurisdiction that
does not impose sanctions for breach when there is overlapping ownership of
the breaching and breached firms and that firms should adopt such choice-of-Iaw
clauses. It is not self-evident, however, given the complicated interplay of incentive
effects surrounding breach and the measure of damages, which has been the subject
of extensive commentary, see, e.g., Aaron S. Edlin, Breach Remedies. in 1 The
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, id. at 174, whether share
values would be maximized by such an approach and, correspondingly, whether
diversified shareholders would benefit from a regime that does not sanction breach
of contract as Fox asserts. But if there is a substantial overlap of ownership across
contracting parties, it is possible that there will not be litigation over a contractual
breach in the first place (the owners with cross-holdings might prod management
to renegotiate the contract rather than litigate).
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prominently in an individual's calculus than gains,147 it is implausible that
such behavior will prevail systematically in decisions where significant dollars
are at stake for sophisticated repeat players such as institutional investors.
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the staff of a single government
regulator would make fewer mistakes than sophisticated market participants
with substantial wealth at stake in getting the disclosure system correct.
Finally, it should be noted that whether investors or an agency internalizes
the costs and benefits of interfirm externalities, there is a further reason
why social welfare is not self-evidently maximized with the disclosure of
interfirm externalities. The disclosures that Fox advocates are the objective
of mandatory disclosure-information regarding firm-level costs and profit
margins-are data that facilitate collusion and, hence anti-competitive
behavior. This is, of course, the reason for the longstanding prohibition
against firms' information-sharing under the U.S. antitrust regime.
3. Does the SEC Require Disclosure of Information regarding Interfirm
Externalities?
The third and most important critique of the interfirm externalities rationale
for a single regulator securities regime is that the SEC's mandated disclosure
does not, and cannot, in practice require firms to disclose private proprietary
information such that the released information will significantly assist
competitors. In response, Fox states that "almost all potential corporate
disclosures have interfirm costs" and that such disclosure is the focus of
numerous items in Regulation S-K. 148
However, as I stated in my prior article, and as Fox ignores, there are
express requirements for disclosure items in Regulation S-K that explicitly
exempt firms from disclosing information that would "affect adversely the
registrant's competitive position."J49 Perhaps Fox's thesis is that if the SEC
explicitly excludes such information for this specified item-new products
and lines of business-then it must be assumed that the SEC intends that
the disclosure of the other required items in the document will have such an
147 See, e.g., Russell Hardin, Collective Action 82-83 (1982). The behavioral pattern
is termed "hysteresis"; it is similar to the economic concept of risk aversion, with
diminishing marginal utility of income, in which an individual values a one-dollar
loss more highly than a one-dollar gain.
148 Fox, supra note 3, at 1353.
149 Regulation S-K, Item 101, 17 C.ER. § 229.IOI(c)(ii) (1999) (providing that an
issuer is not required to disclose narrative information concerning new business
lines and products "the disclosure of which would affect adversely the registrant's
competitive position").
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impact. I draw the opposite conclusion, however. It seems far more plausible
to assume that the SEC does not expect significant proprietary information
to be contained in mandated disclosures concerning existing businesses
compared to new businesses and that where it considered it likely that
disclosure could compromise proprietary information, it made explicit that
such information did not have to be disclosed.
The interpretation I advance of the SEC's view of proprietary information
is supported by the SEC's current disclosure practice. In its most recent
substantive addition to the disclosure requirements of Regulation S-K, the
1997 rules requiring the disclosure of the market risk of firms' positions
in financial derivatives, the SEC adapted its disclosure requirements in
response to commentators' concerns that specific detailed disclosures would
reveal proprietary information. Namely, in response to the concern that
"competitors, suppliers, and market traders potentially may be able to use
the information to exploit the registrants' positions in the market," the SEC
adopted four provisions that permit the aggregation of the disclosures over
instruments and time-periods in order to ensure that the "disclosures do not
reveal proprietary information."15o
The explicit policy against the disclosure of proprietary information-the
information relevant to the interfirm externalities that underlies Fox's
rationale for a single regulator regime-suffuses the securities regime and
not only the specific issuer mandates of Regulation S-K. In particular, money
managers are not required to disclose their entire portfolio holdings so that
they can protect the proprietary information of their investment strategies
under the agency's established procedure for requesting confidential
treatment of such information. 151 In addition, under the more general
disclosure standards of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws, both the agency and the courts permit firms to abstain from disclosing
information that entails significant interfirm externalities, that is, items of
substantial importance to competitors, such as a significant mineral lode
150 Securities and Exchange Comm'n, Disclosure of Accounting Policies for Derivative
Financial Instruments and Derivative Commodity Instruments and Disclosure of
Quantitative and Qualitative Infonnation About Market Risk Inherent in Derivative
Financial Instruments, Other Financial Instruments, and Derivative Commodity
Instruments, 62 Fed. Reg. 6,044, 6,055 (Feb. 10, 1997).
151 Instructions for Confidential Treatment Requests, Fonn l3F (Infonnation Required
of Institutional Investment Managers Pursuant to Section l3(f) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules Thereunder), 17 C.ER. 249.325 (2001).
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discovery made by extracting firms 152 or preliminary merger negotiations. 153 If
the courts and SEC interpreted their mandate as does Fox, namely, to mitigate
interfirm externalities, then firms would have to provide competitors with the
timely disclosure of information useful in assessing rivals' profitability, and
these exclusions would not be a fixture of the securities regime.
Indeed, if the purpose of the federal regime were to mitigate interfirm
externalities-Fox's rationale-as opposed to the more conventionally
understood rationale of investor protection given firms' underproduction
of information, then the system of civil liability for disclosure violations
under the securities laws would be dramatically different from its current
form. Private rights of action would not be given to shareholders of issuers,
but, rather, to the competitors who benefit from the positive externalities that
are the ostensible object of mandatory disclosures. Because investor fraud
concerns are not at stake according to the interfirm externalities rationale
for a single securities regulator, the advocate of such a rationale logically
must either consider such matters appropriately left to the states (and thus an
area presumably appropriate for competitive regulation) or come up with a
completely different rationale for much of the mandatory (non-competitive)
federal regime. Fox has constructed an elaborate rationalization of the SEC's
extensive disclosure regime based on Easterbrook and Fischel's theoretical
justification, which has no connection to the agency's stated goals and
agenda or its actual practices. Given that Fox's position is that interfirm
externalities are the justification for federal securities regulation, to be
intellectually consistent, he should be advocating a radical revamping of
securities regulation and not advocating retention of the status quo for U.S.
issuers.
But rather than attempt to divine the SEC's intentions from the presence
or absence of exemptive provisos for disclosure of proprietary information
and from a civil liability structure not in confonnance with a regime
directed at interfirm externalities, we can ascertain whether the agency's
disclosure mandates are addressing such externalities by examining the
actual disclosure practices of finns for the items in the Regulation S-K
fonn that Fox identifies as supporting his thesis: "profits and sales of
each significant individual line of business conducted by the issuer, future
capital spending plans, research and development ("r&d") spending, cost
152 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969) (disclose or abstain rule for insider trading in context of discovery
of major copper strike).
153 See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (whether company must disclose
preliminary merger negotiations depends on particular facts of case).
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ratios, liquidity constraints, backlogs, inventories and sources of supply." 154
Consider first r&d disclosures, by examining the most recent Form 10-K entry
for this item by Merck & Co., one of the largest pharmaceutical companies, in
a sector in which unlike the vast majority of firms, r&d expense is significant
enough to be included as a line item in financial statements:
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
The Company's business is characterized by the introduction of
new products or new uses for existing products through a strong
research and development program. Approximately 8,900 people are
employed in the Company's research activities. Expenditures for the
Company's research and development programs were $2,068.3 million
in 1999, $1,821.1 million in 1998 and $1,683.7 million in 1997 and
will be approximately $2.4 billion in 2000. The Company maintains
its ongoing commitment to research over a broad range of therapeutic
areas and clinical development in support of new products. Total
expenditures for the period 1990 through 1999 exceeded $13.0 billion
with a compound annual growth rate of 11 %.
The Company maintains a number of long-term exploratory and
fundamental research programs in biology and chemistry as well
as research programs directed toward product development. Projects
related to human and animal health are being carried on in various fields
such as bacterial and viral infections, cardiovascular functions, cancer,
diabetes, pain and inflammation, ulcer therapy, kidney function, mental
health, the nervous system, ophthalmic research, prostate therapy,
the respiratory system, bone diseases, endoparasitic and ectoparasitic
diseases, companion animal diseases and production improvement.
In the development of human and animal health products, industry
practice and government regulations in the United States and most
foreign countries provide for the determination of effectiveness and
safety of new chemical compounds through pre-clinical tests and
controlled clinical evaluation. Before a new drug may be marketed
in the United States, recorded data on the experience so gained are
included in the New Drug Application, New Animal Drug Application
or the biological Product License Application to the FDA for the
154 Fox, supra note 3, at 1353. The first item, line-of-business reporting, while
theoretically of relevance to Fox's argument, is an even weaker example for his
thesis in practice, given the numerous empirical studies that have studied this
disclosure, and is discussed at infra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
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required approval. The development of certain other products is also
subject to government regulations covering safety and efficacy in the
United States and many foreign countries. There can be no assurance
that a compound that is the result of any particular program will obtain
the regulatory approvals necessary for it to be marketed.
New product candidates resulting from this research and
development program include an injectable antibiotic; an antifungal
agent; an oral compound potentially useful for treatment of
chemotherapy-induced emesis; an oral compound potentially useful
for the treatment of depression and other neuropsychiatric diseases; a
second COX-2 specific inhibitor potentially useful for the treatment
of osteoarthritis, rheumatoid arthritis and pain; and certain new
vaccines. 155
Contrary to Fox's contention, this entry provides absolutely no details
concerning the specific research undertaken, the stage of development,
the likely success of the research, and so forth, for any particular drug,
infonnation of the sort asserted by Fox regarding SEC mandates that would
be helpful to a competitor. The company's filing for the previous fiscal
year, 1998, has a specific entry referring to the progress of a drug, Vioxx,
produced by its r&d program, through the FDA approval process, but the
report provides no new infonnation because there was a news report issued
on the occurrence date of every reported event in the 1O_K. 156
155 Merck & Co., Inc., Form IO-K for fiscal year ended Dec. 31, 1999 (filing date with
SEC Mar. 22, 2000).
156 Merck & Co. Inc., Form IO-K for fiscal year ended Dec. 31, 1998 (filing date
with SEC Mar. 24, 1999). ("New product candidates resulting from this research
and development program include Vioxx, a new anti-inflammatory product for the
treatment of osteoarthritis and relief of pain, for which the company filed an NDA
with the FDA on November 23, 1998. On January 11, 1999, the FDA assigned
a six-month priority review to the company's NDA for Vioxx. In February 1999,
the company received confirmation that the FDA's Arthritis Advisory Committee
meeting for Vioxx had been scheduled for April 20, 1999.") Three examples of
news reports and company press releases of these facts, which were obviously
stale information by the time of the mandated IO-K disclosure are: Robert Steyer,
Monsanto Drug Gets FDA Hearing Tuesday, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 29,
1998, at El (reporting that Merck submitted its application for Vioxx a few days
earlier for FDA review, putting it three months behind Monsanto's petition for a
competing drug, Celebrex, which is to commence being reviewed by an FDA
advisory committee in two days); FDA Grants Priority Review for Vioxx(TM),
Merck's Investigational Medicine for Osteoarthritis and Pain, PR Newswire, Jan.
11, 1999; Merck & Co., Inc., 255 Chemical Market Rep., Mar. 1, 1999, at 19
(announcing that Merck reports an FDA advisory committee will meet on
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The same point can be made regarding future capital spending plans.
Consider Merck's 1999 lO-K entry under the capital expenditures item
identified by Fox as providing useful information to competitors:
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
Capital expenditures were $2.6 billion in 1999 and $2.0 billion
in 1998. Expenditures in the United States were $2.0 billion in
1999 and $1.4 billion in 1998. Expenditures during 1999 included
$1.0 billion for production facilities, $664.5 million for research and
development facilities, $101.7 million for environmental projects, and
$784.4 million for administrative, safety and general site projects.
Capital expenditures approved but not yet spent at December 31, 1999
were $2.5 billion. Capital expenditures for 2000 are estimated to be
$2.8 billion.
Again, it is difficult to perceive the value of this entry to a competitor for
assessing the profitability of Merck or industry conditions.
Two final examples will, hopefully, not belabor the point too much. Fox's
list of disclosures providing valuable data to competitors includes the item
"liquidity constraints." Firms do not typically report much information
under this item unless they are in financial difficulty. Merck's entry
under "liquidity" simply states that it has enough cash to cover its capital
expenditures and notes its triple-A debt rating. Surely, the only time in which
such an entry could be valuable for a competitor would be when liquidity
matters, that is, when a firm is in economic distress. Consider, therefore, the
entry of Paging Network ("PageNet"), a wireless communications company,
which was the largest paging carrier in the United States and had a significant
entry discussing such a constraint in its 1999 Form 1O-K:
PageNet's deteriorating financial results and defaults under its debt
agreements have resulted in significant liquidity constraints. The report
of PageNet's independent auditors expresses substantial doubt about its
ability to continue as a going concern. See discussion under "Liquidity
and Capital Resources."
April 20 to consider approval status for Vioxx). It should further be noted that
while newspaper reports referred to the earlier start in the approval process for a
competing drug to Vioxx, Merck's lO-K made no reference to that drug. This is
further evidence at odds with Fox's claim of the SEC's key role in the release of
significant information relating to interfirm externalities.
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General
PageNet's deteriorating financial results and liquidity have caused
PageNet to be in default of the covenants of all of its domestic
debt agreements. On February 2, 2000, PageNet failed to make the
semi-annual interest payment on its 8.875% senior subordinated notes
due 2006 (8.875% Notes), and its 10.125% senior subordinated notes
due 2007 (10.125% Notes). As of March 2, 2000, the non-payment
of interest constituted a default under the indentures of the 8.875%
Notes and the 10.125% Notes. As of April 17, 2000, PageNet failed to
make the semi-annual interest payment on its 10% senior subordinated
notes due 2008 (10% Notes), and does not expect to make additional
cash interest payments on any of its Notes. As a result of this
default, PageNet's bondholders could demand at any time that PageNet
immediately pay $1.2 billion of its bonds in full. Should this happen,
PageNet would immediately file for protection under Chapter 11 of
the United States Bankruptcy Code (Chapter 11).
PageNet is also in default of several of the financial and other
covenants of its Credit Agreement. As a result of these defaults,
the lenders under the Credit Agreement could demand at any time
that PageNet immediately pay the $745 million outstanding under
the Credit Agreement in full. Should this happen, PageNet would
immediately file for protection under Chapter 11.
PageNet is prohibited from additional borrowings and has classified
all of its outstanding indebtedness under the Credit Agreement and
the Notes as a current liability as of December 31, 1999. As of May
1, 2000, PageNet had approximately $55 million in cash. PageNet
believes that this cash, plus the cash expected to be generated from
operations, is sufficient to meet its obligations, except for the cash
interest payments due under the Notes, into the third quarter of
2000. However, if PageNet's financial results continue to deteriorate,
PageNet may not have enough cash to meet such obligations through
the third quarter of 2000. PageNet is considering alternatives to ensure
that it has sufficient liquidity through the completion of the Merger.
However, there can be no assurance that PageNet's efforts to obtain
additional liquidity will be timely or successful or that the Merger will
be completed. As a result, PageNet may have to reduce the level of
its operations and/or file for protection under Chapter 11 to complete
the Merger and/or restructure its obligations. PageNet is negotiating a
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debtor-in-possession loan facility with its lenders to be made available
in the event it commences a Chapter 11 case. Filing for bankruptcy
would have a material impact on PageNet's results of operations and
financial position.
PageNet's deteriorating financial condition and lack of additional
liquidity indicate that PageNet may not be able to continue as a
going concern for a reasonable period of time. PageNet's ability
to continue as a going concern is dependent upon several factors,
including, but not limited to, the continued non-demand for immediate
payment of outstanding indebtedness by the holders of the Notes and
the lenders under the Credit Agreement and PageNet's ability to (i)
generate sufficient cash flows to meet its obligations, other than the
cash interest payments due under the Notes, on a timely basis, (ii)
obtain additional or restructured financing, including potential debtor-
in-possession borrowings if PageNet is required to file for protection
under Chapter 11, (iii) continue to obtain uninterrupted supplies and
services from its vendors, and (iv) reduce capital expenditures and
operating expenses. PageNet is proceeding with these initiatives as
well as also proceeding with its plan to complete the Merger described
above. 157
This firm has provided a detailed description of its financial problems.
But it does not reveal to a competitor either marginal cost or other key
information that could provide information on how a rival would fare in
the marketplace, the disclosures Fox considers key for the externalities
rationale. More important, this entry does not provide any new information
of value to competitors regarding PageNet's liquidity. PageNet's financial
difficulties were well-known prior to the release of the annual report: its debt
had been downgraded in the previous quarter, and it had, in fact, entered
into a merger agreement with its major competitor to stave off bankruptcy,
which was also reported in the lO-K filing. 158 Competitors, particularly its
merger partner, did not learn of PageNet's liquidity problems, nor acquire
157 Paging Network Inc., Form lO-K for fiscal year ended Dec. 31, 1999 (filing date
with SEC May 4, 2000). This was the first report identified in a search for a filing
with the words "liquidity" and "constraint" of all lO-K filings for fiscal year 1999,
LEXIS, COMPNY Library, 10-K File.
158 See, e.g., Antony Bruno, Moody's Lowers Pagenet's Debt Rating, Radio Comm.
Rep., Oct. 11, 1999, at 3; Antony Bruno, Tie-up Aids Troubled Industry, Radio
Comm. Rep., Nov. 15, 1999, at 1 (reporting merger of Arch Communications
Group, the second-largest paging carrier, with Paging Network, its rival and the
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crucial data regarding its profitability, from the information available in the
SEC's mandated disclosure requirements.
Competitors, in fact, obtain a better sense of industry sector costs and profit
margins from their own cost accounting than from information provided
in another firm's SEC filings. Fox's thesis would seem more relevant for
noncompetitive industries where consumers would benefit from new entrants
who are deterred from entry due to ignorance of sector profitability. Few
U.S. industries fall into this category, however. To return to the PageNet
example, undoubtedly, the relevant players in the wireless communications
industry were aware of the company's financial difficulties prior to its SEC
filings. As Pagenet's customers found the company increasingly unable to
provide adequate service, its competitors would have readily heard the buzz
in the industry of its deteriorating position, and this would have percolated
into the financial press.
There is nothing to suggest that the boilerplate or after-the-fact disclosures
in PageNet's SEC filings could be combined by a rival with proprietary
information to glean insight into the profitability of the industry or product
line, and Fox does not provide concrete examples of such use. In support
of his thesis, Fox states that while he was in practice, his clients did
not want to disclose items that were not clearly required and gave as
"their most frequent reason ... fear that the information will be used by
their competitors."159 He points to this as evidence that the SEC requires
such information disclosure. I do not wish to minimize Fox's experience
in practice. However, more probative evidence on the content of the SEC's
mandated disclosures than his clients' unwillingness to disclose information
when the disclosure requirement was not "absolutely clear" would be if they
had informed him that they had spent time pouring over competitors' SEC
filings to learn about their competitive positions in the industry and did in fact
obtain such information. I doubt whether he heard about such activity while in
practice. It is improbable that people engage in such activity, because there is
little information of important proprietary (competitive) value to glean from
SEC documents.
As a final example, consider the following entries under the "backlog"
item on Fox's list. 160
number-one carrier, and noting analysts saw merger as only way for Pagenet to
avoid bankruptcy, a growing concern all year).
159 Fox, supra note 3, at 1354 n.42.
160 The following firms are the first five firms that were found in a LEXIS search,
undertaken June 3, 2000, of IO-Ks filed in 2000 that included the word "backlog."
Because, in contrast to the other items, there was so little meaningful content and
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(1) Capital Pacific Holdings, Inc., a regional builder and developer:
BACKLOG AND INVENTORY
The Company typically pre-sells homes prior to and during
construction through home purchase contracts requiring earnest money
deposits or through reservation documents requiring reservation
deposits. Generally, reservation deposits are refundable, but home
purchase contracts are not cancelable unless the customer is unable
to sell their existing home, qualify for financing or under certain
other circumstances. A home sale is placed in backlog status upon
execution of such a contract or reservation and receipt of an earnest
money deposit or reservation deposit and is removed when such
contracts or reservations are canceled as described above or the home
purchase escrow is closed.
The following table shows backlog in units and dollars at the end of
each of the last three fiscal years for each of the Company's residential
operations, including unconsolidated joint ventures:
ENDING BACKLOG
FEBRUARY 28, 1998 FEBRUARY 28, 1999 FEBRUARY 29, 2000
UNITS ($OOOS) UNITS ($OOOS) UNITS ($OOOS)
California 122 $75,000 51 $45,700 52 $62,000
Texas 200 30,700 252 47,600 272 54,700
Nevada 41 7,100 57 12,200 97 20,200
Arizona 13 2,200 137 18,500 71 11,100
Colorado 106 18,400
Total 376 $115,000 497 $124,000 598 $166,400
The following table shows net new orders (sales made less
cancellations and credit rejections), homes closed and ending backlog
relating to sales of the Company's homes and homes under contract
or reservation for each quarter since the beginning of fiscal year 1999,
including unconsolidated joint ventures. The Company's backlog at
any given time is a good indicator of the number of units that will be
closed in the four to six months following such date:
so much variety in the entries under this heading, I provide the report of five firms
rather than one firm.
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ENDING BACKLOG
NET NEW HOMES
ORDERS CLOSED UNITS ($OOOS)
Fiscal Year 1999
1st Quarter 196 152 420 $124,500
2nd Quarter 261 235 446 120,800
3rd Quarter 249 205 490 145,300
4th Quarter 347 340 497 124,000
Total Fiscal Year 1999 1,053 932
Fiscal Year 2000
1st Quarter 349 303 543 $124,900
2nd Quarter 364 308 599 138,000
3rd Quarter 380 291 688 176,800
4th Quarter 304 394 598 166,400
Total Fiscal Year 2000 1,397 1,296
(2) Littlefield, Adams & Company, a designer and distributor of young
men's and boys' active wear products:
INVENTORY, BACKLOG AND PRODUCTION
The Company maintained an inventory in 1999 substantially in
excess of anticipated demands. The total value of such inventory as
of December 31, 1998,was $3,157,000. As of December 31, 1999, it
had $377,000 in inventory, after a program of inventory sales started
in September 1999.
Approximately 77% of the goods produced in 1999 were through
the services of contract screen printers, with 76% through one outside
contractor.
Generally, Littlefield requires payment for goods within 30 to 60
days after delivery; however, exceptions are made on a case by case
basis depending on circumstances such as sizes of orders, anticipated
future business and past credit experience. As of December 31, 1999,
the Company had trade receivables of $830,000, with an average aging
period, from date of shipment, of 36 days.
(3) Hirsch International Corp., a supplier of embroidery machinery:
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BACKLOG AND INVENTORY
The ability of the Company to fill orders quickly is an important part
of its customer service strategy. The embroidery machines held in
inventory by the Company are generally shipped within a week from
the date the customer's orders are received, and as a result, backlog is
not meaningful as an indicator of future sales.
(4) Republic Technologies International Holdings, producer of specialty
steel products:
BACKLOG
The company calculates backlog as those orders received but not yet
shipped. Its combined backlog as of December 31, 1999 and 1998,
was $297 million and $306 million on a proforma basis, respectively.
Orders are generally filled within 3 to 14 weeks of the order depending
on the product, customer needs and other production requirements.
Customer orders are generally cancelable without penalty prior to finish
size rolling, and depend on customers' changing production schedules.
Accordingly, the Company does not believe that the amount of backlog
orders is a reliable indication of future sales.
(5) SMLX Technologies, Inc., a developer of technological solutions for the
medical, dental, and other industries:
The Company anticipates that it will not be required to maintain
significant inventory levels of products until the Company's products
are deemed acceptable for sale. The Company does not currently have
any material backlog. Until the Company is able to market its products
on a broad basis, it does not anticipate that its backlog or inventory
level will be material. At that time, the Company intends to cause these
products to be manufactured for it shortly before they are required for
shipment. The Company does not foresee that an extensive period of
time will be required from the time of its manufacturing order to the
time of final delivery of its products.
These last illustrations should make the point crystal clear regarding the
distance between Fox's claim concerning the content of SEC filings and
reality. Of the five firms, the disclosures of four are uninformative if the
disclosure's purpose is to improve a rival's competitive position. Only one
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firm, Capital Pacific Holdings, provided much specific detail regarding
the number of backlogged units, but the backlog in question involved a
standard accounting practice for housing sales; another, Littlefield, Adams,
provided the average age of its trade receivables. Perhaps a competitor could
conceivably gain some information about the firms' competitive position
from the disclosures, but this is hardly the significant proprietary data that
inform Fox's characterization of the SEC's disclosure policy. The thoroughly
generic disclosures in the mandated items that Fox himself asserts are likely
to generate value to competitors indicate that any real benefits to competitors
from such disclosure mandates are either accidental or trivial.
When .firm-specific information is provided beyond the standard
boilerplate disclosures, the information is of such significance to the firm's
own investors that it is in practice revealed prior to the SEC's mandated filing,
despite its potential value to competitors: it is independently revealed in
press releases or reported by financial reporters and analysts. 161 IfSEC filings
provide any meaningful competitive information about rivals in the context
of the information-intensive activities of financial analysts, arbitragers, and
other market professionals, as well as competitors' own information about
their business, it is surely not by design.
Perhaps Fox would respond to the criticism that important firm-
specific information with spillover effects released in advance of SEC
filings would not be reported by firms or uncovered by independent
sources if the SEC did not mandate its eventual disclosure. But such
a contention would not be convincing. Announcements of capital and
r&d expenditures, for example, have significantly positive stock price
effects. 162 Hence managers have a strong incentive to reveal information
about such activities because they benefit from their revelation and do not
need a government mandate to prod disclosure. Financial difficulties, on the
161 A further illustration of the potency of the incentives for revealing such information
involves potential takeovers: prior to the announcement of a bid (which will be
disclosed under SEC rules), the target's shares advance in price and examinations
of the source of the runup suggest that it is due not to insider trading but to
information generated by the rumor mill of Wall Street, a "legitimate market for
information." Gregg A. Jarrell & Annette B. Poulsen, Stock Trading Before the
Announcement of Tender Offers: Insider Trading or Market Anticipation?, 5 J.L.
Econ. & Org. 225, 244 (1989). See also id. at 227-29.
162 E.g., Su Han Chan et aI., Corporate Research and Development Expenditures and
Share Value, 26 J. Fin. Econ. 255 (1990); John J. McConnell & Chris J. Muscarella,
Capital Expenditure Decisions and Market Value of the Firm, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 399
(1985); SEC Office of Chief Economist, Institutional Ownership, Tender Offers
and Long Term Investments (1985).
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other hand, as revealed by liquidity constraint disclosures, are not matters
that management affirmatively benefits from revealing, unless the disclosure
would indicate that problems are less severe than investors have anticipated,
as silence is considered bad news. Quite apart from the incentive of managers
to reveal information to avoid the adverse inferences drawn by investors from
silence, market professionals have powerful incentives to uncover adverse
information about firms. In addition, financial difficulties affect third-party
relations (dealings with customers, suppliers, and creditors), and hence the
information finds its way into the business press. Prior to running up against
explicit liquidity constraints, for instance, firms' troubles are invariably well
known, and they experience downgrades by bond-rating agencies, which
are publicized events. For instance, months before PageNet's SEC filings
indicated any significant financial difficulties, the press reported that Moody's
was considering downgrading the company's debt. 163
Besides his specific examples of SEC mandates in Form S-K that evince
an objective to disclose interfirm externalities, Fox contends that "almost
all potential corporate disclosures" have the effect of a real externality, that
is, can affect other firms' cash flows. 164 This is a fallacy. Most information
in fact does not have such an effect. A good example of this fallacy is the very
item that Fox cites as evidence of the need for the SEC because of inadequate
voluntary disclosure prior to 1934, namely, depreciation. 165 Depreciation has
no bearing on other firms' cash flows: indeed, it has no bearing on a firm's
own cash flows because accountants' measure of book depreciation has no
connection to an asset's economic depreciation, except by chance, or any
163 Pagenet Debt under Review, Dallas Morning News, Mar. 3, 1999, at 3D. I searched
all the SEC filings for Paging Network available on line through 1998. The first
filing to indicate a liquidity problem was the third-quarter 1999 IO-Q, which was
filed in November 1999, in which the company noted that it was precluded from
further borrowing under the terms of its notes and that there was no assurance that
it would be able to obtain additional liquidity, or that its proposed merger would be
consummated, and hence that it would avoid bankruptcy. The earliest filing to raise
any possible concern was the first quarter IO-Q, filed in May 1999, thus several
months after the news report regarding Moody's consideration of a downgrade,
in which management stated that the company was in compliance with its credit
agreement covenants and that "while no assurances could be given, the Company
believes that ... it will remain in compliance." Paging Network, Inc., Form IO-Q
(filed with SEC on May 17, 1999), available at LEXIS, COMPNY Library, Filings
File. The language in the second quarter IO-Q, filed in August 1999, was identical
to that of the first quarter report, id.
164 Fox, supra note 3, at 1353.
165 Id. at 1378.
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maintenance expenditures by the firm and, hence, no relation to the asset's
value (its replacement cost). 166
Another example from 1934 Fox cites in order to bolster his interfirm
externality case is the disclosure of sales, the one major item that the
SEC mandated upon its creation that the New York Stock Exchange had
not previously mandated of its listed firms. 167 To Fox, this demonstrates
that the SEC's disclosure policy includes valuable interfirm externalities. He
is mistaken. The SEC mandated disclosure of gross or net sales and cost of
goods sold; marginal cost data, information that could enable competitors to
ascertain their rivals' profitability, are not revealed in these disclosures, which
instead provide extremely general information regarding a firm's profitability.
The sales figures whose disclosure was mandated are not more useful to
competitors than to the firm's investors, as they should be under Fox's rationale
for disclosure. 168 Accordingly, this is not a particularly robust instance of
mandatory disclosure directed at remediating interfirm externalities.
There is still another reason to be skeptical of Fox's claim that
the mandated disclosure of sales by the newly-created SEC revealed
important interfirm externalities. Fox's source, a 1939 law review article
by two SEC staff attorneys states, consistent with his thesis, that firms
did not want to disclose sales information because these figures would
give competitors an advantage, and that originally the agency accepted
firms' proprietary concerns and granted exemptions from disclosure.169
However, the article goes on to state that the SEC changed this policy when an
investigation revealed that the IIdisclosure had little effect upon buying policy"
because "competitors and customers had already obtained the 'confidential'
in!ormation,." 170 This fact demolishes Fox's claim regarding the sales data.
For ifthe information was available to competitors without its being released in
firms' financial statements, then the SEC mandated-disclosure could hardly be
an instance ofremediation ofinterfirm externalities that are neither voluntarily
166 See, e.g., Rick Antle & Stanley Garstka, Financial Accounting (forthcoming
2002) (manuscript at 15-23, on file with author) (Chapter 11: Long-Term Assets);
William H. Beaver & Roland E. Dukes, lnterperiod Tax Allocation and Depreciation
Methods: Some Empirical Results, 48 Acct. Rev. 549 (1973) (estimations providing
evidence that accounting depreciation methods were not consistent with underlying
cash flows of assets).
167 Fox, supra note 3, at 1353 n.33.
168 For a discussion of the benefits of these disclosures to investors, see Maurice C.
Kaplan & Daniel M. Reaugh, Accounting, Reports to Stockholders, and the SEC,
48 Yale LJ. 935, 948 (1939).
169 ld. at 946-47.
170 ld. at 947 (emphasis added).
HeinOnline -- 2 Theoretical Inq. L. 461 2001
2001] The Needfor Competition in International Securities Regulation 461
produced nor discoverable by competitors. Moreover, the discussion in the
article is in direct opposition to Fox's hypothesized regulatory rationale: it
indicates that when the agency believed a disclosure mandate would adversely
affect a firm's competitive position, it did hot require the specific disclosure.
The final item that Fox cites as an instance of the optimality of the SEC's
mandatory disclosure compared to voluntary disclosure because it concerns
interfirm externalities is the line of business or segment reporting standards.
These standards were adopted by the SEC in the late 1960s and have been
intensively studied by accountants and economists. While, as I noted in my
prior article,171 information regarding the profitability of a conglomerate by
line ofbusiness could provide information ofvalue to competitors and produce
a real cash-flow effect, the implementation ofthis reporting requirement under
the SEC rules has rendered it improbable that it would ever have such an effect.
As Edmund Kitch has cogently indicated, under the segment reporting rules,
a firm is accorded broad discretion to allocate costs and group activities,
and consequently, the rules cannot be expected to lead to any significant
disclosure of private information that would benefit competitors. 172 Kitch
explains this perhaps paradoxical result by the further contention that it
is virtually impossible in practice to implement a disclosure regime that
includes proprietary information of the sort of concern to Fox: either firms
will not meaningfully disclose the information or else they will delist to
avoid disclosure. 173 Kitch's thesis sheds light on the SEC's implementation
of its segment-reporting requirement: recognizing the quandary, the agency
naturally prefers non-meaningful disclosures to delistings.
The best available data are in accord with Kitch's analysis, rather than
171 Romano, supra note 2, at 2380-81.
172 Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 Brook.
L. Rev. 763, 858 (1995). Economists and accountants have modeled the segment
disclosure choice as a strategic game in which the disclosers use the information
to disadvantagt! competitors. A study testing such models found, consistent with
Kitch's hypothesis, that the choice to report a segment separately depends on the
competitiveness of the industry and the variation in the firm's earnings persistence
(profitability) in that sector, such that firms are less likely to disclose segments
separately when they are consistently earning abnormal profits. Rachel M. Hayes
& Russell Lundholm, Segment Reporting to the Capital Market in the Presence
of a Competitor, 34 J. Acct. Res. 261, 264 (1996) (one model of the strategic
disclosure choice and discussion of findings of unpublished empirical study testing
the strategic choice models). The recent accounting standard change regarding
segment reporting, which was directed at management's discretion, is discussed at
infra note 444.
173 Kitch, supra note 172, at 874.
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Fox's pOSition. Empirical studies of segment reporting uniformly show
that it has had no price impact on firms. 174 Fox states that this is to be
expected since some segment information should affect firms positively and
others negatively. 175 However, this rationalization is at odds with his critique
of Dye's model, as well as with the basis for his social welfare analysis of
disclosure policy, in which he asserts that the externality is necessarily in
one direction, positive (that is, the cash flow effect will be negative to the
discloser and positive to its competitors). Fox cannot have it both ways and be
theoretically consistent. Under his hypothesis, there should be a negative price
effect on a disclosing firm because it is releasing proprietary information that
will have an adverse impact on its value (otherwise, it would have voluntarily
disclosed the information). If Fox meant instead to contend that the lack of
a price effect is due to disclosing firms' benefiting from rivals' simultaneous
disclosures regarding their lines of business, then again, his rationalization of
the data is inconsistent with his theory ofregulation: because under his analysis
of interfirm externalities, the gains of competitors are, by definition, greater
than the losses of disclosing firms, then there should still be a significant price
, effect for the portfolio of disclosing firms, albeit a positive, not a negative,
one.
Fox further contends that the fact that some of the studies of segment
reporting show a reduction in the variance of returns after the segment
reporting requirement was adopted indicates that such disclosures are an
example of the information that he defines as interfirm externalities. 176
This contention is incorrect. If a piece of information entails an externality
such that it increases competitors' value at the expense of the disclosing firm,
then there must be a price effect, not a variance effect, from the disclosure of
such information. That is the definition of an interfirm externality-it affects
174 See Bipin B. Ajinkya, An Empirical Evaluation of Line-of-Business Reporting,
18 J. Acct. Res. 343, 357-59 (1980) (no effect on returns, increased consensus
in probability assessments); Daniel W. Collins & Richard R. Simonds, SEC
Line-of-Business Disclosure and Market Risk Adjustments, 17 J. Acct. Res. 352,
372-73, 378-80 (1979) (change in market risk); Bertrand Horwitz & Richard
Kolodny, Line ofBusiness Reporting and Security Prices: An Analysis of an SEC
Disclosure Rule, 8 Bell J. Beon. 234, 239, 241-42, 246 (1977) (no effect on market
risk or on returns); see generally Rosanne M. Mohr, The Segmental Reporting
Issue: A Review of Empirical Research, 2 J. Acct. Literature 39, 45-52, 56-62
(1983) (literature review summarizing general results of no effect on returns,
some improvements in analyst forecasts, increased consensus, evidence mixed
concerning whether market risk shifted).
175 Fox, supra note 3, at 1355.
176 Id.
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other firms' cash flows. Thus, in the formal models discussed earlier, the
item of information subject to potential disclosure regulation, which was the
precision (inverse of the variance) of a firm's returns, has an impact on the
returns of other firms, not on the variances of the returns. Accuracy of pricing
is not evidence of a cash-flow impact. Hence a reduction in the variance of
returns on the introduction of segment reporting, a change on which there is
not even consensus in the literature as to its occurrence, does not indicate that
the information released in segment reporting involves interfirm externalities
(affected the value of other firms' cash flows).
To the extent that there was a reduction in the variance of prices from the
segment reporting disclosures, this suggests that the requirement resulted in
greater standardization in reporting, which increases comparability across
firms. While this effect may benefit investors,177 it is not a benefit that
entails an interfirm externality of the sort that Fox uses to justify the single
regulator regime; that is, it is not a benefit to competitors (standardization
of disclosure does not enable competitors to determine more accurately
the profitability of their rivals and thereby to adopt more efficient business
strategies; indeed, it may even obscure special idiosyncrasies of particular
firms as it forces all firms into compliance with a specific format). Moreover,
even were standardization to benefit the competitors for whom Fox posits
the mandatory disclosure regime exists, Fox provides no evidence that a
single government agency is necessary to obtain standardized disclosure.
Standardization occurs in numerous contexts where there is no single
government regulator; the substantial uniformity of corporate law rules is one
ofthe more prominent examples. 178 In any event, the benefit ofstandardization
is not Fox's justification for mandatory disclosure under a single regulator,
because it has nothing to do with remediating interfirm externalities.
The data on the impact of the SEC's mandated segment reporting
disclosures are important indicia that even the context that would appear
to fit best with Fox's interfirm externalities rationale for a single securities
regulator fails to do so. Contemporary disclosure practices do not support
177 A decline in the variance of stock returns is not necessarily an improvement in
investor welfare. Namely, in an efficient market, stock prices change frequently
as information is released, so the more information that is produced by firms, the
higher we might expect the volatility of returns to be. From this perspective, a
decline in volatility after a rule change may indicate that in reaction to the rule,
there was a reduction in the information produced by firms, with a concomitant
reduction in price adjustment. A rule with such an impact does not benefit investors.
178 For a detailed discussion of why standardization does not require a single regulator,
see infra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
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the interfirm externalities rationale, because firms simply do not disclose
this type of information under existing SEC mandates. This is not because
firms are deliberately ignoring SEC mandates; it is because the SEC does
not require them to do so. When a theory of regulation is not theoretically
well-grounded and cannot practicably be implemented, as is true of the
interfirm externalities rationale for a single securities regulator, then the
position ought to be discarded rather than promoted as the basis for public
policy and, in particular, for justifying the status quo in securities regulation.
C. Evaluating the Empirical Data on the Efficacy of the Federal
Securities Regime
In developing the thesis for opening securities regulation up to competition,
I sought to make the case empirically-particularly given the ambiguity
in economic models regarding the efficacy of government disclosure
mandates-by drawing on the finance literature studying the impact of
the federal securities laws and the empirical literature on competition for
corporate charters in the United States. The finance literature on the federal
securities laws suggests that the regime has not been effective. But because
this literature cannot demonstrate the effectiveness of the alternative to the
SEC regime, regulatory competition, the literature on state competition for
charters is useful to consult, as it provides an existing legal context from
which we can project what, in all likelihood, will occur under competition
among securities regulators. 179 In his criticism of regulatory competition Fox
takes issue with my reading of the finance literature assessing the federal
securities laws. ISO In this Part, I show why Fox's critique is mistaken.
179 The state competition literature is discussed in the succeeding part, which illustrates
that despite some commentators' claims to the contrary, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk &
Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managersfrom
Takeovers, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1168 (1999), the experience of charter competition
has, on the whole, benefited shareholders, is better than the alternative, and is
quite relevant for an analysis of securities regulation. Fox does not offer any
evidence to dispute my characterization of the state competition literature, but cites
other commentators who disagree with it and asserts that the interfirm externalities
rationale for securities regulation renders the corporate law experience irrelevant.
Fox, supra note 3, at 1392-93. Because disclosure of interfirm externalities does
not provide a compelling rationale for a single securities regulator, see supra Part
III.B., the experience of state competition for corporate charters is instructive for
predicting the effect of regulatory competition on securities law.
180 Fox, supra note 3, at 1370-91.
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1. Benston's Study of the Disclosure Mandated by the 1934 Act
As discussed in my prior article, the groundbreaking study on the impact
of the 1934 Act was conducted by George Benston several decades ago. 181
Benston investigated the impact of the Act on firms' returns by comparing
pre- and post-Act returns of firms affected by the Act-those not disclosing
sales data prior to the Act-with those that were not affected-those already
disclosing sales data. Benston examined sales data as the distinguishing
feature, because sales, along with cost of goods sold, was the only item
mandated by the SEC that all NYSE-listed firms had not disclosed before
the Act. 182 Benston found that the legislation had no significant price effect. 183
Because new information is impounded into stock prices in capital markets
upon its disclosure, we can infer from the absence ofa price effect that the Act's
mandated disclosure of sales data did not provide meaningful information to
investors.
Benston's result is at odds with a characterization of the disclosure
regulation mandated by the SEC under the 1934 Act as an improvement
for investor welfare over the preexisting voluntary disclosure scheme. Fox
thus maintains that Benston' s test is not the correct test of the welfare
effects of the Act. This claim has two parts. Fox first turns Benston' s study
on its head by asserting that to improve investor welfare, the mandated
disclosure under the Act should have an effect on variance, not on price.
He then raises a series of objections to the specifics of Benston' s test for
a stock price effect. For ease of exposition, I discuss Fox's arguments in
reverse order.
a. Why Benston s test for a stock price effect is the correct measure of
the effect of the 1934 Act on investor welfare. In critiquing Benston's test
for a stock price effect of the 1934 Act, Fox raises several objections.
He first objects to Benston's examination of a "single disclosure item."184
This objection is inappropriate. The "single" item in question, sales, is
the only significant financial datum whose disclosure the SEC mandated
that the NYSE did not require of listed firms before the Act, as well
181 George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,63 Am. Econ. Rev. 132 (1973).
182 Id. at 133; see also GeorgeJ. Benston, The Value ofthe SEC's Accounting Disclosure
Requirements, 44 Ace.. Rev. 515, 519 (1969) (table indicating items disclosed by
all NYSE firms from 1926-1934).
183 Benston, supra note 181, at 144-45. See also George J. Benston, An Appraisal
of the Costs and Benefits of Government-Required Disclosure: SEC and FTC
Requirements, 41 Law & Contemp. Probs. 30, 51-52 (1977).
184 Fox, supra note 3, at 1373 n.91.
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as the only item of the mandated items that many NYSE firms did ·not
voluntarily disclose before the Act. 185 Consequently, this is the best piece of
information with which to test whether the Act had an effect, for it provides
us with a natural experiment: we can contrast the impact of the Act on firms
for which it imposed a disclosure requirement compared to those for which
it did not.
Fox next challenges Benston's hypothesis that the Act should have a
differential effect on prior non-disclosers coinpared to prior disclosers of
sales data. He contends instead that the correct hypothesis is that there
should be no effect; that is, the price impact should not differ between
pre-Act disclosing and non-disclosing firms. Fox's prediction is founded on
the view that the quality of sales information disclosed before the SEC
was established pursuant to. the 1934 Act was lower than that of the
sales information disclosed after the agency's creation, and hence, all
firms, regardless of their pre-Act disclosure status, benefited equally from
the legislation. 186 This is an odd hypothesis because it implies that the
SEC's mandatory sales disclosure imposed a new disclosure requirement on
firms that were already disclosing sales and Qot simply on firms that had
not previously done so. Under Fox's hypothesis, investors would have
reevaluated the price of firms that, after the Act, disclosed sales information
for the first time the same as they evaluated the price of firms that had
already been disclosing sales information prior to the Act. The assertion that
the Act's impact would have been no different for disclosers than for
non-disclosers is, however, implausible, because if the SEC were remedying
a market failure and sales information were important to investors, then they
should have reassessed the value of a firm that went from no disclosure to
disclosure of sales information after the Act differently from their
assessment of the value of a firm that always had disclosed some sales
information. Fox does not provide any explanation for why moving from
zero to high-quality disclosure would have precisely the same price effect as
moving from low- to high-quality disclosure, but such an explanation is
necessary given Benston's data (no differential price effect). Moreover, there
is no evidence that the quality of pre-Act disclosers' sales figures improved
after the Act, data that would also be necessary for Fox's hypothesis to be
185 Benston, supra note 181, at 133, 142. The SEC apparently copied much of
the NYSE disclosure requirements. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as
Regulator, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1453, 1466 (1997).
186 Fox, supra note 3, at 1373 n.91.
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correct. 18? But if Fox was correct, Benston should have fou.nd significant
returns for both samples, which he did not.
The data concerning the disclosure of cost of goods sold cast further
doubt on Fox's contention that Benston's results are questionable because of
an absolute improvement in disclosure quality after the Act. As previously
noted, cost of goods sold, like sales, was an item required by the SEC
that was not required by the NYSE. Although there was an increase in the
number of firms disclosing cost of goods sold in their income statements
after the Act (a rise from 33 to 47 firms), the increase occurred primarily
in the disclosure category that is described as the lowest quality, the one
that did not include depreciation, selling, and general and administrative
expenses in the calculation of cost of goods sold (a rise from 8 to 17 firms).
In fact, for the disclosure category described as the highest quality, which
included all of these items in the computation, there was a decline (a drop
from 9 to 5 firms). 188 Thus, cost of goods sold is not an item for which Fox's
claim of an increase in the quality of disclosure by all firms post-Act holds.
Yet Benston's results are identical-there was no price effect-when he uses
cost of goods sold instead of sales in his analysis of the 1934 Act's impact. 189
This suggests that the more plausible explanation of the data is Benston's, not
187 Fox's source on the quality of the disclosure of sales data, the 1939 article by SEC
staff attorneys, provides the following information on sales disclosures in firms'
income statements: Of the 70 firms in Kaplan & Reaugh's sample, supra note 168,
the number of firms disclosing net sales after the 1934 Act approximately doubled
(31 compared to 17 firms, including 3 firms that disclosed both gross and net sales
either before or after the Act). [d. at 945 n.42. The number of firms disclosing gross
sales, "sales" and "sales and operating revenue" is virtually unchanged (a rise from
22 to 23 firms), and 2 firms stopped disclosing net sales after the Act. [d. These
data suggest that the quality of disclosure did not significantly increase after the
Act. Furthermore, Kaplan and Reaugh do not indicate whether the new post-Act
disclosers of net sales were pre-Act disclosers of gross sales, and not pre-Act
nondisclosers and, correspondingly, whether the unchanged number of gross sales
disclosers post-Act were the same firms as the pre-Act disclosers of gross sales
rather than nondisclosers. Yet such distinctions are essential for Fox's hypothesized
explanation of Henston's data to be correct. Hence Fox's contention that the 1934
Act should not have had a price effect because it improved the quality of all firms'
disclosures is not credibly supported by his data source.
188 [d. at 949 n.59. There was virtually no change in the middle category that included
selling, general and administrative expenses (an increase from 16 to 19 firms), id.,
an item whose disclosure Kaplan and Reaugh consider crucial for computing the
cost of goods sold, id. at 950.
189 Henston, supra note 181, at 142 n.12.
HeinOnline -- 2 Theoretical Inq. L. 468 2001
468 Theoretical Inquiries in Law [Vol. 2:387
Fox's: there was no price effect because mandated disclosure did not improve
upon the voluntary disclosure provided prior to the Act.
There are other reasons to question the claim of the inadequacy of the
information provided to investors before the creation of the SEC as a basis for
rejecting the significance of Benston's finding. Fox states that the NYSE did
not require audited financial statements until 1932 and notes their absence
in the Exchange's 1925 manual. 190 But the information in the NYSE 1925
manual for market practices up through to 1934 on which Fox relies is, in
fact, grossly misleading. Benston's research indicates that the vast majority of
NYSE firms' financial statements were audited before the NYSE required the
practice in 1932 (82% were audited in 1926 and 94% in 1934, forexample),191
and other sources from the 1930s indicate that at least 85% of NYSE firms
were audited before enactment of the 1934 Act. 192 In fact, entrepreneurs have
been voluntarily submitting to independent audits for centuries. Ross Watts
and Jerold Zimmerman detail the voluntary use of independent auditors dating
from thirteenth-century merchant guilds and up through to the earliest known
corporate forms, including joint stock companies, for centuries prior to the
United Kingdom's codification of the six-hundred-year-old practice in 1844,
and they note that audits ofU.S. corporations occurred in the nineteenth century
as well. 193 Ifcertified financial statements are a sign ofthe quality ofdisclosure,
as Fox implies in his claim that they did not exist prior to the creation of the
SEC, then Fox is doubly incorrect: not only is his claim that the SEC was
necessary for investors to obtain certified financial statements false, but so is
the claim that the level of voluntary disclosure was of inadequate quality. 194
190 Fox, supra note 3, at 1376, 1376 n.99.
191 Benston, supra note 182, at 519-20. It should be noted that the first required filing
of financial statements under the 1934 Act was in July 1935.
192 See Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street 48 n.32, 633 (1995).
193 See Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmerman, Agency Problems. Auditing, and the
Theory ofthe Firm: Some Evidence, 26 J.L. & Econ. 613 (1983).
194 Another error in this regard is Fox's claim that Benston's only source of information
regarding what firms disclosed or were required by exchanges to disclose was
inquiries to the exchanges. Fox, supra note 3, at 1376. In fact, Benston not only
surveyed the exchanges, but he confirmed firms' disclosure practices by using
another data source, Moody's Manuals, a publication available to investors at the
time, which contained the NYSE firms' financial information. Benston uses the
data on firms from his earlier study, cited in supra note 182, in conjunction with his
exchange surveys. Benston, supra note 181, at 142. Fox's dismissal of Benston's
data by the claim that the NYSE provided self-serving, false information to Benston
regarding auditing requirements is therefore irrelevant, as the NYSE is not the only
source of information regarding pre-Act auditing practices.
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Another example that Fox provides to convey a "sense of the magnitude
of the problem" of inadequate disclosure, the failure of the NYSE to mandate
disclosure of depreciation,195 is equally misplaced as a criticism of Benston 's
study. Benston found that 71 % of NYSE firms disclosed depreciation in 1926,
and this figure undoubtedly understates the level ofdisclosure in later years, as
by 1934, the year of the federal legislation and thus the last filing year before
the 1934 Act took effect, it was up to 93%.196 For instance, we do not know how
many investors were able to obtain such information privately nor whether
the nature of the assets of the non-disclosing firms was such that providing
a depreciation figure would not be informative, compared to the disclosing
firms (Le., the bulk of the firms' assets were intangible and, hence, non-
depreciated). Of course, as previously noted, the disclosure of depreciation
is not particularly economically meaningful in the first place, given the lack
of a connection between accounting depreciation measures and economic
depreciation. It is therefore not apparent why Fox thinks revelation of this
information would be of much significance to investors (let alone competitors
under his interfirm externalities rationale for mandatory disclosure).
Fox's discussion of disclosure practices before and after the creation of
the SEC with the 1934 Act does not, then, refute the validity of Benston's
test of the impact of the 1934 Act and the SEC's mandatory disclosure
on investor welfare: the proper test for a welfare improvement is whether
there is a difference in the stock price impact on prior disclosers of sales
information compared to prior non-disclosers. Sales information would have
to be of no value to investors-which is inconsistent with Fox's critique
of Benston's study that the level of voluntary disclosure before the 1934
Act was inadequate-for Fox's alternative hypothesis to be the correct
prediction.
At a later point in his article, Fox restates his objection to Benston's study
based on the adequacy of pre-Act disclosure somewhat differently. Rather
than relating the quality of disclosure to the predicted hypothesis of the Act's
price effects, Fox maintains that Benston's interpretation of his data-that
the Act had no effect on firms' disclosures--cannot be correct because
SEC proponents in the 1930s maintained that the SEC had a significant
impact on disclosure.1 97 As evidence in support of this position, he cites in
particular the finding in the 1939 article by SEC staff attorneys that 4 of 70
firms did not provide shareholders with income statements before the 1934
195 Fox, supra note 3, at 1378.
196 Benston, supra note 182, at 519.
197 Fox, supra note 3, at 1376.
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Act. 198 However, Fox neglected to state that the same article also reports that
3 of 70 firms did not provide shareholders with income statements after the
1934 Act as well. l99 Not only is this an exceedingly small number of firms
not providing income statements, but also the number of non-reporters was,
for practical purposes, unchanged by the legislation. Moreover, as the article
by the SEC staff attorneys further states, institutional investors and other
substantial shareholders "often managed" to obtain financial information not
otherwise published from firms prior to the Act.2OO Since informed traders set
the market price, individual investors would not have been harmed by the
supposed inadequate financial disclosures that the SEC ostensibly remedied.
Although many commentators in the 1930s believed that voluntary
disclosures were inadequate and the SEC significantly improved disclosure
practices, it is perilous to rely exclusively, as does Fox, on the
characterization of the state of disclosure quality made by contemporaries
of the SEC-most of whom were partisans in a pitched political battle
in the midst of an economic depression-to measure its achievement.
The assertions of such individuals should be handled with care because
advocates of the legislation at the time were working from what have turned
out to be mistaken premises regarding the economics and institutions of
financial markets. Subsequent'research has shown that many of the supposed
factual premises that underpinned the rhetoric regarding the harms of the
"unregulated" market that produced the federal securities legislation were,
in fact, incorrect. Paul Mahoney, for instance, has demonstrated the fallacy
of the claims motivating the enactment of the 1934 Act regarding rampant
stock price manipulation by trading pOOIS.201 In addition, Harold Bierman
198 ld. at 1376-77 n.99.
199 Kaplan & Reaugh, supra note 168, at 940. Presumably the firms identified as not
providing shareholders with income statements filed income statements, as required
by the Act, with the SEC, but did not include that information in the annual reports
provided to shareholders. As the NYSE also required income statements, it is
probable as well that the four pre-Act non-disclosing firms in Kaplan and Reaugh's
sample provided that information as required by the exchange but not directly to
their shareholders. Supporting this conjecture is Benston's finding that 100% of
NYSE firms reported their net income in 1926 as well as 1934, Benston, supra note
182, at 519, and it is improbable that the number would have decreased in 1930,
the pre-Act year in Kaplan and Reaugh's study, as the time series data available in
these studies show little aggregate change in disclosure practices. It should also be
noted that the income data could have been available to investors without going to
the stock exchange or, for that matter, in hiter years, to the SEC, because Benston's
source for firms' financial data was Moody's Manuals. Id.
200 Kaplan & Reaugh, supra note 168, at 937.
201 See Paul G. Mahoney, The Stock Pools and the Securities Exchange Act, 51 J. Fin.
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has investigated the manipulation claims motivating the federal securities
legislation and concluded that there was little truth behind the claims.202
Finally, Benston concludes with a similar finding regarding the claims of
rampant financial statement fraud, that there is little evidence that there were
a significant number ofcases of fraud in financial statements prepared prior to
the enactment of the federal securities laws.203
Fox advances one other objection to the formulation of Benston's study
of testing the welfare effects of the 1934 Act by examining stock price
effects. He criticizes the very object of Benston's study, the 1934 Act, by
questioning the significance of the Act compared to the 1933 Act with
respect to mandated disclosure. His claim is that because the 1933 Act had
more severe civil liability sanctions than the 1934 Act, firms did not have to
comply with the 1934 Act, and this is supposed to explain Benston's failure
to find a significant impact. Fox makes this comparison in order to conclude
that it is "a particular danger" to view a study of the impact of the 1934
Act as suggestive of the value of the legislation today.204 In other words, we
are supposed to give credence to the argument that even if the 1934 Act had
no impact on stock prices, if we could redo Benston's test today, we would
uncover an impact, because of an increase in civil sanctions.
Although a counterfactual cannot be disproved, there is nothing to suggest
that Fox's speculation is correct. First, Fox provides no evidence that firms
flouted the 1934 Act, and if they had, it would be inconsistent with his thesis
that the Act had an impact on the quality of disclosure. Further undermining
this particular critique, it should also be noted that the 1933 Act with its
higher civil sanctions also had no price effect.205 Second and more important,
in today's markets, there is an extensive industry producing information about
firms, and the vast majority of investors are sophisticated institutions. These
&on. 343 (1999) (finding that the pattern of price changes was umelated to pool
trading and to what we would expect were the pools manipulating prices). See also
Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy ofthe Securities Act of1933,30 J. Legal
Stud. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Mahoney, The Political Economy of the Securities Act]
(explanation of the 1933 Act's prohibition of new issue gun-jumping as a means
to reduce competition in favor of established investment banks rather than as an
investor protection device). In addition, the federal regulation of futures markets,
initiated in the 1920s, was similarly grounded in a flawed understanding of those
markets. See Romano, supra note 19, at 293-95,307-10.
202 See Harold Bierman, Jr., The Great Myths of 1929 and the Lessons to Be Learned
133-45 (1991).
203 Benston, supra note 181, at 135; Benston, supra note 182, at 517-18.
204 Fox, supra note 3, at 1373-74 n.91.
205 See infra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
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factors render far less important both government-mandated disclosure and
the threat of civil sanctions today than in the 1930s, when, according to Fox,
firms were ignoring the SEC's mandates with impunity. Hence, if there is a
reason not to draw conclusions from studies of the impact of the 1934 Act, it
would not be because a change in government sanctions makes the Act more
potent today, but, rather, because improvements in information technology and
the development of new financial intermediaries and supporting institutions
make the Act of far less importance today, which undercuts Fox's position.
Moreover, there is considerable research on the impact of SEC-imposed
disclosure requirements post-1934, in the more contemporary era for which
Fox's objection to empirical data because of a low probability of civil
liability is inapplicable. The findings of the more recent studies are, in fact,
in accord with those of Benston's study. The numerous studies investigating
the SEC's adoption of segment reporting requirements in 1969 have failed to
identify any stock price effect,206 In addition, studies of the SEC's mandated
disclosure of the replacement cost of assets in 1976 find that the change had
no effect on stock prices.207 Thus, as with the sales disclosure mandate ofthe
1934 Act, neither of these more recent mandates provided new information
regarding firm values. The data regarding the absence of a price effect from
SEC disclosure regulation are, accordingly, consistent over time: the SEC's
mandates have not been directed at producing information ofvalue to investors
beyond what was being voluntarily produced.
b. The inappropriateness of the use of variance of stock returns as the
standard of investor welfare. In response to the data that the 1934 Act had
no impact on stock prices, Fox contends that mandatory disclosure of new
information should not effect returns, but, rather, should effect the variance
of returns.208 This is an assertion that Fox invokes several times in his article.
This claim, however, misunderstands and misuses the literature.
For instance, Fox uses a quote from George Stigler that price dispersion
is a measure of ignorance in the market, in support of his claim that
a reduction in the variance of stock returns after the enactment of the
206 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
207 See Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmennan, Positive Accounting Theory 174, 174
n.9 (1986) (citing studies).
208 Fox, supra note 3, at 1375. Indeed, Fox recharacterizes Benston's study as an
investigation of the risk of stocks around the enactment of the 1934 Act in contrast
to how Benston viewed his study, as first and foremost a study of the Act's impact on
prices. See Benston, supra note 181, at 137 ("If the SEC's disclosure requirements
are meaningful, the statements they require should contain infonnation and [the
effect] should be reflected in changes in its (a corporation's) stock prices.").
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federal securities laws indicates that they improved investor welfare.209 The
Stigler quotation is, however, being misused with respect to the findings in
Benston's study of the 1934 Act, as well as studies of the 1933 Act, which
Fox is grouping together in his reference to Stigler. Stigler was not referring
to the size of the variance in the return of a stock over time when he refers to
dispersion, but rather, he is discussing dispersion in the price of a good offered
by different sellers-the frequency distribution of prices quoted by sellers for
a particular good at a single period of time (such as, to use Stigler's example,
the asking price of a Chevrolet by Chicago auto dealers in 1959). The use of
the term dispersion in the disparate settings as a measure of informativeness to
purchasers is inaccurate. An appropriate use in a stock market setting would
be the dispersion across bid-and-ask prices of a stock's market makers; a
reduction in this dispersion is not, however, what is measured by the stock
return variance in the studies being critiqued by Fox.
Stigler's contribution was to show that consumer search reduces price
dispersion and that the optimal level of search equates the marginal cost of
search and its marginal expected return (a better price). Stigler discussed
mechanisms by which dispersion is reduced (or search is subsidized), such
as advertising prices and development of specialized traders, and concluded
that it would be "wholly uneconomic entirely to eliminate [ignorance's]
effects."210 Stigler's conclusion is at odds with the view that Fox apparently is
espousing, that government intervention is necessary to mitigate a consumer
search problem that results in large disparities in a good's prices depending
on sale location. Moreover, in Stigler's own empirical research on the federal
securities laws, he expressly did not view a reduction in variation in stock
prices as evidence that the federal regime had a beneficial impact on investors
and, instead, hypothesized that such an effect would be evidenced by an
increase in stock returns.211
Stigler shares the view that is the consensus among financial economists,
namely, that the stock market efficiently processes information such that
small investors do not have to engage in a search for price protection.212 It is
209 Id. at 1370 (quoting from Stigler's classic 1961 article The Economics of
Information).
210 GeorgeJ. Stigler, The Economics ofInformation, 69 J. Pol. Econ. 213, 224 (1961).
211 George J. Stigler, Public Regulation ofSecurities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964).
212 A recent survey of financial economists indicated that there is consensus on the
efficient market hypothesis. Ivo Welch, Views of Financial Economists on the
Equity Premium and on Professional Controversies, 73 J. Bus. 501 (2000). If a
stock has multiple listings, then there might be price dispersion, but this is not
relevant to the issue that Fox is discussing, since the stocks investigated in the
studies on the enactment of the federal securities laws were single market listings.
HeinOnline -- 2 Theoretical Inq. L. 474 2001
474 Theoretical Inquiries in Law [Vol. 2:387
textbook learning that in an efficient market, new information that is of value
to investors affects stock prices, not their variance.213 The relevant measure
of risk that affects value in modem finance theory is not firms' total variance,
the measure on which Fox focuses, but market (systematic) risk.214 Moreover,
where firm-specific measures have been found empirically to affect returns,
the variance of returns is not a significant variable; rather, price-to-earnings
and market-to-book value ratios are significant.215 Diversified investors will
not pay a premium for a reduction in own-firm variance, and hence information
affecting the firm-specific risk of a security will not be incorporated in stock
prices, because diversification eliminates this risk.
Fox highlights the 1934 Act's impact on variance rather than return
because Benston found that the total variance of returns decreased,
although the market risk or sensitivity of returns in relation to market
movements (beta)-the only risk of concern to investors in modem finance
theory-increased after the ACt.216 But Benston further found that there was
no difference in the change in variance across the two groups of firms in his
sample, the pre-Act disclosers and non-disclosers of sales data. Namely, the
firms for which the Act's mandate had bite, the pre-Act non-disclosers ofsales,
did not experience a greater reduction in variance than those that had always
disclosed sales. In fact, the variance of the non-disclosers was slightly lower
than that of the pre-Act disclosers, in both the pre- and post-SEC periods.
Because the decline in variance occurred for both sets of firms and not simply
for the firms whose disclosure was impacted by the Act, Benston concluded
that the 1934 Act did not affect the variance in stock returns.217
Even if we accept Fox's, rather than Benston's, interpretation of the
In addition, price differentials in the context of a mUltiple listing have little to do
with the level of disclosure by issuers, which is Fox's concern, but, rather, have to
do with broker execution costs and secondary exchanges' lower costs of operation
compared to the primary market such as the NYSE, which is the principal location
of price discovery for the shares. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara,
Regulating Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: A Law and Economics
Perspective, 28 J. Legal Stud. 17,29-30 (1999).
213 See, e.g., Ross et aI., supra note 6, at 319-26.
214 See id. at 255-61, 273-81.
215 ld. at 270.
216 Benston, supra note 181, at 144-45, 149.
217 ld. at 149. It should further be noted that the decline in variance occurred either in
mid-1933 or mid-1936, depending on how one views the scatterplots of the data,
neither of which years can readily be associated with an impact from the 1934 Act.
George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: Rejoinder, 65 Am.
Ecoo. Rev. 473,475 (1975).
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significance of the variance data-that the standard for a welfare gain
from a variance effect does not require a differential effect on the variance
of pre-Act disclosers and that of non-disclosers-it is important to note
that a reduction in variance across-the-board does not demonstrate that
government intervention to mandate disclosure is required to improve
investor welfare. Interpreting the data most favorably to Fox's position,
a reduction in variance could suggest that the 1934 Act had an effect of
standardization-the spread in stock returns decreased because the SEC's
disclosure regulation facilitated investor comparison of firms. But such a
finding is not evidence that the SEC was necessary for standardization.218
To the contrary, product standardization has, for instance, occurred in
contemporary financial markets-the unregulated financial derivatives sector
developed its own standard form contract for swaps-as well as in numerous
non-financial sectors, such as electronics, without government intervention.
More importantly, stock exchanges can implement uniform standards for
securities disclosure, and when the federal securities laws were enacted in the
1930s, such efforts had been under way at the NYSE for some time.219
218 Fox appears to be aware that state intervention is not a prerequisite for
standardization, because he does not make such an argument-the need for
standardization-when he advocates the necessity for mandatory disclosure by
a single regulator; he relies on the need to address interfirm externalities.
Standardization involves a financial, and not a real, externality, because it does
not have an impact on firms' cash flows. The concern that Fox emphasizes is
the disclosure of information relating to real rather than financial externalities.
Dye's model suggests that regulation is unnecessary in the context of financial
externalities because in that context, voluntary disclosure and mandated disclosure
generally produce the same outcome. Dye, supra note 84, at 15. The exception
is when the utility of a risk-averse disclosing firm's entrepreneur is not equally
weighted in the social welfare function with the utilities of other entrepreneurs
and investors, but this is an objective function inconsistent with Fox's approach
to social welfare, which focuses on the gains to other firms even at the disclosing
firm's expense, and would therefore not overweight the disclosing firm's welfare.
Moreover, if the undiversified entrepreneur is risk-neutral, then there is also no
divergence between voluntary and mandatory disclosure outcomes, regardless of
the utility function weights. [d. Admati and Pfleiderer view standardization as of
at most "secondary importance" to the issue of mandatory disclosure, because the
need for a standard does not imply a need for government action, as firms have
incentives to adopt a standard on their own. Admati & Pfleiderer, supra note 85,
at 513-14. Finally, as earlier noted, a decline in variance after the 1934 Act is
not a welfare improvement if it is due to fewer price changes because less useful
information is being produced. See supra note 177.
219 See Mahoney, supra note 185, at 1469-70 (discussing turning point for NYSE
disclosure requirements beginning in 1910 with the abolishment of unlisted trading).
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Government intervention might be called for if the market were to
adopt a standard that is sub-optimal. But such an outcome is scarcely to
be expected in the securities disclosure context, given the multiplicity of
repeat-play financial intermediaries who stand to gain from the choice of
a better standard and given the ability of exchanges, a natural source of
disclosure .standards through listing requirements, to internalize the costs
and benefits of uniform disclosure where a single firm would not because
exchanges "own" the marketplace on which the firms trade. Most important,
even if government regulation is necessary to provide a standard, competing
regulators are not an obstacle to the accomplishment of standardization of
disclosure. In the United States, for example, there are fifty state corporation
codes, but there is substantial uniformity in their substantive content.220 In
addition, all of the states have accepted the accounting standards adopted by
the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") in the exercise of their
licensing power over the accounting profession, while they could have applied
different rules for solely local (in-state) businesses, as they have done with
respect to the registration requirements for new issues.
It is important to conclude by clarifying what is at issue in the dispute
over the findings regarding stock price and variance in Benston's study and,
accordingly, the significance of his research for regulatory competition. The
issue regarding the efficacy of the single regulator system is not whether
220 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. Despite the efforts of the International
Accounting Standards Committee ("IASC"), there is, at present, substantial diversity
in national accounting standards. Fox contends that this is evidence that each
nation's firms are so inherently different that different rules by national origin are
appropriate. See Fox, supra note 13. A related argument is made by Stephen Choi
and Andrew Guzman, that because of territorial-based regulation, this diversity is
an imperfect reflection of a need for diversity in standards across firms, which is
not correlated with firms' national origins but firm-specific characteristics. Choi &
Guzman, supra note 23. These contentions may well be true. However, another
plausible explanation of the diversity in international accounting standards is the
lack of effective regulatory competition: when domestic firms are captive registrants
because of a prohibitive cost to transferring regimes (the loss of the home capital
market), national regulators can more easily retain inefficient accounting rules
as they will not lose firms to a regulator with superior rules. See supra notes
14-17 and accompanying text. Thus, the SEC can refuse to implement accounting
rules favored by other regulators that are members of the lASe, because U.S.
firms must comply with the accounting rules the SEC approves and cannot
choose to operate under another accounting system. If there were international
securities regulation competition, then there would automatically be competition
for accounting standards as well, and uniformity in the standards for at least
multinational firms might be reached quite rapidly.
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a regulator can possibly identify additional items beyond what firms will
disclose voluntarily. Because information production is costly, a regulator
can always identify an item that h,as not been voluntarily disclosed by all firms
and might be of use to a hypothetical investor. The issue is, however, whether
such additional disclosures are cost-justified from investors' perspectives.
None of Fox's criticisms of Benston's study are directed at this question, and
this is a serious failing. Benston's finding that stock prices did not increase
upon the SEC's enhanced disclosure requirements is strongly suggestive
that the market's cost-benefit calculation was, in fact, correct, that is, the
information was either already available or it was not of sufficient value
to investors to justify the cost to firms in disclosing it. This should not be
surprising: markets are particularly well-suited for making such judgments.
2. Event Studies of the 1933 Act
Several studies have sought to determine the impact of the 1933 Act on
the value of new issues, the most celebrated and earliest of which was
conducted by George Stigler.221 All ofthe studies, which compare new issue
prices before and after the legislation over varying lengths of time thereafter,
find that the 1933 Act had no price effect.222 Under textbook finance theory,
this suggests that as was true of the 1934 Act, the 1933 Act did not provide
investors with meaningful new information.
Fox dismisses the significance of the event studies of the 1933 Act,
contending that we should not expect to see a price effect from the Act's
newly-mandated disclosure, because inadequate disclosure prior to the
legislation would have been impounded in stock prices and equalized
returns before and after the Act.223 This position is inconsistent with Fox's
221 Stigler, supra note 211; Gregg A. Jarrell, The Economic Effects of Federal
Regulation of the Market for New Securities Issues, 24 J.L. & &on. 613 (1981);
Carol J. Simon, The Effect of the 1933 Securities Act on Investor Information and
the Performance ofNew Issues, 79 Am. &on. Rev. 295 (1989).
222 The only exception is one subsample in Simon's study, unseasoned issues traded
on regional exchanges, which experienced higher returns after the Act. Simon,
supra note 221, at 304-05. But this subsample also performed significantly worse
in both periods than the other new issues in her study, id. at 308, so it is difficult
to conclude that the Act was of much help even to the investors in this subset of
firms.
223 Fox, supra note 3, at 1382. Fox raises some additional objections to the studies that
are not well founded. He wrongly implies that Stigler and Jarrell are comparing
new issues with secondary offerings; both compare the returns of new issues before
and after the Act, adjusted for the return on the market as a whole. Stigler, supra
note 211, at 120, Jarrell, supra note 221, at 630-32. Fox also objects to testing
for a price effect from new information by adjusting individual stock returns for
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contention that mandated disclosure was necessitated by the inadequacy ofthe
disclosure produced by the market. For if voluntary disclosure is inadequate,
then returns should have improved after th~ 1933 Act; investors would have
no longer been misled about firm values and improperly pricing the securities.
The relative rate of return on new issues should have increased after the Act
compared to the rate ofreturn on such issues before the Act had the Act solved
an information failure in the new issues market.
Fox further contends, as he argued regarding the 1934 Act, that the
effect of the 1933 Act should be a reduction in investors' risk and
not an improvement in returns.224 But as earlier discussed, this contention
is incorrect. The impact that would be reasonably expected if a disclosure
provides new information-the rationale for mandating disclosure, that the
information was not released voluntarily-is an improvement in returns
and not in variance. This is textbook learning on the operation of capital
markets-they are efficient such that the public disclosure of a new piece of
information that affects investors' assessments of a firm's future cash flows
will immediately be impounded into the stock's price.225 There is only no price
effect if the datum is not informative-if it does not alter investors' valuations
of the firm. Accordingly, the event studies imply that the proponents of the
Act were simply wrong in their assumption of the new issue capital market's
serious imperfections or of the remedial efficacy of the legislation.
While the event studies of the 1933 Act do not uncover any price effect, the
variance of the returns of new issues declined.226 In Fox's view, the reduction
in total variance post-1933 evinces investors' ability to estimate firms' futures
cash flows improved after the legislation. However, as I discussed in my prior
article, there are suggestive data that the reduction in risk after the 1933 is
not an indication that investors were able to make better forecasts due to
the mandated disclosure, but rather, a result of the elimination of high-risk
firms from public capital markets.227 In particular, Gregg Jarrell has found that
there was a decrease in the proportion of outstanding new issues of common
market movements, on the grounds that individual rates of returns are equalized so
absolute returns should be studied. This objection is inconsistent with elementary
principles of modem finance, that stock returns are determined by their relation to
market risk and that whether a datum is new information, such that it produces an
abnormal return, can only be identified by adjusting the return for the simultaneous
impact of the market's movement. See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
224 Fox, supra note 3, at 1370.
225 See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
226 Stigler, supra note 211; Jarrell supra note 221; Simon, supra note 221.
227 Romano, supra note 2, at 2377.
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stock to debt after the 1933 Act and that there was a dramatic increase in the
private placement market for debt of high-risk bonds.228 He also has found
that there were fewer high-beta (that is, high market-risk) new issues after the
Act than before it, a clear indication of fewer high-risk offerings post-1933 .229
The only explanation that reconciles all of these findings is that the 1933
Act led to a decrease in public offerings with high risk. This explanation is
important because a reduction in the variance of returns due to a contraction in
investors' opportunity set after the legislation is not a welfare improvement.
To the contrary, because investors merely require higher compensation to
invest in securities with greater risk, the restricted availability of financing for
high-risk ventures by the loss of access to public markets entails a net social
loss.
Fox offers no evidence to refute the explanation of the variance decline
as due to withdrawal of high-risk issues from the public sector. He instead
advances the "suspicion" that the Depression caused an increase in debt. 230
Fox's suspicion, however, is not pertinent for Jarrell's data, which distinguish
across the risk of the debt issues. In particular, Fox does not explain why the
Depression, which had begun four years prior to the enactment of the 1933
Act, would have increased the issuance of debt (in hard financial times and
with many bank failures, for instance, one would expect that it would have
been more difficult for firms to borrow during the Depression and that debt
issuance would have declined rather than risen) or why, as Jarrell found, the
Depression would have affected the composition of debt across markets, that
is, forced higher-risk debt to be privately rather than publicly marketed after
1933. Fox simply does not have an explanation of the data that are at odds
with his position regarding the efficacy of the 1933 Act.
Fox's final argument to counter the contention that the reduction in
variance post-1933 indicates that the Act adversely affected the public
issuance of high-risk securities is to assert that there is no "obvious" reason
why the 1933 Act would have shifted the issues with the greatest risk
away from the public sector.231 In my prior article, I provided one explanation
for why risky offerings would have shifted away from public markets after
228 Jarrell, supra note 221, at 661,664,667,669.
229 Id. at 648. Simon did not undertake an investigation similar to Jarrell's. But she
does note that the unregulated over-the-counter market for stock issues increased
significantly after the 1933 Act and suggests that the "extent to which SEC
regulation shifted riskier securities to unregulated markets is an important issue to
be addressed in future research." Simon, supra note 221, at 313.
230 Fox, supra note 3, at 1371 n.83..
231 Id.
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the enactment of the 1933 Act, the hypothesis of Seha Tinie, that the 1933
Act's liability regime deterred high-risk issues from coming under the Act,
because the Act subjected underwriters to strict liability and the possibility of
poor performance is higher for issues with greater risk.232 Tinie advanced this
thesis to explain the well-documented phenomenon that IPOs are underpriced
and offered evidence that the new offering discount increased after 1933. But
Tinic provided more suggestive data supporting the explanation of the 1933
Act's variance reduction as removing issues with high risk from the market:
a showing that the new securities that reputable underwriters, who have the
most to lose from litigation, were willing to offer shifted after the 1933 Act to
larger issues with less risk.233
Fox criticizes Tinie's litigation-avoidance thesis as an explanation of the
variance results by contending that the discount for a new issue post-1933 is
too high to be explained by the cost of liability.234 But litigation costs do not
have to explain the entire discount ofnew issues for the thesis to be correct that
the new liability standard under the securities laws affected the desirability
of underwriting risky issues. Underpricing could be a function of numerous
underwriter reputational concerns, of which lawsuit damages is only one
component. In other words, Tinie's thesis and data support Jarrell's conclusion
regarding the impact of the 1933 Act on market composition, whether or
not they explain what Tinie set out to explain, namely, !PO underpricing.
Moreover Fox's criticisms are not directed at the more suggestive evidence in
Tinic's study in support ofthe hypothesis that the 1933 Act removed the riskier
issues from the public sector, the shift in offering sponsorship by reputable
underwriters to less risky issues post-1933.
232 Seha M. Tinic, Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock, 43 J. Fin.
789 (1988).
233 Id. at 813.
234 Fox, supra note 3, at 1372 n.83. Fox's related criticism regarding Tinic's insurance
hypothesis is puzzling. Fox questions why one would give up a dollar today
to be sure that one is not sued for a dollar tomorrow. Id. That is what firms
generally do when they buy liability insurance. Fox should consider questioning
the rationale for having a liability insurance industry, rather than linic's hypothesis
of self-insurance; presumably in the 1930s, it was cheaper for underwriters to
drop riskier issues than to purchase liability insurance, as insurance would have
been quite costly because there would not have been an actuarial baseline from
which insurers could set premiums. There are data to support such a speculation:
an important factor contributing to the crisis in directors' and officers' liability
insurance in the 1980s was increased legal uncertainty. See Roberta Romano, What
Went Wrong with Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance?, 14 Del. J. Corp. L.
1,21-30 (1989).
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In addition to the litigation-avoidance explanation already noted, there
are other explanations for why the 1933 Act could have pushed high-risk
issues out of public markets. For example, another possible explanation
involves the restrictions the SEC placed on the accounting information that
could be revealed in the documents for public securities. The SEC followed
the conventional conservative bias in accounting and required the use of
historical cost as opposed to market value of assets, prohibited the use of
appraisals and earnings forecasts, and led the campaign to eliminate goodwill
from balance sheets.235 To the extent that it is more important for high-risk
firms to convey such information to investors in order to obtain the best issue
price than it is for low-risk firms, the agency's disclosure policy would force
high-risk firms into the private placement market, where they could continue
to provide the prohibited information.
Suggestive data on this hypothesized impact on high-risk firms of
the accounting requirements of the Act are provided in a study by
George Benston, in which he investigated which industries used private
debt most frequently for new issues after the 1933 Act (a market that
largely did not exist before 1934). Benston found that the post-1933
private issuers tended to be in industries for which, according to his
rankings, conservative accounting is misleading and, consequently, were
those industries for which the SEC's reporting requirements could
produce a negative bias in investors.236 These were extractive industries,
where historical cost of property is less meaningful and appraisals of
estimates of oil in the ground are the critical data for valuation, and
transportation and retail firms, where intangibles like monopoly franchises
and goodwill are major assets. Unfortunately Benston did not measure
industry risk, and hence we cannot conclude from his findings that the
accounting explanation of why the legislation would remove risky issues
from public markets is correct. But as with Tinic's data, Benston's
data imply that the federal securities laws affected the composition of
offerings.
I will conclude this discussion by noting one other possible explanation
for a decrease in the risk of new issues after the 1933 Act. Many of the
procedures established for public underwriting in the 1933 Act were directed
at protecting the interests of more established sectors of the financial industry
(wholesale investment banks) over newer interests (integrated retailers).237
235 See, e.g., Benston, supra note 182, at 526.
236 Id. at 527-28.
237 See Mahoney, The Political Economy of the Securities Act, supra note 201.
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The Act's distributional impact on the financial industry provides an even
more straightforward explanation for why there would be a decline in public
offerings of high-risk issues after the Act. The legislation appears to have
driven out of business many smaller regional underwriters, who tended to
handle high-risk issues.238
Supporters of the SEC such as Fox may find none of the explanations
advanced for why the 1933 Act would force high-risk issuers out of
the public market (the Act's strict liability for underwriters, the SEC's
conservative accounting disclosure requirements, or the adverse impact on
regional underwriters) persuasive, but they are all coherent explanations.
More important, they are entirely consistent with the data regarding the
impact of the Act on stock returns and variances, as well as Jarrell's
additional data related to high-risk issues. Fox's explanation of the variance
effect of the Act as indicating a change in the accuracy of stock value
assessments rather than a change in the composition of public issues, in
contrast, cannot explain Jarrell's findings regarding high-risk issues; it only
explains the finding of a general reduction in the variance of returns after
1933.
But even if we were to reject Stigler's and Jarrell's market composition
explanation of the change in variance around the 1933 Act, in favor of
Fox's conjecture, as earlier discussed, finding a variance reduction from the
legislation does not demonstrate that the Act (and, derivatively, mandatory
disclosure by a single regulator) was a welfare-increasing policy step. First,
the variance reduction detected in the studies ofthe 1933 Act was a measure
of firm-specific risk and not market risk. Textbook finance theory teaches that
the risk that is priced is market risk, and hence, investor wealth is not affected
by a reduction in firm-specific risk.239 Consequently, the reduction in variance
ofthe 1933 Act cannot be characterized as improving investor welfare. Second
and correspondingly, if there is no price effect from a mandated disclosure,
then the requirement did not provide new information concerning future cash
flows. It was either already available in the marketplace or of no value to
investors.
A reduction in variance, without a price effect, implies that the 1933
Act, at best, had the impact of a standardization of the disclosure for
238 Id. at 28-29. Mahoney, who provides persuasive evidence of the distributional
effect of the 1933 Act, notes that Henry Manne suggested that the 1933 Act helped,
rather than hurt, the major investment banks, "who underwrote low-risk securities
and ... had nothing to lose from a 'full disclosure policy' and much to gain from
driving out underwriters of high-risk securities." [d. at 2.
239 See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
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new issues-at worst, it means that the Act reduced the level of reliable
information being produced, which would have lowered stock return
variance because prices change less frequently when new information is
not revealed in a timely fashion. But it bears repeating that even under the
most benign interpretation of the data's effect on investors, standardization
does not require a single regulator or a mandatory regime; it can be and is
accomplished voluntarily.240 Additional evidence in support of this assertion
can be gleaned from Carol Simon's 1933 Act study. Simon found that the
Act's greatest impact on variance was for the small issues that were not traded
on the NYSE.241 One explanation for the smaller effect on NYSE firms is that
the NYSE was already providing such a standardizing function comparable
to the SEC. There is no plausible reason to believe that satisfactory uniform
practices would not have been developed by the stock exchanges had there
not been the federal legislation.
3. The Impact of SEC FinanciaL Disclosure and Transaction Review on
Stock VaLuation
In addition to the classic studies by Benston and Stigler on the impact of
the original federal securities legislation, a recent paper by Kirsten Ely and
Gregory Waymire provides further evidence that the SEC's disclosure
policy has not been value-enhancing. Ely and Waymire examine the pricing
of NYSE shares with respect to financial information provided by firms
before and after the SEC.242 They find that the explanatory power of earnings
and book values for prices in the pre-SEC era is not significantly different
from that under the regulation of the FASB and its predecessors, the entities
to whom the SEC delegated the power to establish accounting principles.
The introduction of accounting standard-setting bodies and changes in the
standard-setting process, including the reduction in diversity of accounting
practices in the 1960s to improve interfirm reporting comparability, did not
240 See text between supra notes 218-19.
241 Simon, supra note 221, at 309-10.
242 Kirsten Ely & Gregory Waymire, Accounting Standard-Setting Organizations and
Earnings Relevance: Longitudinal Evidence from NYSE Common Stocks, 1927-93,
37 J. Acct. Res. 293 (1999). They randomly selected one-hundred NYSE firms for
each of the sixty-seven years between 1927-1993 and examined the explanatory
power of yearly cross-sectional regressions of market-adjusted stock returns on
annual earnings changes and levels. [d. at 301-02.
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significantly improve "earnings relevance," the explanatory power ofearnings
for the valuation of firms. 243
The upshot of this study is that the impact of regulatory accounting
standard-setting under SEC auspices on the informativeness (what Ely and
Waymire term the "value-relevance" of earnings) of financial statements is
not significant. Ely and Waymire's findings further suggest that a single
accounting standard-setter has difficulty identifying what accounting rules
will produce relevant information. This goes to the heart of the argument
for regulatory competition: its advantage in harnessing market incentives to
ascertain cost-effective disclosure requirements.
Finally, an SEC advisory committee analyzed stock price data to determine
whether investors benefit from the agency's review of registration documents
prior to a public offering by a seasoned issuer.244 The hypothesis under
study was that if the information generated by staff review is "predominantly
negative," following the claims of advocates of mandatory disclosure and the
review process that issuers will not voluntarily disclose negative information
prior to an offering, then in an efficient market, SEC reviews should be
associated with stock price declines during the course ofthe review, in contrast
to offerings that are not subject to such review.245 The alternative hypothesis in
the study was that the continuous disclosure of information by issuers renders
unnecessary the SEC staff's separate review of transactional filings. The
advisory committee found that there was no statistically significant difference
in the average change in stock prices relative to the market according to
243 Consistent with Ely and Waymire's data, James Davis, Eugene Fama, and Kenneth
French show that the relation between stock returns, book-to-market ratios, and size
is the same throughout the period 1929-1997. James L. Davis et aL, Characteristics,
Covariances, and Average Returns: 1929-1997 (University of Chi. Graduate Sch.
of Bus., Center for Research in Sec. Prices Working Paper No. 471, Feb. 1999).
However, this study is not as probative on the SEC's efficacy as the Ely and Waymire
study because Davis et aL group the data around the mid-point year 1963, and
this will obscure any difference in the five-year pre-SEC and the twenty-nine-year
post-SEC segments of their early period. But if the accounting-rule changes to
improve uniformity promulgated in the 1960s were more substantial than the
other events that Ely and Waymire examine, including the SEC's creation, then
the Davis et aL data, which, because they are investigating a totally different
question, are centered around 1963, would be as informative regarding a monopoly
standard-setter's effectiveness as Ely and Waymire's data.
244 SEC Advisory Comm. on the Capital Formation & Regulatory Processes, Final
Report app. A at 15 (1996) [hereinafter SEC Advisory Comm. Report], available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/capforml.
245 ld. at 14.
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whether or not filings were reviewed, consistent with the position that staff
review of filings generates no new material information.246
The advisory committee's data are additional evidence that the SEC staff
is not better able than investment professionals are at assessing the quality
of a firm's disclosures, paralleling the conclusion to be drawn from the
previously discussed studies. In short, the agency is no better at determining
what information should be disclosed than the market is. Perhaps a diehard
advocate of the SEC would interpret the committee's finding as evidence
of value added by the agency, by maintaining that all issuers disclose full
information because of the threat of staff review. But such an explanation is
simply implausible when evaluated in conjunction with all the other studies.
It is far more plausible that the threat of liability for fraudulent disclosures
is a more powerful motivator of issuers than SEC staff review. Such a threat
would persist under regulatory competition.
4. Studies of Firms' Voluntary Disclosures and Listing Choices
Fox contends that the changes in the capital market since the enactment of the
federal securities laws render studies of the 1930s legislation uninformative
and that results of analogous studies of SEC-mandated disclosure in the
changed market circumstances would be different.247 However, as previously
discussed, the SEC's mandates of segment reporting in 1969 and replacement
cost accounting in 1976 did not have any impact on stock prices, duplicating
the findings regarding the 1930s legislation.248 Moreover, the change in capital
market conditions since the 1930s ought to elicit genuine doubt regarding the
need for a single regulator, because contemporary markets are dominated by
institutional investors and there is far greater competition among financial
intermediaries, producing information sources about securities that did not
exist seventy years ago. Indeed, the private sector provides information
concerning valuation beyond mandated SEC disclosures. Financial analysts'
earnings forecasts, for instance, provide significant information to the market
regarding equity valuation beyond firms' mandated disclosures.249
There is, more importantly, a literature on firms' voluntary disclosure
choices in contemporary markets that provides compelling support for
regulatory competition. This literature not only bolsters the findings
regarding the failure of the 1930s legislation to provide information of
246 [d. at 15.
247 See Fox, supra note 3, at 1373-74.
248 See supra notes 174, 207 and accompanying text.
249 Amir et al., supra note 12.
HeinOnline -- 2 Theoretical Inq. L. 486 2001
486 Theoretical Inquiries in Law [Vol. 2:387
value to investors that markets did not provide, but also contradicts Fox's
additional objection to competition that "managers [will] prefer as Iowa level
of periodic disclosure as possible," as well as related "race-to-the-bottom"
concerns of other critics of regulatory competition.250
First, there is considerable evidence that firms voluntarily disclose
significant amounts of information beyond that mandated by securities
regulators. For example, the disclosure accompanying debt issued in
the private placement market duplicates the disclosure of public debt,
even though that higher level of disclosure is not required.251 In
addition, European firms listing in London typically comply with U.K.
disclosure requirements, which are higher than Continental requirements,
even though they could instead comply with their home-states' regimes under
the European Union directives.252 European firms engaging in international-
style offerings in the institutional market, which is not subject to formal
disclosure requirements, disclose even more information than is required by
any European nation, selecting a level of disclosure closer to U.S. disclosure
standards.253 Furthermore, the listing requirements ofthe newly created Neuer
250 Fox, supra note 3, at 1411; Trachtman, supra note 70; see also Cox, supra note 3
(raising the possibility of "race-to-the-bottom" concern over regulatory competition
in securities law).
251 Trevino, supra note 7. It is possible that these issuers are responding not only
to investor desires for more information but also to potential liability under Rule
IOb-5, which applies to private placements as well as public issues and could
lead the issuers to follow public issue disclosure requirements because precedents
involving public securities will set disclosure standards for private issues too.
See William J. Carney, Jurisdictional Choice in Securities Regulation, Va. J. lnt')
L. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 8, on file with author). But regardless of
the disclosure motive, as William J. Carney notes, the extraordinary depth of the
private market suggests that the SEC regime imposes high costs on issuers, so
that they have exited from the regulated public market, id. (manuscript at 9). The
cost of the regime may also be perceived by investors, as they no longer require a
substantial discount to purchase debt securities offered in the private market, see
SEC Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 244, at 52-53.
252 See Gary K. Meek & Sidney J. Gray, Globalization of Stock Markets and Foreign
Listing Requirements: Voluntary Disclosures by Continental European Companies
Listed on the London Stock Exchange, 201. Int'l Bus. Stud. 315 (1989) (sample
of European companies trading in London); Hal S. Scott & Philip A. Wellons,
International Finance Transactions, Policy, and Regulation 311 (7th ed. 2000)
(references concerning Danish and French firms' compliance with U.K. standards).
253 See Jackson & Pan, supra note 8 (interviews regarding capital raising practices
with twenty-eight European lawyers whose firms included eight of the ten leading
advisers to issuers by deal value and eight of the thirteen leading advisers by deal
number and who were advisers on over sixty European offerings in 1999).
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Markt in Germany consist of greater disclosure than those of the older stock
exchanges, such as the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, in response to shareholder
demand, and its market has prospered.254 Although the identity of the
listings-technology and other growth companies-undoubtedly accounts
for much of the exchange's success, the Neuer Markt is actively engaged
in satisfying investor preferences, having, for example, amended its listing
requirements when investors raised concerns that listed companies were
flouting the exchange's lock-up rules.255 Finally, in the unregulated hedge fund
market, information services have been established that collect investment
information from numerous hedge fund managers, calculate the fund values
and risk, and then market the information to investors.256 Extensive voluntary
disclosure is not a new or unusual phenomenon: as earlier discussed, before the
enactment of the federal securities laws, NYSE firms disclosed considerable
financial information and provided certified audited statements, as businesses
had voluntarily been doing for centuries.257
Consistent with these data on voluntary disclosure practices, investment
analysts assign rankings to U.S. firms not simply according to the adequacy
of their mandatory disclosures but also according to their voluntary
disclosures.258 This feature of the analysts' rankings indicates that the practice
254 Vanessa Fuhrmans, Playing by the Rules: How Neuer Markt Gets Respect, Wall St.
l, Aug. 21, 2000, at Cl.
255 Id. Although the bloom is currently off the rose of technology stocks, as the industry
has slumped world-wide, and Neuer Markt listings have plummeted, the exchange
has continued to follow its course of adopting regulations for listed companies that
appeal to investors, such as requiring the reporting of directors' share dealings. See
Penny Bazaar, Economist, July 21, 2001, at 60,61.
256 Craig Karmin, Investors' Desire for Hedge-Fund Data Prompts New Firms to
Peddle Specifics, Wall St. J., Feb. 22, 2001, at C16. Many large investors, such as
the World Bank or the California Public Employees' Retirement System, require
periodic specified disclosures of the hedge funds in which they are invested.
[d. Such developments are a market response to the collapse a few years ago
of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management, which engaged in minimal
disclosure, especially of its unusually high leverage. It was able to operate so
secretively because of investor demand to participate in the fund given an initial
stellar performance and illustrious staff. For a chronicle of the fund's demise, see
Roger Lowenstein, When Genius Failed (2000).
257 See Benston, supra note 182 (detailing NYSE firms' disclosure and auditing
practices before the federal legislation); Watts & Zimmerman, supra note 193
(detailing voluntary use of independent auditors back to thirteenth-century guilds
and up through the earliest known corporate forms, including joint stock companies,
for centuries before the United Kingdom codified the 600-year practice in 1844,
and noting audits of U.S. corporations occurred in the nineteenth century as well).
258 Christine A. Botosan & Marlene A. Plumlee, Disclosure Level and Expected Cost
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of disclosing more than required is common even for domestic firms subject
to the SEC's regime. These data indicate that regulators have not divined the
optimal mix of disclosure in their mandated regimes and provide evidence
that fears of a race to the bottom resulting in no or little disclosure were firms
free to choose their disclosure regime are thoroughly unfounded.259
Second, the quantity and quality of firms' voluntary disclosures are
positively correlated with stock issuances and stock prices.260 In other words,
of Equity Capital: An Examination of Analysts' Rankings of Corporate Disclosure
7 (University of Utah Working Paper, Jan. 2000). (The Association for Investment·
Management and Research evaluates corporate reporting practices by assigning
ranks to firms according to the adequacy of their reporting in three disclosure
categories: annual reports and other mandated disclosures, weighted at 40%-50%;
quarterly reports and other voluntary disclosures, weighted at 30%-40%; and "other
aspects," which refers to "access to management through presentations to analysts,
company-sponsored field trips and interviews," weighted at 20%-30%.)
259 Furthermore, voluntary disclosures often include information, such as improved
segment reporting, that ought to be of special interest to Fox, as he believes
such information entails interfirm externalities. See Paul Healy et aI., Stock
Performance and Intermediation Changes Surrounding Sustained Increases in
Disclosure Strategy, 16 Contemp. Acct. Res. 485, 495 (1998) (commonly cited
reasons for analysts increasing a firm's disclosure ranking include improvements in
segment disclosures). These data further suggest either that the private cost-benefit
calculation is not as disparate from the social cost-benefit calculation with respect
to interfirm externalities as Fox maintains, or that he has misidentified which data
contain significant proprietary information.
260 See, e.g., id. at 498, 503, 508-09 (sustained improvements in voluntary disclosure
results in improved stock performance and also is positively associated with
stock issuances); Richard Frankel et aI., Discretionary Disclosure and External
Financing, 70 Acct. Rev. 135, 141 (1995) (firms significantly more likely to
forecast earnings if they access capital markets over sample period); Mark Lang &
Russell Lundholm, Cross-Sectional Determinants ofAnalyst Ratings ofCorporate
Disclosures, 31 J. Acct. Res. 246, 265, 269 (1993) (financial analyst federation
disclosure quality rating increases with security issuance); William Ruland et aI.,
Factors Associated with the Disclosure of Managers' Forecasts, 65 Acct. Rev.
710, 720 (1990) (firms reporting forecasts more likely to issue new capital);
Frederick D.S. Choi, Financial Disclosure and Entry to the European Capital
Market, 11 J. Acct. Res. 159, 168-70 (1973) (firms entering Eurobond market
increase disclosure); Christine A. Botosan, Disclosure Level and the Cost ofEquity
Capital, 72 Acct. Rev. 323,344, 346 (1997) (voluntary disclosure in annual report
significantly explains cost of capital of firms with small analyst following). One
could interpret the data indicating that disclosure increases in conjunction with
new issues as implying that the incentive for managers to disclose information in
secondary trading markets is inadequate, see, e.g., Palmiter, supra note 22, at 107,
but that would be an improper inference to draw. Increases in disclosure are also
associated with benefits for secondary market trading, such as reductions in bid.:ask
spreads, see infra notes 261-62, and with managerial equity-based compensation,
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increased voluntary disclosure reduces firms' cost of capital. The numerous
studies supporting this assertion indicate that disclosure is valued by investors
and that firms competing for capital respond to those preferences. Thus, the
market provides incentives for managers to disclose information to investors
beyond what is mandated by regulators. There is no reason to believe that
this behavior would be any different in a competitive international securities
regime and that managers would suddenly move to regimes requiring no
or minimal disclosure. Rather, they would shift to regimes with disclosure
mandates that are most consistent with the preferences of their investors.
Third, increases in the level of voluntary disclosure, as well as in the
overall quality of disclosure, reduce the bid-ask spread in a stock's price and
correspondingly improve the stock's liquidity.261 Both effects are beneficial
for investors and thus lower firms' cost of capital. This is a further reason why
managers have incentives to provide information to investors, whether or not
there is a mandatory regime. In fact, managers release information voluntarily
when there is greater information asymmetry between the firm and investors
regarding its value, as measured by the bid-ask spread, in order to reduce that
asymmetry and thereby increase the value ofthe shares.262
Increases in voluntary disclosure may not, however, always be beneficial
see supra note 52. In addition, some studies find that increased disclosure comes
with a cost of higher volatility related to a change in ownership pool, see infra
notes 263-67, suggesting that it could be cost effective to raise disclosure levels
only when seeking new capital.
261 See, e.g., Healy et aI., supra note 259 (sustained increases in voluntary disclosure
result in increased liquidity); Michael Welker, Disclosure Policy, Information
Asymmetry, and Liquidity in Equity Markets, II Contemp. Acct. Res. 801 (1995)
(firms with high analyst disclosure ratings have smaller bid-ask spreads than firms
with lower ratings).
262 See, e.g., Carol A. Marquardt & Christine I. Wiedman, Voluntary Disclosure,
Information Asymmetry, and Insider Selling through Secondary Equity Offerings
16, 19-20, 22 (John M. Olin Sch. of Bus., Washington Univ. Working
Paper No. 97-05, Apr. 1997) (in secondary offerings, managers act as if
reduced information asymmetry is correlated with reduced cost of capital,
such that their participation in an offering explains the frequency of voluntary
disclosure); Maribeth Coller & Teri Lombardi Yohn, Management Forecasts
and Information Asymmetry: An Examination of Bid-Ask Spreads, 35 J. Acct.
Res. I, 6-8, 10 (1997) (firms with increasing bid-ask spreads release earnings
forecasts to reduce spread); Shuping Chen et aI., Voluntary Disclosure of
Balance Sheet Information in Quarterly Earnings Announcements (University
of S. Cal. Working Paper, May 2000) (managers more likely to make
voluntary balance sheet disclosures when earnings are less informative to
reduce information asymmetry), available at SSRN Electronic Paper Collection,
http://papers.ssrn.comlso13/papers.cfm?abstracCid=216469.
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for a firm. A study by Brian Bushee and Christopher Noe finds, for example,
that improvements in voluntary disclosure attract institutional investors with
a high propensity to trade and thereafter increase the disclosing firms' stock
volatility, which the authors consider to be undesirable.263 However, it should
be noted that Bushee and Noe also find that increased volatility is positively
related to relative stock performance, presumably a desirable occurrence for
firms.264
Additional support for Bushee and Noe's interpretation of their data and
a negative effect of increasing disclosure can be inferred from a study by
Christine Botosan and Marlene Plumlee examining the relation between
disclosure levels and the cost of capital. They find, unexpectedly, that in a
sample of large firms, in contrast to earlier research on small firms, a higher
analyst ranking for voluntary disclosure leads to a higher cost of capital
(although a higher ranking for mandatory disclosure leads, as expected, to a
lower cost of capital).265 Botosan and Plumlee explain this result as consistent
with Bushee and Noe's analysis, because the voluntary disclosures leading to
the higher rankings are principally quarterly reports, which offer more timely
disclosure of information and are of interest to institutional investors who
seek to trade on short-term earnings reports.266 Although Bushee and Noe are
examining the effects of changes in disclosure rankings while Botosan and
Plumlee are investigating absolute disclosure levels, Botosan and Plumlee's
hypothesis is that the presence of investors who engage in aggressive trading
could produce increased stock volatility for high voluntary disclosure firms,
which would explain the higher cost of capital that they find.
The findings of the studies by Bushee and Noe and by Botosan and
263 See Brian J. Bushee & Christopher F. Noe, Unintended Consequences of Attracting
Institutional Investors with Improved Disclosure (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper
No. 00-033, Oct. 1999). They consider increased volatility undesirable because it
can increase the likelihood of a lawsuit, increase the firm's perceived riskiness and
hence its cost of capital, or make incentive compensation less effective. [d. at 5.
264 [d. at 17. When disclosure changes in the subsequent year (that is, the year in
which the change in volatility is measured) were included in the analysis, while
the institutional investor variable was still positively related to volatility, neither
period's disclosure variable was significant. [d. at 20. This suggests that the
increase in volatility following an increase in disclosure is not simply due to the
improvement in market efficiency (more price adjustments) from the enhanced
disclosure.
265 Botosan & Plumlee, supra note 258 (in a sample of large firms, those with higher
rating of required disclosure have lower cost of capital, but greater voluntary
disclosure is associated with higher cost of capital).
266 [d. at 23-24.
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Plumlee suggest that care should be taken in assuming that all increases in
disclosure, including voluntary disclosure, will improve investor welfare.
When evaluated in conjunction with the rest of the literature, this line
of research implies that the benefit of improved liquidity from increased
disclosure could be offset by the cost of an increase in "transient" investors
who have high portfolio turnover, leading to future increases in volatility.267
However, as firms are repeat players in capital markets, we would not expect
managers to continue a practice of increased disclosure if such costs were to
outweigh the benefits to the firm. Moreover, given the relative incentives of
managers and bureaucrats to avoid error in this context, there is little reason
for confidence that a government agency would do a better job at cost-benefit
calculation than firms.
Ascertaining the net effect of voluntary disclosure on volatility and share
value is not, however, the critical issue for regulatory reform. The issue is
whether firms persistently disclose only the minimal amount of information
that is required and, hence, whether there will be inadequate disclosure in a
competitive regulatory environment, the concern that motivates the parade of
horribles recited by opponents of regulatory competition.268 The literature on
firms' voluntary disclosure practices demonstrates in a convincing fashion, in
my judgment, that there is no cause for such a concern. The international
and domestic evidence is overwhelming that firms provide a substantial
amount of information to investors regardless of the regulatory regime. Firms
persistently engage in greater disclosure than regulators require. They also
do not migrate, when a choice of securities regime is possible, to the regime
requiring the least amount of disclosure.269
267 Bushee & Noe, supra note 263, at 6.
268 E.g., Cox, supra note 3; Trachtman, supra note 70. Fox suggests that disclosure
will be too "low" in a competitive regime, but he does not provide the details
of what information firms would stop disclosing that investors, as opposed to the
SEC, deem important; presumably he is referring to information regarding interfirm
externalities. E.g., Fox, supra note 3, at 1396 ("[each issuer] will choose [a regime]
requiring significantly less disclosure"). He also maintains that capital will be
inefficiently allocated under regulatory competition. Id. at 1362. These objections
are a rehash of his interfirm externalities rationale for disclosure regulation,
which, as discussed in supra Part III.B., is not only theoretically flawed but also
cannot practicably be implemented. Moreover, there is no evidence that a single
regulator allocates capital efficiently. The most vibrant sector of the U.S. economy,
high-technology, for instance, is not initially financed under the SEC's regulatory
auspices but, rather, is financed by private placements through venture capital
firms. See Gompers & Lerner, supra note 106.
269 It should be noted that some commentators mistakenly believe that this fact reveals
an absence of effective regulatory competition and not its essence. See John C.
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In the United States, regulation has ironically even hindered the voluntary
disclosure of information that is of critical import to investors. For example,
the SEC for decades banned earnings forecasts, information far more
significant to investors than the historical accounting data that are the focus
of SEC mandates.27o More economically savvy regulators than the SEC have
recognized that market participants are often better informed than they are and
adapted their regulatory strategies accordingly. The Federal Reserve Board
and other central banks, for instance, have adopted an approach to capital
requirements for market risk that relies on financial institutions' internal
measurement models rather than the regulatory style of a governmentally-
mandated formulaY' The proposal for regulatory competition in securities
Coffee, Jr. et aI., The Direction of Corporate Law: The Scholar's Perspective,
25 Del. J. Corp. L. 79, 99 (2000) (foreign firms' choice to come under the
stricter disclosure rules of U.S. listing means that regulatory arbitrage does not
work) (remarks of John C. Coffee, Jr.). As this article has repeatedly pointed out,
regulatory competition does not result in the lowest level of disclosure. It is odd
that commentators who have praised the ability of foreign firms to choose the U.S.
regime instead of their home regulator have not sought to extend choice to U.S.
firms. There is no coherent rationale for distinguishing U.S. from non-U.S. firms
in this manner: there is no evidence that U.S. managers are more likely to exploit
shareholders or that their investors are less informed than those of foreign firms,
to require mandatory, rather than optional, coverage by the SEC. Just as foreign
firms tend not to select the lowest level of disclosure that is available, neither will
U.S. firms if they can choose their regulatory regime. Indeed, if the SEC were to
lose its territorial monopoly, both U.S. and non-U.S. firms that are under the SEC's
regime today might choose another sovereign, which, spurred by the gains from
competition, would better calibrate the costs and benefits of disclosure regarding
investor needs than the SEC.
270 This policy was subject to sustained criticism in the I970s, with one of the objections,
ironically, that it disadvantaged individual investors, as firms could not make public
forecasts of earnings but could discuss them privately with analysts and institutions.
See, e.g., Homer Kripke, Can the SEC Make Disclosure Policy Meaningful?, 2 J.
Portfolio Mgmt. 32, 35-37 (1976). Eventually the SEC modified its position, but
its limited safe harbor induced fear of liability and, consequently, did not increase
significantly the public disclosure of forecast information. For a brief discussion of
the SEC policy regarding forecasts, see Romano, supra note 2, at 2378-80.
271 See Federal Reserve System Risk-Based Capital Standards: Market Risk, 12 C.P.R.
pts. 208, 225 (2001) (enacted Sept. 1996) (implementing amendments to the Basle
Accord reached by central bankers for market risk, relying on firms' internal
methods to measure value-at-risk). The banking regulators adopted this approach
because the private sector had information superior to that of the regulators
concerning the risk measurement of investment portfolios, as the banks had
internal incentives to develop the most accurate techniques and the technology was
improving so rapidly that regulators could not keep up.
HeinOnline -- 2 Theoretical Inq. L. 493 2001
2001] The Need/or Competition in International Securities Regulation 493
law is motivated by a similar judgment as that which motivated the central
bankers of the benefits of harnessing market incentives to the regulatory
apparatus.
IV. THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
AS A PARADIGM FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION
Information concerning firms' voluntary disclosure choices provides insight
into what a competitive securities regime would look like. But it is, at
best, still very much an educated guess. Even the EU's mutual recognition
arrangement for stock listings is not the stuff of true competition, because
all EU securities regimes must meet specified minimum standards. There is,
however, one context in which firms can and do choose their legal regime
without restriction: the choice of corporate law in the United States. The
rules governing relations between managers and shareholders are within
the jurisdiction of the states, and the state recognized with jurisdictional
authority over a firm is the firm's chosen statutory domicile.272 The experience
of investors under this regime is instructive for the prospect of competition
among international securities regulators. This is because the interests and
incentives in the two settings are similar: the object of protection of both
regimes is the financial interest of investors, and under competition, investors'
preferences will dictate the choice of regulator because insiders who require
investment capital will bear the higher capital cost of an investor-unfriendly
regime choice.
There are compelling data that shareholders have, on balance, benefited
from the competitive charter regime in the United States.273 This implies
that investors would fare equally well under securities regulatory competition.
After briefly providing an overview of the empirical literature on U.S. charter
272 The United States follows a choice-of-Iaw rule that recognizes a statutory domicile
for corporate law, as do most countries operating under the British common law
tradition, in contrast to most Continental European countries, which follow a
real-seat rule that requires a significant physical presence in the jurisdiction for
domicile recognition. The significance of a recent decision of the European Court of
Justice, Case C-212l97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R.
1-1459, upholding a firm's use of a statutory domicile under EU treaty principles,
for the continued validity of the real-seat rule will be resolved by litigation in
progress (comments by European corporate law scholars at Siena Conference on
Company Law and Capital Market Law, March 2000).
273 The data are reviewed in infra Part IV.A.
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competition that supports the case for extending competition to securities
law, this Part addresses questions that have recently been raised concerning
the efficacy of state competition. These include whether there is effective
competition across the states for charters because of Delaware's dominant
share of incorporations274 and the related question whether there are network
effects in corporate law that undermine competition or have led to the
enactment ofinefficient codes, as well as whether securities law is qualitatively
different from corporate law such that charter competition is not an apt
analogy. It concludes by responding to a long-standing contention that the
experience with state regulation of hostile takeovers is evidence that charter
competition should be abandoned in favor of a national regime analogous to
the federal securities laws administered by the SEC.
A. The Evidence that State Competition for Charters Benefits
Shareholders
A good proxy for ascertaining whether firm choice of legal regime under
competition benefits investors is the effect upon shareholder wealth of a
domicile switch. If a change in domicile increases firm value, it would
be exceedingly difficult to maintain that charter competition is harmful to
shareholders. Of course, because in the United States, reincorporation is
subject to shareholder approval, it would be surprising to find firm value
declines upon a domicile change. Critics of state competition have either
overlooked this fact275 or contended that shareholders are ignorant, irrational,
or coerced when they vote in favor of a domicile change,276 particularly
274 Delaware is the predominant choice of domicile of publicly traded corporations and
particularly of reincorporating firms. For example, in my study of reincorporations
between 1960 and 1983 of both NYSE and over-the-counter firms, over 80% of the
reincorporations were in Delaware, Romano, supra note 21, at 244, and in Dodd
& Leftwich's earlier study of reincorporations of NYSE firms between 1927-1977,
90% were in Delaware, Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Marketfor Corporate
Charters: "Unhealthy Competition" vs. Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259, 263
(1980). In addition, in 1996,56% of NYSE firms were incorporated in Delaware
(data provided to author by Robert Daines).
275 Cary, supra note 71.
276 Bebchuk, supra note 25, at 1471. Bebchuk uses this same assumption-investors'
ignorance of the impact of the legal regime on their welfare-in joint work
to construct a formal model of his position against state competition, in which
competition results in adoption of laws that favor managers over shareholders.
See Oren Bar-Gill, Michal Barzuza, and Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Market for
Corporate Law 15 (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (model
requires positive probability that investors vote for a move to a domicile with a
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when the new domicile is Delaware, which, as the dominant incorporation
state, is often cast as the villain in the race-to-the-bottom explanation of
competition, as an enactor of laws that facilitate managers' exploitation of
shareholders. However, this is not a plausible scenario of the circumstances
of voting on domicile changes by U.S. equity holders. As earlier noted, these
voters are primarily sophisticated institutions holding large portfolios, who
are situated within a well-developed investor communication network and
hence are repeat players in proxy votes, such that the cost of being informed
about different legal regimes in order to vote intelligently on a reincorporation
is quite low. 277
There have been eight studies investigating the effect on stock prices of
a change in incorporation state.278 All of the studies find positive abnormal
law favoring managers over shareholders). Other assumptions built into the model
to produce the result that state law favors managers are the assumptions that
managers control the domicile decision, will only propose reincorporation into a
state whose laws favor managers over shareholders, and can propose such moves
without penalty. It is not surprising that such a model replicates William Cary's
characterization of state laws, as it is a static model that takes as given Cary's view
in which there are no constraints on managers, Cary, supra note 71, such as would
be imposed in a dynamic model of markets, which formed the basis of Ralph
Winter's critique of Cary's position, Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251 (1977), and
which would include the regime preferences of new issuers, an important segment
of the reincorporation market, see Romano, supra note 21, at 253 (table 5) (close to
one-third of reincorporations are IPOs), and nonpassive investors who can impose
costs on managers who act against their interest.
277 See sUpra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. Reincorporations do not present
prisoner dilemma problems that arguably could accompany shareholder voting
on dual class stock recapitalizations or bondholder voting on amendments to the
indenture in insolvency recapitalizations, referred to as exit consents, see, e.g.,
Gordon, supra note 96 (dual-class stock); John C. Coffee Jr. & William A. Klein,
Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers
and Recapitalizations, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1207 (1991 ) (exit consents), because
they do not bundle the vote with an increased cash payout that is forfeited if the
investor votes no or if the proposal is not approved by a majority. The bundling
issues that can arise include the selection of Delaware itself, an objection raised
by Bebchuk and discussed at infra note 297 and accompanying text, or provisions
in the new firm's charter that would otherwise have been the subject of a charter
amendment, a possibility discussed at infra note 292.
278 Event studies use standard econometric techniques to determine the impact on stock
prices of new information. When the date on which the information is released is
known and the sample size is large, the methodology is well-specified to identify
abnormal returns of even a few percentage points; for example, the power of the
statistical test for a sample of 100 firms to pick up an abnormal return of 1% or
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stock returns, with four finding a significant positive stock return at the time
of the announcement of the domicile change;279 one finding a significant
higher is 100%; for 50 finns, the power of the test at a 1% return is 94% and 100%
for a 2% return. See A. Craig MacKinlay, Event Studies in Economics and Finance,
35 J. Econ. Literature 13,29 (1997). The eight event studies of reincorporations
are: Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care
Standard in Corporate Govemance, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1989); Dodd & Leftwich,
supra note 274; RandaIl A. Heron & Wilbur G. LeweIlen, An Empirical Analysis of
the Reincorporation Decision, 33 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 549 (1998); AIIen
Hyman, The Delaware Controversy-The Legal Debate, 4 J. Corp. L. 368 (1979);
Jeffry Netter & Annette Poulsen, State Corporation Laws and Shareholders: The
Recent Experience, 18 Fin. Mgmt. 29 (1989); Pamela Peterson, Reincorporation
Motives and Shareholder Wealth, 23 Fin. Rev. 151 (1988); Romano, supra note 21;
Jianghong Wang, Perfonnance of Reincorporated Finns (Nov. 1995) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). The event dates used in these studies are the
date of the proxy statement, filed with the SEC and sent to the shareholders, that
notices the meeting at which the reincorporation is being proposed for a vote,
with additional tests run using the later date of the actual shareholders' meeting.
In my event study, I also examined the price effect on the earliest possible public
announcement dates, which are not available for many finns, the date of a board
meeting approving the reincorporation, and the date of the incorporation of the
shell subsidiary into which the finn is merged to effectuate the domicile change,
which typically is the earliest date, preceding the proxy mailing by a month
and the board meeting by a few days or weeks. Romano, supra note 21, at 268
n.62. In an event study, it is desirable to identify the first public announcement
date of the event under study-here, the reincorporation-in order to detennine
when investors would have first learned of the proposal, because in an efficient
market, the effect of new infonnation is immediately impounded into the price.
The statistical tests continue to be well-specified when the announcement date is
uncertain, and an interval around the suspected announcement date is used instead
of one date. See Stephen J. Brown & Jerold B. Warner, Using Daily Stock Retums:
The Case of Event Studies, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 3, 14-15 (1985). For a discussion on
why the event studies discussed here-reincorporation event studies-are the best
evidence of the value of state competition compared to others-event studies of
judicial decisions or statute enactments, see Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano,
Event Studies and the Law: Part II Empirical Studies of Corporate Law (Yale Int'I
Ctr. for Fin. Working Paper No. 00-33, Apr. 2001).
279 Bradley & Schipani, supra note 278, at 66-67 (significant positive returns on event
date and approximately one month before); Romano, supra note 21, at 270-71
(significant positive returns at three-day, one-week, and one-month intervals before
event); Wang, supra note 278, at 14-18, 21 (significant positive returns for full
sample over three-day event interval; significant positive returns for Delaware
finns over forty days before event; positive returns over three-day event interval
significant only at 10% but significant at 5% if shareholder meeting date used as
event for three-day interval; returns to Delaware finns consistently higher than
those to non-Delaware finns, which are negative throughout most ofevent interval);
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positive return for only a subset of reincorporations on the announcement
date with different results on the subsequent shareholder meeting date;280
another finding a significant positive return over two years prior to the
reincorporation;281 and two finding positive returns that are significant at the
10% confidence leve1.282 These uniformly positive findings, in my judgment,
are compelling evidence that competition benefits shareholders. In any event,
one certainly cannot read this literature and conclude that state competition
for charters is damaging to shareholder welfare.
However, because reincorporations are typically accompanied by changes
in business plans,283 there is a question whether the positive stock price effects
are evidence of the market's assessment of the change in business plan rather
than the change in domicile. To examine whether the positive price effect
was a function of investors' responses to other changes in business plan
accompanying the reincorporation and not their evaluation of the new legal
regime, I compared the returns of reincorporating firms grouped by the type
of activity accompanying or motivating the domicile change: engaging in
a mergers and acquisitions program; undertaking takeover defenses; and a
miscellaneous set of other activities including reducing taxes. Although one
might have expected the impact to vary across firms, with the antitakeover
reincorporations experiencing negative returns, as prominent commentators
have viewed defensive tactics as adverse to shareholders' interests,284 in fact,
not only was the sign on that group's abnormal return positive, but there was
Hyman, supra note 278, at 385 (significant positive returns four days before event,
using difference-in-mean test between price changes or reincorporating firms and
the S&P index rather than a t-test of the abnormal returns).
280 Heron & Lewellen, supra note 278, at 559 (table 6, clean sample of firms
reincorporating to limit liability of directors). As discussed at infra notes 286-95 and
accompanying text, this study found a significant negative effect for a subsample of
firms reincorporating for takeover defensive purposes at the time of the shareholder
meeting but not at the proxy mailing date, Heron & Lewellen, supra note 278, at
557-58, but there is good reason not to place much credence in the result.
281 Dodd & Leftwich, supra note 274, at 272-75 (significant positive returns two years
before event).
282 Netter & Poulsen, supra note 278, at 35-37 (positive returns one month around
event that were significant at 10% level only); Peterson, supra note 278, at 159
(return on day -1, day +3, and day +10 positively significant at 10% for subsample
of 16 firms not reincorporating for takeover defense reasons; insignificant returns
for full sample of 30 firms and 14-firm subsample reincorporating for takeover
defense reasons).
283 See Romano, supra note 21, at 250.
284 E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (1981).
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no significant difference across the groups.285 This finding implies that the
significant positive returns upon reincorporation are due to investors' positive
assessment of the change in legal regime and not a confounding of the impact
of reincorporating firms' other future projects.
In contrast to my findings, using a different event date, Heron and Lewellen
find a different price reaction depending on whether the reincorporation is
undertaken to limit directors' liability (significantly positive) or to erect
takeover defenses (significantly negative).286 They interpret their results as
indicating that some reincorporations are undertaken to increase share value
(the director liability limitation group) and others to entrench management
(the defensive tactic group). There are, however, a number of problems with
Heron and Lewellen's interpretation of the data. The takeover defense firms'
abnormal returns are significant only on the shareholder meeting date and
not on the earlier proxy mailing date. This is odd, given the results of the
other reincorporation studies,287 which detect significant positive effects on
proxy mailing dates, and given the efficient market hypothesis, under which
adverse information regarding a move should have been incorporated in the
stock price at the earliest public announcement date.288 More important, the
use of the meeting date as the event date is highly problematic for event
285 See Romano, supra note 21, at 272 (analysis of variance test of cumulative
residuals). Peterson also finds that the returns to firms reincorporating for
antitakeover reasons are insignificant, while firms reincorporating for other reasons
are significantly positive at the 10% level on a few event days. Peterson, supra
note 278, at 159. She does not, however, test whether the returns across the
different groups are actually significantly different. Given the small sample size
(30 firms in total, 14 firms reincorporating for antitakeover purposes), the power
of the test for the antitakeover reincorporations as well as the full sample is low.
In addition, Peterson also does not indicate what announcement date she is using,
which renders it difficult to assess the import of her results, see infra notes 289-90
and accompanying text, although they are consistent with my study's results.
286 Heron & Lewellen, supra note 278, at 557-59.
287 It should be noted that I found that cumulating the abnormal returns around later
dates, compared to earlier dates, resulted in higher statistical significance levels,
although there was no change from insignificance to significance in my groups.
Romano, supra note 21, at 272.
288 See Ross et aI., supra note 6, at 319-30. One potential explanation of the different
results in my and Heron and Lewellen's studies is the different time-periods of
our samples. I do not, however, think that this explanation is correct. Heron
and Lewellen's sample overlaps with the Netter and Poulsen and Wang studies,
which find positive price effects. Although Wang does not classify reincorporation
types, Netter and Poulsen separately examine, as a proxy for defensive tactic
reincorporations, a sample of California emigrations, which is a better indicator
for a move based on a difference in takeover regime than the firm-level defenses
HeinOnline -- 2 Theoretical Inq. L. 499 2001
2001] The Needfor Competition in International Securities Regulation 499
study analysis, which throws doubt on the reliability of the finding. James
Brickley's investigation of the event study methodology found that random
samples of annual meeting dates-that is, a sample on which there is no a
priori reason to find a significant price effect-produce significant abnormal
returns, in contrast to random samples of proxy mailing dates.289 Brickley's
explanation of the finding of abnormal returns on randomly selected meeting
dates in contrast to mailing dates is that annual meeting dates are well-known
in advance and often contain important management announcements (such
as earnings forecasts), which can produce abnormal returns because "risk
and expected returns can increase around predictable events likely to contain
information."29o This result indicates that Heron and Lewellen's finding of
abnormal returns on the annual meeting date, but not on the proxy mailing
date, is not a reliable indication of the impact of reincorporation.
Firms sometimes raise a reincorporation proposal at a special meeting,
although that is not common because it entails the increased cost of holding
an extra meeting compared to raising the issue at the annual meeting, and
typically, the timing of the move can be planned to coincide with the annual
meeting. Thus, there may be some firms in Heron and Lewellen's sample
for which Brickley's finding is not directly relevant, although the theoretical
basis for expecting the price effect for those firms to occur on the meeting
rather than mailing date is lacking: the number of contested management
proposals is so small that there is very little uncertainty over reincorporation
voting outcomes to be resolved for enough firms to affect a full sample
portfolio's returns on the proxy mailing dates. Indeed, it is well-known
that managements use proxy consultant firms to determine the likely voting
posture of their investors and do not put up proposals that have a substantial
chance of being defeated. But even if we were to assume that special meeting
firms dominate this sample, the negative return on mailing dates for a subset
of their antitakeover reincorporation firms is not probative for judging state
in the Heron and Lewellen subsample, since the latter defenses were valid in all
states including Delaware, except for staggered boards, which were prohibited in
California during the Netter and Poulsen sample period, see infra notes 292, 295,
and part of the Heron and Lewellen sample period. Netter and Poulsen found a
positive stock price effect significant at 10%, a result that is the opposite of Heron
and Lewellen's finding and similar to mine, while their sample period overlaps
with that of Heron and Lewellen's and not my sample. Netter & Poulsen, supra
note 278.
289 See James A. Brickley, Interpreting Common Stock Returns around Proxy Statement
Disclosures and Annual Shareholder Meetings, 21 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis
343, 346-47 (1986).
290 Id. at 347-48.
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competition because of a further shortcoming with Heron and Lewellen's
interpretation of the significance of their finding. They mistakenly assert
that the reincorporating firms' takeover defenses could only have been
undertaken in Delaware.291 However, all of the defenses they identify as
adopted by the reincorporating firms-fair price and supermajority charter
amendments, staggered boards, elimination of cumulative voting and poison
pills-could have been undertaken in any state at the time of their study and
were not exclusively available in Delaware.292 This error undermines the claim
that the reincorporation was essential for adopting a takeover defense-in
291 Heron & Lewellen, supra note 278, at 554.
292 The only exception is for firms emigrating from California, for which staggered
boards were prohibited until 1989 (roughly two-thirds of their sample period), when
California amended its corporation code to eliminate the mandatory application of
cumulative voting and permit staggered boards. See Cal. Corp. Code §§ 301,301.5
(Deering 2000) (providing legislative history 1989 Amended Stat. ch. 876, §§ 1-2).
Heron and Lewellen do not indicate how many, if any, of their takeover defense
firms were reincorporating from California. Moreover, Delaware's takeover statute
could not have been an important motivation for reincorporation, as virtually all
states had takeover statutes equal to or stricter than Delaware's statute during the
period of the study. See Romano, supra note 22, at 59,67. Heron and Lewellen's
conclusion that the reincorporations accompanied by adoption of takeover defenses
are exercises of managerialism may be correct, but it is beside the point for the
debate over competition-the managers of these firms did not need to reincorporate
in Delaware to adopt takeover defenses. The only relevant concern is the possibility
that by bundling the takeover defenses into one vote on a domicile change, rather than
subjecting them to separate votes as charter amendments, management is more likely
to garner sufficient shareholder support for the defenses. Because the proxy materials
for a reincorporation must clearly describe any changes with respect to takeover
defenses under the new domicile, including the new charter, it is possible, but, in
my judgment, improbable, that bundling the takeover defenses in the new charter
of the reincorporated firm enabled management to obtain majority support, which
would not have been attained in separate voting on defenses as charter amendments.
The increase in shareholder votes against antitakeover tactics probably began after
1987, the year institutional investors began offering shareholder proposals, many of
which were directed at defensive tactics, see, e.g., Del Guercio & Hawkins, supra
note 140, at 296-97, which is the final third of Heron and Lewellen's sample period,
although a majority of the sample reincorporations occurred during that period.
Given institutional investors' opposition to particular defenses in those years, it
seems highly improbable that they would approve a domicile switch if it were
to result in a defense, such as a staggered board, that the firm would otherwise
lack. Moreover, many of the defenses Heron and Lewellen specify, such as fair
price and supermajority provisions, are not considered particularly potent and thus
would not be of concern to voting investors. See, e.g., Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T.
Starks, Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: The Role
of Institutional Investors, 57 J. Fin. Econ. 275, 286 (2000) (of 2042 shareholder
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contrast, for example, to firms emigrating to a state with a takeover statute that
did not exist in the state of origin, as was true for many firms in my study of
reincorporations, which covered years when not all states had statutes, and a
subset of firms in Heron and Lewellen's study.293
A possible explanation for adoption of some, although not all, of the
antitakeover charter provisions that Heron and Lewellen identify upon a
move to Delaware is that the firms were not adding new protections but,
rather, were maintaining existing protections, because the default rules in
Delaware are more favorable to bidders than the rules in other states,
and hence the firms could require a charter provision to obtain equivalent
protection.294 Consonant with this critique of Heron and Lewellen's analysis,
Netter and Poulsen, using the more appropriate proxy mailing date as the
event, found that the stock price effect of reincorporations to Delaware from
proposals offered from 1987 to 1994, 249 involved rescinding poison pills, while
only 24 involved repealing fair price or supermajority provisions). Heron and
Lewellen do not provide a breakdown of the sample firms' defenses to resolve this
question, and they separately examine only poison pill defenses, the one defense
that managers can adopt at any time, without shareholder approval, and hence a
defense not relevant to the bundling hypothesis. But the shareholder proposal data
suggest that the antitakeover reincorporations in Heron and Lewellen's study are
not readily interpretable as acts of managerialism-shareholders would have voted
them down if they were. The significance of state permission of takeover defenses
for evaluating the efficacy of state competition is discussed in infra Part IY.D.
293 Romano, supra note 21. Heron and Lewellen do not indicate what percentage of
firms obtained new statutory, as opposed to firm-level, defenses.
294 See John C. Coates IV, An Index of the Contestability of Corporate Control:
Studying Variation in Legal Takeover Vulnerability (July 17, 1999) (unpublished
working paper, on file with author) (Delaware has lowest ranking in index based
on statutory default rules with respect to ability to defend against hostile bids). For
example, Heron and Lewellen refer to the adoption of fair price and supermajority
charter amendments, Heron & Lewellen, supra note 278, at 554; such defenses
are part of many states' corporation codes but not Delaware's. In this regard, a
negative stock price reaction could be interpreted as disappointment by investors
that the reincorporating firms were not obtaining the maximum benefit-facilitation
of a bid---of a domicile change to Delaware; but such a reaction should still have
been incorporated into stock prices on the proxy mailing, not meeting, date, as
the authors provide no evidence that there was any uncertainty surrounding the
outcome of the vote, to distinguish this subset of reincorporations from those of all
other event studies. Heron and Lewellen state that for a subset of firms they used
only firms that gained additional defenses upon reincorporation by adding a charter
amendment or opting into a takeover statute, id. at 558, but they do not indicate
whether they checked for differences in the default rules in the original state code
compared to Delaware that would necessitate a specific provision in a Delaware
charter compared to the original state charter.
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California, the one state arguably more favorable to bidders than Delaware
given the fact that it does not have a takeover statute and it prohibited staggered
boards and required cumulative voting during the period covered by the Netter
and Poulsen study, was insignificantly positive.295
The difference across reincorporation subsamples in Heron and Lewellen's
study cannot readily be interpreted as evidence that the positive effects
of reincorporation found in other event studies are indicia of investors'
valuation of confounding events-a change in business plans accompanying
domicile changes-rather than the value of the new legal regime and hence of
state competition. The reincorporations in the Heron and Lewellen study for
which there was a significant positive price effect were, in fact, undertaken
solely to take advantage of the new domicile's legal regime-the ability
to limit directors' liability-and were not accompanied by any announced
change in business plan. It is possible that investors interpret such moves as
an indication that the company is planning to engage in a transaction that
typically leads to frivolous litigation that would be prevented by the limited
liability provision. But even this explanation of Heron and Lewellen's
finding is consistent with interpreting the positive price effects as due to
the Delaware legal regime, rather than a confounding event (the expected,
albeit unspecified, transactions): it is due to the regime's beneficial effect
on the cash flows accruing to firms from particular transactions by reducing
the probability of litigation. Indeed, one could extend this logic to question
whether we should be concerned about the possibility of confounding events
in event studies that consist of a reincorporation and a new business plan
motivating the reincorporation. Namely, if the new domicile reduces the cost
of undertaking a new business strategy, such as a mergers and acquisition
program, that investors consider a value-increasing event, then because the
value to the firm of that new strategy would have been less under the
old domicile's regime and it would not have been undertaken without the
reincorporation, a positive price effect identified by the event study includes
the value of both the strategy and the cost advantage of operating under the
new regime.296 Thus one cannot separate out the two effects, because the two
events are inextricably connected and both are positively contributing to firm
value. The possibility of confounding events poses an interpretive problem
295 Netter & Poulsen, supra note 278, at 35-36. California removed the limitation
on staggered boards in 1989, see supra note 292, and in contrast to Heron and
Lewellen's sample, Netter and Poulsen's sample of reincorporations all occurred
in 1986-1987.
296 For an explanation that firms reincorporate to reduce the transaction costs of new
business undertakings, see Romano, supra note 21, at 249-51.
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only if the hypothesized signs of the events differ (so that a large positive
effect of one event could mask a small negative effect of the other)-which
is not the case when the destination state's regime reduces the new business
strategy's cost. Thus, it is most plausible to conclude that the positive price
effects identified in the reincorporation studies represent investors' valuation
of the new legal regime and thereby indicate that investors view a domicile
change as value-enhancing.
Some scholars question the appropriateness of using event study
methodology for assessing the efficacy of state competition beyond the
issue raised by the potential confounding in the stock price of a domicile
change and a change in business operations at the time of reincorporation.
For instance, Lucian Bebchuk has asserted that stock price studies are not
probative on whether state competition benefits shareholders, because state
competition may produce some provisions that are harmful to shareholder
interests even if the overall package of provisions is not, and hence we
would not detect a negative price effect upon reincorporation.297
Bebchuk's critique is not a troubling objection to the use of event studies in
determining whether competition is preferable to a centralized federal statute.
This is because his premise of offsetting price effects in which shareholders
are being forced to choose between bundles of good and bad statutes
would be troubling only if the statistical findings of the event studies were
uniformly insignificant, indicating that the bundled codes are in equipoise
between good and bad provisions. Yet, as discussed, nearly all event studies
report significant positive price effects. His alternative contention that any
significant positive results are due to confounding events, as previously
discussed, is incorrect as well. Most important, from the perspective of a
corporate code and the efficacy of the output of competition, it is the net
wealth effect of a code on investors that is important, and that effect is
positive.
Although it may be possible for a scholar to identify a specific provision
of a corporate code that he or she believes is value-decreasing compared to
297 Bebchuk, supra note 25, at 1449-50. He also speculates that event studies will not
identify a negative effect if the old and new domiciles' laws are the same. Id. This
hypothesis is mistaken. The hypothesis could be correct only if the price effect
of a reincorporation were insignificant, yet many event studies find a significant
positive price effect. Moreover, in contrast to his speculation regarding the content
of the old and new legal regimes, reincorporating firms perceive the new regime to
differ significantly from the old, and the new and old regimes differ on an objective
measure of responsiveness as well, with the higher ranked (more innovative) states
obtaining the most reincorporations, see Romano, supra note 21 at 258-61, 246.
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his or her own proposed legislation, it is difficult to imagine any real-world
political process that would do a better job at enhancing share value than the
competitive process in which Delaware is the prominent incorporation state.
This is what the event study data reveal. Bebchuk does not, for instance, offer
any plausible alternative when he raises his "bundling" critique. In particular,
he offers no empirical support for predicting that a federal corporation code
would contain fewer harmful provisions than state codes do. There is, in
fact, no ground for believing that the political process producing corporate
law at the federal level will differ for the better from that in the states.298
Other approaches to ascertaining the impact of the legal regime on
investor welfare besides stock price studies have been undertaken. Three
studies have examined whether firm performance improves upon a change
in domicile, using accounting measures of performance (return on equity
and earnings before interest and taxes).299 The studies find no significant
difference in accounting performance for the reincorporating firms.3°O The
absence ofsignificant differences in accounting performance can be interpreted
298 An examination of the lobbying process in the corporate takeover context,
commonly viewed as the most problematic area in state codes, indicates that
the federal and state political processes (with the exception of Delaware, whose
takeover law is more favorable to shareholders than that of other states) are in
essentials indistinguishable. See Roberta Romano, The Future ofHostile Takeovers:
Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 457, 468-85 (1988); infra Part
IV.D.
299 Barry Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role ofCorporate Law in the Theory ofthe
Firm, 28 J.L. & Econ. 179 (1985) (comparing performance of firms reincorporating
in Delaware to firms incorporated in states deemed to have stricter codes than
Delaware); Roberta Romano, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, 5 Indus.
& Corp. Change 277 (1996) (examining change in performance ofreincorporating
firms over three years following domicile switch, adjusted for industry average
performance and also compared to a paired sample of non-reincorporating firms not
incorporated in Delaware); Wang, supra note 278 (examining change in earnings
before income and taxes adjusted for industry performance, before and after
reincorporation, and comparing Delaware and non-Delaware reincorporations).
There are far fewer performance studies than event studies for good reason.
Economists consider stock price data more reliable than accounting data because
investors are interested in future cash flows (that is what stock prices reflect) and
accounting data not only measure past cash flows but also provide very imperfect
measures of those flows.
300 Wang finds that the change in earnings over the year after the domicile change is
higher for the firms that reincorporated in Delaware, compared to the firms that
reincorporated in other states. Wang, supra note 278, at 23. This is a very interesting
finding, but it does not indicate whether the difference is due to Delaware or to the
quality of the firms selecting Delaware.
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as suggesting that the charter market is in equilibrium, in that firms are selecting
the domicile most suited to optimizing their future performance. But the positive
price effect upon reincorporation would imply a subsequent improvement in
performance that was impounded in the price on the move.
Finally, an alternative approach that has been employed to investigate
whether competition benefits shareholders is to compare the value of firms
incorporated in Delaware, the state that has been the most successful
competitor, to the value of firms incorporated in other states.30 ) The idea is
that a significant difference for otherwise similar firms would represent the
effect of the Delaware legal regime on firm value. Robert Daines undertook
such a test, using as his measure of value Tobin's Q, which is the ratio of a
firm's market to asset value and thus is a measure of a firm's intangible assets.
The ratio is conventionally interpreted by economists as a proxy for a firm's
investment or growth opportunities, and Daines' insight is to note that this
should include opportunities added by corporate law ruleS.302 Daines finds that
Delaware firms have significantly higher Tobin's Qvalues than non-Delaware
firms, controlling for investment opportunities and a set of other variables
known to effect Tobin's Q, such as a firm's business diversification, in order
to ensure that he is picking up a legal regime effect.303
Daines' finding is important because it uses a completely different
methodology from event studies and yet has the same key result as those
studies regarding state competition, namely, that on average, it benefits
301 Daines, supra note 142.
302 Id. at 10.
303 This result holds up under a variety of robustness checks that Daines undertakes.
For a sense of the economic significance of his results, consider his 1996 finding
that Delaware firms' Tobin's Q value is .07 higher than non-Delaware firms; this
translates into a 5% higher market value for Delaware firms than non-Delaware
firms. /d. at 13. Daines offers two explanations of how Delaware corporate law
would add value to firms: facilitation of takeovers and superior protection of public
investors from exploitation by insiders, compared to other state regimes. Id. at 17.
For evaluating the efficacy of state competition, ascertaining the precise reason for
Daines' result that Delaware's legal regime enhances share value is not of strict
importance; only determining whether it increases or decreases firm value is. But
Daines' thesis regarding facilitation of takeovers is consistent with the investor-
disappointment interpretation of Heron and Lewellen's finding concerning firms
reincorporating for defensive tactics advanced in supra note 294. When considered
in conjunction with Daines' finding, Wang's finding of a greater performance
improvement for Delaware than non-Delaware reincorporations, see supra note
300, can also be interpreted as evidence that the Delaware legal regime improves
firm value. Both of their findings are consistent with the reincorporation data-the
positive returns on a move are an anticipation of higher future performance.
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shareholders. The fact that different methodologies produce similar results
regarding the efficacy of competition renders it difficult for critics of charter
competition to dismiss the empirical research that is at odds with their belief
that competition and the Delaware legal regime in particular do not benefit
shareholders.
These studies also refute James Cox's and Hal Scott's opposition to
regulatory competition in securities law on the grounds that investors will
not differentiate securities disclosure regimes and discount stock prices
accordingly.304 This is because the positive price effects of reincorporations
and the higher Tobin's Qvalues of Delaware firms indicate that legal regimes
are, indeed, priced by investors. Further evidence refuting this claim is that
bond investors price differences in indenture covenants: bonds with call
protection and with event risk protection, for instance, have lower interest
rates than those without such protections.305
304 Cox, supra note 3, at 1233-36; Hal S. Scott, Internationalization of Primary
Public Securities Markets, 63 Law & Contemp. Probs. 71, 75 (2000). Scott
asserts in particular that investors "sophisticated or otherwise" cannot know what
information they are "missing" and thus cannot discount securities properly.ld. This
contention is plainly incorrect. First, investors know what fundamental financial
information is and can clearly tell whether a firm's financial statements contain
the information of importance to them. This is evidenced by the fact that firms
respond to their demands to disclose information that is not required, as discussed
in supra Part III.CA. Second, investors are able to compare the differences in
disclosures required by competing regimes and are thus able to discount the
securities of issuers registered under regimes that require less disclosure where
the omitted information is valued by the investors. The data, discussed in this
section, on state competition and bond covenants provide compelling support for
this proposition. Third, Scott does not offer any reason for why in the case of
what he terms "missing" information-that is, some item that no firm discloses
so no one knows the information is "missing" from firms-a government agency
would know what sophisticated investors do not know, that an important piece of
information is missing, and mandate its disclosure so that the market can price it.
Of course, when the ostensible missing disclosure concerns information about one
firm that is disclosed by others, sophisticated investors and financial analysts will
notice the omission and discount the stock, treating silence adversely, which could
prompt disclosure by the firm to reduce the discount. See supra notes 76-77 and
accompanying text.
305 See, e.g., Robert E. Chatfield & R. Charles Moyer, "Putting" Away Bond Risk: An
Empirical Examination ofthe Value ofthe Put Option on Bonds, 15 Fin. Mgmt. 26,
31-32 (1986); Leland Crabbe, Event Risk: An Analysis of Losses to Bondholders
and "Super Poison Put" Bond Covenants, 46 J. Fin. 689, 690 (1991); Richard
J. Kish & Miles Livingston, Estimating the Value of Call Options on Corporate
Bonds, 6 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 95, 97 (1993).
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Critics of charter competition have contended that the findings by Daines
and the event study literature do not demonstrate that state competition
benefits shareholders, but, rather, are evidence that the victor of the
competition is simply somewhat better than the rest of what is, in essence,
a rotten bunch and that the value of firms would be even higher under a
regime of less competition that implements the legal rules the critics prefer
to those produced by competition.306 However, it should be noted that if, as
some of the critics of charter competition acknowledge, the most successful
competitor increases shareholder wealth, then it is not possible for them to
contend that competition is a "race to the bottom": if competition were a race
to the bottom, then shareholders should fare the worst, not the best, under the
most successful competitor's regime. The confident assertion, without any
empirical support, that the value of firms would be higher were substantive
corporate law rules the ones espoused by a commentator, rather than the
ones produced by competition, is hubris; it does not refute the empirical
findings that Delaware law and, hence, competition for charters have provided
shareholders with economic benefits.307
B. Do U.S. States Compete for Charters?
Some commentators have contended that because of Delaware's dominant
position in the charter market, one cannot view the production of corporate
laws in the United States as a competitive market.308 Their position is that
other states do not even attempt to compete with Delaware for incorporations.
This contention has often been made in conjunction with the use of network
economics to explain Delaware's success, that there are economies of scale in
the choice ofa legal regime-for example, the stock of legal precedents-that
cannot be successfully duplicated by other states and thereby place Delaware
306 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law
and Regulatory Competition, 87 Va. L. Rev. 111, 138-39 (2001).
307 There are, in fact, no data indicating that the particular law that Bebchuk and
Ferrell prefer to Delaware's regime, the takeover code promulgated by the City
of London's Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, see id., has made U.K. firms more
valuable than Delaware firms.
308 E.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market
for Corporate Law 12 (New York Univ. Ctr. for Law & Bus. Research
Paper No. 00-011, 2000), available at SSRN Electronic Paper Collection,
http://papers.ssrn.comlpaper.taf?abstracUd=2l7849; Mark J. Loewenstein,
Delaware as Demon: Twenty-five Years After Professor Cary's Polemic, 71 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 497 (2000).
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in the position of a monopolist.309 This does not contradict the evidence of
positive price effects of a Delaware domicile. Rather, it makes those data all
309 E.g., Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory ofIndeterminacy in Corporate
Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1908 (1998); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate
Law and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va. L. Rev. 757 (1993). James Cox does
not question whether states compete for charters, but, instead, contends that the
states did not compete with the SEC over securities disclosure regulation in
their Blue Sky laws and that the experience in the Blue Sky market, which he
considers to have been a "race to the bottom," rather than the experience in the
corporate charter market, is the appropriate context from which to predict the
output of securities regulatory competition. Cox, supra note 3, at 1243-44. In a
more recent article, Cox restates the claim: he contends that because the states did
not "impose demanding disclosure requirements," but, rather, have deferred to the
federal agency over the past several decades while they have operated securities
regimes alongside the SEC's mandatory regime, they will not impose stringent
disclosure requirements under regulatory competition. James D. Cox, Premises for
Reforming the Regulation of Securities Offerings: An Essay, 63 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 11, 34 (2000). Cox's contention is, however, mistaken. The experience
under state securities law is not probative for regulatory competition because the
jurisdictional rule, securities sale location, prevents states from competing: a state
does not exercise exclusive authority over an issuer, but, rather, shares regulatory
power with all sovereigns in which its shares are sold, and hence the states have
no incentive to fashion alternative disclosure regimes that would be of value to
investors. Cox further claims that "nearly every decision" of the SEC in the "past
two decades" has been related to competition. [d. at 35. This claim is misplaced:
the competition and decisions to which he refers have no connection to U.S. issuer
disclosure regulation or antifraud liability, but, rather, have to do with trading
systems and foreign issuers or securities of U.S. issuers that are not publicly traded,
and even here, the reduction in disclosure requirements for foreign issuers is not as
substantial as Cox suggests. As I discussed in my prior article, Romano supra note
2, at 2397-98, and consistent with the theory of regulatory competition, the SEC
has been responsive where it has encountered competition from foreign regulators
or other federal regulators such as the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
Over the last two decades, it has not, however, altered its disclosure regulations for
U.S. issuers of public equity, except to increase the mandated items, an excellent
example of which is the new derivatives' risk disclosure rules cited in supra
note 150. The move to integrated disclosure, which Cox cites in support of his
claim about the SEC's behavior, to the contrary did not decrease the disclosure
requirements for U.S. issuers-it only shifted the filing focus from the 1933 Act to
the 1934 Act. Finally, the SEC has consistently increased, not decreased, liability
for violations of the federal securities laws; a good example is its adoption of a
rule against insider trading in the context of a takeover, which makes it easier to
find non-conventional insiders liable than is possible under the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence. Rule 14e-3, 17 C.ER. § 240.l4e-3 (2001).
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the more puzzling, because they would indicate that Delaware is not extracting
all the possible monopoly rents from domestic corporations.
Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar, who are skeptical that charter
competition exists, have maintained that states do not compete for charters
because they have not attempted to duplicate what makes Delaware
the preeminent incorporation state: a specialized court and its higher
franchise fee structure, which leads to its dependence on franchise
tax revenues.31O Other states cannot, however, duplicate Delaware's higher
franchise fee structure in order to compete for a share oflocal charters. Because
Delaware offers a superior product (a substantial stock of legal precedents,
expert judiciary and administrative services, and a commitment to continued
statutory responsiveness),311 for another state to compete, it has to charge a
lower, not higher, price for its product, to be able to attract a sufficient number
of firms to build up the legal capital that Delaware already possesses.
States, in fact, can and do compete with Delaware for incorporations,
even though they have not undertaken the expense of replicating its most
valuable assets, which would be a high-risk undertaking because the state
might expend considerable resources but still not unseat Delaware.312 States
engage instead in behavior that can be termed "defensive" competition, in
that they seek to discourage local firms from reincorporating in Delaware,
rather than seeking affirmatively to attract firms away from Delaware. There
is considerable evidence of such competitive behavior.
First, Delaware is not the only state to be continually revising its
corporation code: other states invariably follow suit, revising their codes
to follow Delaware's innovations, and at least one commentator has
characterized recent revisions to the Model Business Corporation Act
("MBCA")313 as evidence supporting the view that states tend to compete
for charters because the revisions bring the MBCA, which many state codes
follow, closer to the law of Delaware.314 After revising their codes, the states
then publicize their legislative reform efforts as a reason to retain an in-state
domicile rather than incorporate in Delaware.315 If the states were indifferent
310 Kahan & Kamar, supra note 308.
311 See, e.g., Romano, supra note 22, at 38-41.
312 Romano, supra note 21, at 236.
313 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. (3d ed. 1996).
314 Lawrence A. Cunningham, The New Corporate Law-The 1999 Model Business
Corporation Act, 71 Corp. (Aspen L. & Bus.) 1,5 (2000).
315 See, e.g., James I. Lotstein & Christopher Calio, Why Choose Connecticut?
Advantages of the Connecticut Business Corporation Act Over the Delaware
General Corporation Law, 10 Conn. Law. 10 (2000) (article noting recent code
updates in 1997 and 1999 following Model Act and pointing out consequent
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to the retention of local corporations as domestic incorporations, then they
would have no reason to engage in such activity. Second, although Nevada
has never seriously challenged Delaware as the leading reincorporation
sta.te, it did expressly set out to be the "Delaware of the West" and was
one of the few states to achieve a higher inflow than outflow of migrating
firms. 316 Finally, if competition from other states were not a threat, Delaware
would have no reason to update its code as attentively as it does. 317 Indeed,
Delaware's continued responsiveness to changing business needs through
statutory innovation, despite its commanding lead in the incorporation market,
rebuts a criticism of regulatory competition in securities law offered by
Donald Langevoort, that whichever state wins the "competition early on"
advantages of Connecticut incorporation over Delaware, such as use of explicit
statutory guidance rather than case-law interpretation for indemnification, derivative
suits, and conflicting interest transactions and use of more flexible default rules,
including treatment of legal capital).
316 Nevada and Virginia were the only two states besides Delaware that had a net
inflow of reincorporating firms in my study of reincorporations, Romano, supra
note 21, at 247 (figure 3).
317 One might contend instead that Delaware's attentive updating of its code is
simply innovation undertaken by a monopolist and not by a firm concerned
about competition. However, economic theory is ambiguous concerning whether
monopolists innovate more than firms in a competitive industry. Monopolists
tend to innovate more slowly than competitive firms when there is only one
innovator, and thus there is no patent race; but in the context of a patent race,
both monopolists and competitive firms innovate more rapidly than they otherwise
would, and a monopolist could have stronger incentives to innovate (and preempt
a patent race), as it would obtain a higher return from preempting entry than
a firm in a competitive market. See Dennis W. Carlton & Jeffrey M. Perloff,
Modem Industrial Organization 534, 541 (3d ed. 2000). However, as corporate
law is not patentable, the patent race analogy is not necessarily apt. The modeling
of innovation in a nonpatentable context, such as innovation in financial products
rather than industrial (technological) products, is less advanced. Oftwo models that
have sought to bridge this gap, one model with positive externalities (economies
of scale that are a function of more consumers of the product and create profit
opportunities analogous to patents for the banks) results in inconclusive equilibria
regarding whether more, if any, innovation occurs with a monopolist or competition,
while the other model shows that a lack of patent protection may in fact increase
innovation and not induce free-rider problems in a competitive industry. See Philip
Molyneux & Nidal Shamroukh, Financial Innovation 195-201 (1999). In fact, the
latter model would seem to approximate what has occurred in the banking sector:
there has been significant financial product innovation despite (if not because of)
the competitiveness of the industry. ld. at 47-48.
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will thereafter behave as a monopolist "threatening the benefits that would
otherwise flow from true competition. "3 18
Further suggestive evidence that states compete with Delaware to retain
local firms, in accord with the anecdotes concerning states publicizing their
corporation code updating, is the finding that the diffusion of corporate
law reforms across the states follows an ogive or S-shaped cumulative
distribution (the proportion of adopters increases over time).319 This pattern is
conventionally interpreted in the industrial organization literature on product
innovation to be an indication of robust competition.32o A recent study
examining the pattern of diffusion of new financial products across banks (a
pattern in which the adoptions increased over time in a distribution resembling
the ogive pattern of corporation code innovations) determines that the
diffusion pattern is explained by competitive ("bandwagon") pressure on non-
adopters to maintain customer relations and market share, rather than other
explanations involving product profitability or information externalities.321
Adoption of innovations due to competitive bandwagon effects is, in fact,
considered to be more likely when there are significant first-mover advantages
and small adoption costs,322 factors entirely consistent with the defensive
competition that occurs in the corporate law context.
In addition, there is a positive relation between revenues collected from
incorporation (franchise) taxes and a state's responsiveness to corporations'
legislative demands (a composite variable measuring whether and how
rapidly a state adopts corporate law innovations mentioned by a survey
of domicile-switching firms as important in their decisions), an effect that
persists when Delaware is excluded from the statistical analysis.323 This
relationship is consistent with what I have termed a "hostage" theory of the
charter market and Delaware's success, in which the more heavily a state
relies on incorporation revenue, the more responsive it will be to corporate
needs and hence the more attractive a domicile for firms. The fact that the
positive relation is present even excluding Delaware from the analysis is
important additional data suggesting that states are competing for domestic
incorporations.
Kahan and Kamar maintain that the continual updating of corporation
318 Donald C. Langevoort, Deconstructing Section 11: Public Offering Liability in a
Continuous Disclosure Environment, 63 Law & Contemp. Probs. 45, 50 (2000).
319 Romano, supra note 21, at 233-35; Carney, supra note 27, at 731-32.
320 Romano, supra note 21, at 235.
321 Molyneux & Shamroukh, supra note 317, at 11,262-63.
322 Id. at 212.
323 Romano, supra note 21, at 236-41.
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codes by states other than Delaware is not evidence of states engaging
in competition, but their provision of a "service" to citizens. This
characterization of the motive for code updating does not demonstrate that
states do not compete. This is because states do not have to provide such a
service: their citizens can use Delaware's code or that of another state and do
business as a foreign corporation. We have to ask why the state would want
to provide such a service: the only plausible answer is that it wants domestic
corporations. Once this is acknowledged, no matter what euphemism is used
to describe the motivation for code updating activity, it is an indication that
states are competing for local charters. The dominant interest group behind
the desire to revise codes in order to have local charters may well be the
local corporate bar, rather than the state treasurer's office, but this is standard
operating procedure: in all states, including Delaware, the corporate bar is, in
fact, the engine of statutory reform. To be sure, Delaware state officials, and
not just the corporate bar, pay close attention to their incorporation business.
But the attention of other states' officials need not be as focused for a state
to engage in successful defensive charter competition; they can rely on the
local bar to notify them if legislative action is necessary to maintain that
position, just as members of Congress depend on constituents to inform them
of problems in an agency's administration rather than actively monitor the
agency themselves.324 There is also still a financial incentive for the state to
compete: the income ofthe local corporate bar and a state's franchise revenues
are, in all likelihood, positively correlated.325 In sum, to the extent that states
are affirmatively providing the service of domestic incorporation, they are
doing so to facilitate local incorporation (which aids the local bar) and thereby
to discourage foreign incorporation and transfers of domicile affiliation (Le.,
they are defensively competing for local charters).
Kahan and Kamar also discount the positive relation between franchise
revenue and corporate law responsiveness as evidence of state competition
because total franchise tax revenues, rather than the marginal revenue a
324 See Mathew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 2 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 165 (1984)
(contrasting fire alarm and police patrol forms of congressional oversight of the
executive branch).
325 Moreover, there is a direct fiscal payoff to a state for responding to demands of the
bar to update its corporation code and not just an indirect benefit of the local bar's
higher income tax revenues from servicing domestic corporations: the positive
relationship between franchise revenues and corporate law responsiveness holds up
for all states and not simply for Delaware. See supra note 323 and accompanying
text.
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state receives from incorporations, is used in the analysis.326 They have a
point. Total franchise tax revenue is a less precise measure ofstates' incentives
than marginal incorporation revenue under the standard economic principle
that marginalism drives behavior. However, marginal incorporation revenue
is unfortunately a number that is impossible to calculate accurately, given
the form in which data on state tax revenues are made available. Hence total
franchise revenues will have to suffice, as they are the best data to be had.
But the use of total rather than marginal revenue in relation to corporate
law responsiveness as a test for the presence of competition is not the
fatal difficulty that Kahan and Kamar's objection might appear to suggest.
Because firms have the freedom to choose their incorporation state, it is
plausible that there is a positive correlation between marginal and total
revenue. Indeed, if there were no correlation between total and marginal
revenue, there should not be the positive relation between total franchise
revenue and corporate law responsiveness that the data identify. This is
because the most plausible explanation for the empirical finding relating
responsiveness and total revenue is that marginalism is at work, that is,
that states are competing for charters. Kahan and Kamar do not advance
an alternative explanation of the finding. Their explanation that states
revise corporation codes as a service to citizens, for example, would not
predict a systematic positive relation between total franchise revenue and
responsiveness, because states that are not competing for charters provide
the service regardless of the number of local firms and, hence, regardless of
the revenue received from incorporations. If they were correct, there should
be no relation between the variables. In addition, although they do not
articulate their critique in this fashion, Kahan and Kamar may be concerned
that total revenue includes foreign firms' taxes and that firms' presence
in a state other than Delaware may be inelastic (that is, the state collects
franchise fees from all firms doing business in the state).327 But if this is their
concern, then again, we should expect to find no statistical relation between
total revenue and responsiveness because states do not provide any service
to foreign incorporations: they are covered by another state's code. However,
the data are otherwise-the relation is significantly positive.
326 Kahan & Kamar, supra note 308, at 26 n.5l.
327 Because virtually all Delaware finns have no physical presence in Delaware, such
a concern is not relevant with respect to Delaware and there is a nearly perfect
positive correlation between its total and marginal franchise fee revenues.
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C. Network Externalities and Corporate and Securities Law
Some commentators have used network economics to analyze state
competition. In this view, Delaware is successful in the corporate charter
market because there are network externalities in corporate law, that is,
there are economies of scale and scope that depend on a product's (here
a state corporation code's) adoption by large numbers of users, such as
the production of legal precedent. This phenomenon enables Delaware to
maintain a monopoly position, as rival states starting from a smaller base of
corporations will not be able to achieve the same cost economies.
Proponents of the network approach have advanced two arguments to
critique the efficacy of the corporate laws produced by state competition.
These consist of the claim that the legal rules produced by state competition
are sub-optimal because of a lock-in effect in which it is too costly for
firms to shift from an inefficient to a more efficient legal network328 and
the claim that to maintain its monopoly power, which is derived from network
externalities, Delaware purposefully crafts its legal rules to be excessively
uncertain and unpredictable.329 While theoretically possible, neither of these
claims stands up to scrutiny.
1. Will Corporation Codes or Securities Regulation Exhibit Inefficient
Lock-in Effects?
Proponents of the network approach to corporate law suggest that a potential
consequence of a successful chartering business such as Delaware's, in
which the more domestically incorporated firms there are, the higher the
value to firms of operating under the regime, is that inefficient corporate law
provisions will be locked-in (that is, the network effect creates an externality
in which new firms are better offjoining the existing network with inefficient
provisions rather than incorporating in a new network with few firms
but a superior code).330 However, as an analytical matter, as SJ. Leibowitz
and Stephen Margolis have suggested, network effects are not necessarily
externalities: they are only a problem such that an inefficient network will
not be replaced by a more efficient one when market participants cannot
internalize the effects.331 Thus, if a dominant network is inefficient compared
328 Klausner, supra note 309, at 850-51.
329 Kamar, supra note 309; Kahan & Kamar, supra note 308. Kamar further applies
the theory of network externalities to contend that competition is not appropriate
for securities regulation. Kamar, supra note 309, at 1950-51.
330 Klausner, supra note 309, at 850-51.
331 See Leibowitz & Margolis, supra note 24, at 671; Stan J. Leibowitz & Stephen
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to a competing one, the owner of the more efficient one will internalize the
costs of the network, and with a more efficient product, it will be able to
subsidize switchers.332
While an individual corporation cannot internalize the cost of a charter
regime, corporate law regimes have owners that can do so: the legislating
states. If, for example, the Delaware state courts take actions that significantly
decrease share values or if the Delaware corporation code is not revised
to address a developing corporate law issue that another state code has
remedied, Delaware's franchise tax revenues will decrease as the flow of
firms into the state will decrease (at some point, the cost of the inefficient
regime will outweigh the network benefit of the stock of precedents because
the stock will not address the new issue rendering Delaware law inefficient
or outdated). The state will therefore bear the cost of the inefficient regime.
In addition, Delaware counsel, whose business it is to be informed about
corporate law matters and whose human capital will diminish with a decline
in Delaware incorporations, are organized in a state bar association that
eliminates free-rider problems and thereby ensures that the legislature will
ameliorate the problem.
The contention that Delaware internalizes network externalities that would
otherwise produce inefficient rules is not mere speculation: after a decision
by the Delaware Supreme Court that was considered to be adverse to
shareholder welfare because it increased the financial liability of outside
directors at a time of an unstable liability insurance market, legislation was
E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. Econ. Persp. 133,
141-42 (1994).
332 Michael Klausner has suggested that the lock-in of an inefficient provision in
corporate law would not be due to information imperfections (that the first firms
adopting charters do not recognize that their choice of provisions is inefficient),
but due to an externality between early and later users of a product (the benefits
of participating in the larger existing network despite its inefficient rules). Michael
Klausner, A Comment on Contract and Jurisdictional Competition. in The Fall and
Rise of Freedom of Contract 349, 451 n.15 (Frank H. Buckley ed., 1999). Hence this
source of network inefficiencies is the focus of the discussion in the text, although
it should be noted that the two effects are closely related. A lock-in of inefficient
corporate laws because early adopters lacked information regarding the optimal
provision would not be a sustainable charter market equilibrium over time. There
are well-informed specialists-lawyers and investment bankers-who are repeat
players because they advise numerous firms and who will therefore internalize the
cost of becoming informed regarding an inefficient choice, in contrast to individual
corporations, and as a result, either they will ensure that the incorporation state
revises the inefficient provision or have their individual corporate clients switch to
the more efficient regime.
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enacted to negate the impact of the decision by permitting shareholders to
vote to limit outside directors' liability.333 Other states had also been moving
toward legislative reform of director liability, further spurring Delaware's
action.334
Additional support for the proposition that a dominant legal network
will be supplanted by another set of rules if they are more efficient is
a study of Australian corporate law by Michael Whincop.335 Whincop
examined corporate charter terms regarding fiduciary duty (the mix of
indemnification and liability release provisions) prior to the enactment of
mandatory government terms in the late 1920s, classifying common clusters
of terms into three "networks."336 He then tracked the use of these clusters
or networks (their "market share") over time, taking account of switches by
charter amendment. Whincop found that a new mix of indemnification and
release terms emerged and came to predominate, despite the existence of
a substantial older network. This finding is consistent with the proposition
that network effects of inefficient corporate law provisions (or provisions
that lose their efficient properties as business conditions change) will not
prevent the emergence of, and switch to, more efficient provisions. Whincop's
research parallels what casual empiricism would suggest regarding U.S.
corporation codes: Delaware is constantly revising its code as business
conditions change, despite its large stock of precedents that should, under
a network externality analysis, prevent it from updating to more efficient
provisions. These phenomena (the Australian contracting experience and
Delaware's attentive code updating) suggest that early charter provision users
will not impose significant externalities on subsequent users that result in the
persistence of inefficient corporate charter provisions.
333 See Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance
Crisis, 39 Emory LJ. 1155, 1160 (1990).
334 [d.
335 Michael 1. Whincop, Empirical Analysis of Corporate Charters and Mandatory
Rules: An Australian Study (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
336 The separate networks he identifies are: (1) low-level indemnity provisions with
releases of personal liability subject to a dishonesty qualification (the largest
network at 46% of the sample); (2) wide indemnification and narrower releases,
both qualified by willful default exceptions; and (3) limited releases and no or
restricted indemnities (the statutory default requirement). The remaining firms that
did not fit into one of these three groupings (30% of the sample) are classified
into a fourth, miscellaneous category. The first group was not initially the most
popular group, but emerged as the dominant choice, replacing the other clusters,
by the time the government enacted mandatory rules and ended the era of charter
experimentation on fiduciary obligations.
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A further difficulty with the lock-in argument concerns whether competing
corporate law networks offer truly incompatible products (the reason why a
larger market share produces a lock-in effect). The MBCA can be understood
as a competing network to Delaware law as it enables adopting states to
share in the precedents of all users of MBCA boilerplate, as well as the
resources of the Model Act's drafting committee. However, many of the
MBCA provisions are similar to those of Delaware, and consequently, state
courts can, and often do, borrow from Delaware precedents, whether or not
they are MBCA adopters.337 These factors place a limit on the size advantage
of Delaware's network and no doubt explain why it is continually updating
its code (it is concerned about competition, which would not be the case if its
size advantage were unlimited).
Additional criticisms of the significance of possible network effects
involve the key assumption for there to be a network effect of increasing
returns to scale. To the extent that production costs exhibit decreasing
returns or that the increasing returns to a network eventually diminish, then
competing networks are possible (and presumably persistence of inefficient
networks unlikely).338 It is altogether possible that production ofa legal regime
manifests diminishing returns: one instance of such an effect is court docket
congestion. Furthermore, if different rules are appropriate for different firms,
then competing networks can develop to serve niche markets where size
(network effects) is not a disadvantage.339 Although niche-filling does not
seem to be a significant factor in corporate law as there is not a substantial
variety in state codes and enabling codes permit customization, it may be more
important in securities law (if, for instance, different financial accounting
standards were appropriate for different sectors or market environments).
It should be noted that in the securities law context, in addition to state
actors, there is a further set of private actors-stock exchanges, which
could internalize network externalities regarding aspects of the regime,
such as disclosure requirements, if such rules were in their jurisdiction, as
occurred prior to the creation of the SEC. This could occur with competition
if a small jurisdiction were to choose a securities regime that delegates
disclosure standards for listed firms to exchanges.34o Stock exchanges control
which firms list on their exchanges, and thus they can internalize any potential
337 See Cunningham. supra note 314; Lotstein & Calio, supra note 315. A recent
example of a court analyzing a state code by reference to Delaware law is Hilton
Hotels Corp. v. lIT Corp.• 978 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Nev. 1997) (Nevada law).
338 See Leibowitz & Margolis, supra note 24, at 672-73.
339 Id. at 673.
340 See Romano, supra note 2, at 2401.
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network externalities that would cause the maintenance of inefficient rules.341
Because firms pay annual listing fees, an exchange that devises a superior set
of rules can subsidize firms to switch from another network.
Of course, for an individual firm, the number of other listed firms is
not important; it only cares about the trading location that gives it the
lowest cost of capital. But investors may prefer exchanges with numerous
listings in order to obtain the benefit of standardization in disclosure when
exchanges are the source of such standards, and their preferences will feed
back into firms' choice of exchange. However, it must also be noted that
standardization is not of itself evidence of network effects. One standard
may prevail over another because it is better adapted to investor needs.342
Finally, as already noted, if the appropriate disclosure standard varies across
firms or investor clienteles, then network effects will not be important, as
small specialty networks will flourish alongside larger networks.
A separate issue that might be considered to distinguish securities and
corporate law that could be subject to network effects involves enforcement.
The issue is whether policing violations in the securities context requires
substantial government action, in contrast to corporate law, where violations
are policed by private litigation. If this were the case, economies of
scale in enforcement operations (that is, network effects) could limit
competition, as small states could lack the requisite resources to police
securities violations. The enforcement issue is not, however, a clear-cut
case of a network externality. There could well be increasing production
costs (decreasing returns to scale) in government enforcement activities.
The SEC, for example, relies heavily on private litigation for enforcement
support. Whether the SEC delegates enforcement activities to private parties
because of limited resources or because of increasing production costs,
smaller states could also rely on private enforcement to compensate for
scale disadvantages, if the revenues produced by their securities business
are insufficient to cover enforcement costs. A need for a minimum state
size for enforcement purposes is therefore not likely to create a substantial
barrier to the effectiveness of regulatory competition in the securities law
context.
There could still be a problem with respect to enforcement that
341 Some important exchange services that have a network effect are fully priced: the
provision of liquidity is borne by market participants in the form of the bid-ask
spread (expected asset returns are an increasing function of the bid-ask spread). See,
e.g., Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread,
17 J. Fin. Econ. 223 (1986).
342 See Leibowitz & Margolis, supra note 24, at 673.
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unscrupulous promoters will exploit investors by choosing a jurisdiction
with inadequate enforcement capacity. Resources for enforcement operations
do not constitute a problem for large sovereigns or small sovereigns that, by
offering a superior regime, earn a significant financial return from domicile
fees (as Delaware does from incorporation fees). As these jurisdictions would
also, in all likelihood, be the domicile choice of most publicly traded firms,
whose clientele includes sophisticated investors cognizant of enforcement
issues, the enforcement-capacity problem is analogous to the earlier
discussed problem of segmented markets regarding substantive regime
content and not to a network effects problem. Prodding unsophisticated
individuals to invest through financial intermediaries would, again, be the
most effective solution to any potential enforcement concern.343
2. Is Delaware Law Excessively Indeterminate?
The second claim made by commentators using network economics to
critique the output of state competition asserts that Delaware's legal
regime is "excessively" unpredictable or indeterminate, compared to what it
"could be." This claim is associated with Ehud Kamar. 344 The hypothesized
motivation for having indeterminate legal rules is to prevent other states
from successfully copying Delaware law and thus decreasing the monopoly
position Delaware has achieved because of network externalities regarding
legal precedents.345 The evidence Kamar adduces for this claim is the "court-
centered" culture of Delaware corporate law and Delaware's use of "fact-
intensive standard-based tests," which are not always used in other states or
SEC regulation.346
The initial difficulty with the contention that Delaware law is excessively
fact-intensive is one of first principle: that the claim is founded upon
a misunderstanding of the common law process. Objecting to the fact-
intensive nature of Delaware law misses the essence of judicial adjudication
at common law (or, to put it another way, it is an objection to common
law adjudication itself). Common law decision-making is, by definition,
fact-intensive, because it entails an inductive approach to decision-making
that creates general rules out of the resolution of specific disputes in
incremental fashion. Moreover, the principal reason for judicial intervention
in corporate law is to enforce fiduciary obligations that, by their very nature,
343 See text between supra notes 44-45.
344 See, e.g., Kamar, supra note 309.
345 Id. at 1928.
346 Id. at 1932; Kahan & Kamar, supra note 308, at 45.
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cannot be well-specified jn a contract-otherwise they would be written into
the corporate statutes and documents. The judicial inquiry into these issues
is, therefore, inherently fact-based. 347 And, of course, their resolution must
be undertaken by courts and not legislatures, which are ill-suited to engage in
case-by-case decision-making.
The second difficulty with the line of reasoning that Delaware law
is excessively indeterminate involves a confusion between the choice of
legal rules or standards and the unique position of Delaware compared
to other states in the chartering market. In contrast to all other states,
Delaware has a specialized judiciary that hears all corporate law cases,
the Chancery Court, and corporate law expertise is usually an important
selection criterion for state Supreme Court justices. It is, accordingly, a
clear-cut benefit to shareholders of Delaware firms to use the judicial process
to resolve fiduciary issues, as the parties have access to decision-makers
with significant expertise who can tailor a ruling to the specific problems of
the claimants.
In other states, recourse to the judiciary does not offer any such benefit
to shareholders, because courts of general jurisdiction, with no expertise in
corporate law and infrequent exposure to corporate issues, hear corporate
cases. Thus, to compensate for their competitive disadvantage, states other
than Delaware tend to adopt the defensive strategy of more explicit
rules that are intended to reduce the need to resort to the judiciary's
judgment in disputes. Indeed, some states attempt to promote this as a
marketing advantage for local incorporation, stressing a lower level of
reliance on the judiciary with explicit statutes compared to a Delaware
domicile.348 Consequently, the fact that states other than Delaware substitute
bright-line rules for a standard to determine fiduciary issues is not proof that
Delaware law is "excessively indeterminate," but, rather, evidence that they
are seeking to make the bestofwhat is acompetitive disadvantage oftheir legal
systems. This characterization is consonant with the widely shared perception
of practitioners that Delaware courts are superior decision-makers than other
state courts when it comes to corporate law matters, as well as efforts by
347 See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 80, at 90-93.
348 See Lotstein & Calio, supra note 315, at 10 ("[T]he [Connecticut Business
Corporation Act] contains more explicit guidance to corporations and their lawyers
than the [Delaware General Corporation Law] which relies heavily on case law to
interpret the statute.").
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the corporate bars in some states to promote legislation to create specialized
corporate law courtS.349
Kamar further attempts to support his claim that Delaware law is
excessively indeterminate by asserting that there is greater clarity in U.S.
securities law than Delaware law, citing the existence of safe harbor
rules for complying with registration requirements.35o This comparison is
erroneous. The areas of securities law that are related to substantive corporate
law issues, such as insider trading regulation and other forms of antifraud
liability under Rule 10_b5351 are not, in fact, bright-line rules, but imprecise
legal standards. Not only is the language of the antifraud rule more general
than any of the Delaware fiduciary standards that Kamar finds wanting, but
also, the SEC has opposed enacting a statutory definition of insider trading, a
position with which Congress has acquiesced, even though a definition would
provide a bright-line rule and eliminate the existing "standards" approach.352
Underscoring Kamar's misplaced comparison is one former SEC solicitor's
comment that "insider trading is a classic example of common law in the
federal courts. "353
A third and, in my judgment, insurmountable difficulty with Kamar's
thesis is how one could ever identify where, to use Kamar's language, the
"level of indeterminacy of Delaware law may be too high" or where it is "less
predictable than it could be."354 As corporate law practitioners well know,
Delaware law is more predictable and certain than that of any other state,
and that is one of the principal reasons they prefer to incorporate clients in
Delaware.355 Indeed, the settlement rate of Delaware cases is not significantly
349 See, e.g., Thomas A. Slowey, Pennsylvania Chancery Court Is a Sound Proposal,
Pa. L. Weekly, May 2, 1994, at 6.
350 Kamar, supra note 309, at 1920.
351 E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 10, 16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78p (2001);
Rule IOb-5, 17 C.ER. § 240.lOb-5 (2001).
352 See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein & Peter V. Letsou, Business Associations 994 (3d ed.
1996). Kamar recognizes that elements of antifraud liability under the securities
laws are as indeterminate as Delaware law is, Kamar, supra note 309, at 1952
n.175, but misses the implication that the use of a standard is most plausibly
integrally connected to the nature of the legal issue to be decided rather than the
strategic motivations of adjudicators in relation to chartering revenues.
353 Unidentified official quoted in Stephen M. Bainbridge, Securities Law: Insider
Trading 29 (1999).
354 Kamar, supra note 309, at 1913-14 (emphasis added).
355 See Romano, supra note 21, at 250, 274 (reasons provided by counsel for
reincorporating firms). This theme was repeatedly emphasized by corporate counsel
attending the University of Pennsylvania Roundtable, referred to in supra note 142,
at which the Kahan and Kamar paper was presented.
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different from that in other states.356 This would not be the situation if
there were greater uncertainty of outcomes under what Kamar identifies
as Delaware's more fact-intensive standard-based law, because risk-averse
parties are less likely to litigate and more likely to settle when there is greater
uncertainty regarding the legal rule.357 To the extent that divergent perceptions
of the likelihood of success at trial decrease the likelihood of settlement, a
reduction in the uncertainty of predicting the outcome of litigation should
increase the settlement rate.358 In either scenario, if, as Kamar contends,
Delaware's law is more uncertain than that of other states because it is more
standard-based, then the settlement rate should differ across cases brought in
Delaware and those brought in other states.
Moreover, if corporations had found the level of certainty provided by
the Delaware courts too low, then when they successfully lobbied Congress
to preempt state securities litigation, they would not have supported the
"Delaware carve-out" that is contained in the statute, which preserves the
right of shareholders to bring fiduciary claims under Delaware law while
preempting all other state claims arising in connection with a securities
law violation.359 There is simply no force to a characterization of Delaware's
356 In my sample of 139 shareholder lawsuits, see Roberta Romano, The Shareholder
Suit: Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J.L. Econ. & Org. 55 (1991), 24 were
brought solely in Delaware court and 24 solely in another state court. Of these, 19
of the Delaware cases and 17 of the non-Delaware cases were settled or terminated
by the parties' stipulation, and 2 of the Delaware cases and 3 of the non-Delaware
cases were dismissed. The remaining cases were inactive or pending at the time of
my study. Of the non-Delaware court cases, 5 involved Delaware corporations, of
which 4 settled and I was dismissed. Of the Delaware court cases, 1 was a double
derivative suit-the plaintiff was a shareholder in the parent, an Ohio corporation,
while the wholly owned subsidiary was a Delaware corporation; that case settled.
Whether the Delaware cases are classified by the forum (19 settlements of 24 cases)
or by the defendant corporation's statutory domicile (23 settlements of 29 cases, or
22 settlements of 28 cases, depending on how one classifies the double derivative
suit), chi-square tests cross-tabulating lawsuit disposition by state (Delaware versus
all other states) indicate that there is no statistical difference in the settlement rate
across the two groups (the probability values range from .4 to .5).
357 See Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement of Litigation, in 3 The New
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, supra note 24, at 442.
358 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 615 (5th ed. 1998).
359 See, e.g., James D. Cox et al., 2000 Supplement Securities Regulation Cases and
Materials 97-98 (2d ed. Supp. 2000) (the "most notable" exemption in the 1998
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act preempting state securities actions
is the "so-called Delaware carve-out" that preserves state court jurisdiction over
certain fiduciary claims).
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law as not achieving an "optimal" degree of predictability, when there is no
real-world corporate legal system that does a superior job to Delaware in
providing a predictable corporate legal regime.
Kamar might seek to assert that his benchmark for indeterminacy is
an ideal corporate law and not the examples he provides from other
states and federal agencies, but the analytical question whether rules are
superior to standards is, in fact, extremely complex.360 Although, consistent
with Kamar's position, some economists view rules as superior to standards
because of lower enforcement costs,361 the issue is far from settled. Standards
may theoretically be more efficient than rules in the corporate context: Ian
Ayres, for example, contends that the use of standards for corporate law
is efficient because it is easier for parties to contract for precise rules than
standards, and thus a standards approach facilitates the ability of shareholders
and managers to contract out of the defaults of judicial decision-making.362
Moreover, Kamar does not provide an explanation for why explicit rules
would be superior to standards in the fiduciary duty context, beyond those safe
harbor rules already present in the Delaware code regarding self-interested
transactions.
Casual empiricism would suggest instead that the flexibility of an
expert decision-maker's application of a standard (Delaware's approach)
is preferable to the "one-size-fits-all" feature of explicit rules in the fiduciary
context,363 contrary to Kamar's critique. For example, the overwhelming
choice of Delaware over other states by large corporations, which have a
higher probability of experiencing litigation than small firms,364 is consistent
with the claim that fiduciary duty is an area of law for which standards are
superior when they will be interpreted by a knowledgeable decision-maker,
360 For a simple introduction to some of the competing considerations, see Posner,
supra note 358, at 590-96.
361 See Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.
Rev. 557 (1992).
362 Ian Ayres, Review: Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of
Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1391,1404 (1992).
363 As Justice Frankfurter famously remarked, "[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary
only begins analysis." SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943). For an
alternative view of the Delaware judiciary that concludes it enhances firm-value
rather than produces excessive indeterminacy, see Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role
of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 1061 (2000).
364 See, e.g., Kamar & Kahan, supra note 308 (Table 2) (data from the late 1990s in
Towers Perrin 1998 Directors and Officers Liability Survey); The Wyatt Co., Wyatt
Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Survey (1987) (data from mid-1980s).
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as compared to the less fact-intensive approach followed by other states that
Kamar considers preferable. Moreover, the mix of standards and rules in
Delaware case law is consistent with one of the criteria in economic theory
for choosing between rules and standards: the frequency of transactions.365
The judicial approach to dismissing a derivative action in the absence of a
conflict of interest is straightforward and, hence, rule-like in nature, whereas
the example Kamar provides ofan overly fact-intensive standard is the fairness
test applied to breaches of duty in self-interested transactions.366 Derivative
suit filings are a relatively frequent occurrence, in which the benefit of
applying a generalized rule is likely to outweigh the cost of implementing
an individualized standard, compared to a court's need to evaluate the
substantive content of breaches of the duty of loyalty, claims that typically
entail idiosyncratic occurrences in which individualized decisions tend to be
the more cost-effective adjudicative approach.367 The difficulty of identifying
the counterfactual-how Delaware law could optimally be revised to be less
"excessively" fact-intensive--cannot, in the end, be finessed by contending
that Delaware could adopt a more determinate fiduciary standard by "limiting
or prioritizing the [applicable] criteria."368 One needs to state exactly what
those more refined standards are to assess the validity of the proposition.
365 See Kaplow, supra note 361.
366 See, e.g., Kahan & Kamar, supra note 308, at 48.
367 In my sample of 139 shareholder suits, Romano, supra note 356, of the 139
lawsuits, 55 were derivative suits, with an additional 31 combining derivative and
class claims; in contrast, only 22 suits alleged solely a duty of loyalty claim in the
complaints, with an additional 48 combining a duty of loyalty claim with another
type of claim (such as duty of care or securities law violation). Of course, to avoid
a quick dismissal of a derivative suit under the demand requirement, plaintiffs
must allege a conflict of interest (a loyalty breach), and thus these figures overstate
the presence of genuine fact patterns involving the duty of loyalty. Moreover, the
previously noted high settlement rate of these lawsuits reduces the potential pool
of cases that judges will have to adjudicate under the fairness standard.
368 Informing this contention is Louis Kaplow's article advocating the use of rules over
standards, or more-rule-like standards over less-rule-like standards. See Kahan &
Kamar, supra note 308, at 57 n.101. Kaplow's general analysis does not, however,
demonstrate why it is optimal to adopt a more determinate standard than Delaware's
standard in the specific context of fiduciary duty law. First, the fiduciary context is
not a context in which rules are preferable in Kaplow's model, because corporations
have legal counsel on retainer and thus fall into his category of cases where the
cost of obtaining advice is low and there is no difference in conforming behavior
to rules compared to standards. Kaplow, supra note 361, at 564. Second, it is also
not a context in which the ex ante, as opposed to ex post, determination of the
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The final basis for Kamar's claim that Delaware law is excessively
indeterminate is the contention that the Delaware corporate bar benefits
from uncertainty because it creates an excessive amount of litigation,
thereby increasing attorneys' income. This claim is a variant of earlier work
by Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, who contended that with regard
to Delaware law, the key players concerned about Delaware's success in
charter competition are the members of the Delaware bar and that they
engage in rent-seeking in the legislative process by ensuring that Delaware's
code facilitates shareholder suits.369
It is true that there are a number of features in Delaware's corporation
code, identified by Macey and Miller, that facilitate litigation compared to
other state codes, such as the absence of a security-for-expenses provision
requiring suing shareholders to post a bond for defense costs. But it is not
apparent that all such features harm shareholders, and there are other aspects
of Delaware's regime that discourage litigation, such as strict enforcement
of the demand requirement in derivative suits, which puts the decision to sue
in the hands of the board of directors.37o The same is true of Kamar's claim
concerning Delaware's court-centered and standard-based jurisprudence: it
is not self-evident that shareholders are disadvantaged by this approach, and
there are features of Delaware fiduciary law that are quite specific, such as the
demand requirement and the approval process for self-interested transactions.
Delaware's commanding position in the charter market no doubt may
enable the corporate bar to siphon off a share of Delaware's rents by
fashioning a legal regime that increases its income at the expense of share
legal rule is appropriate. Id. The only criterion of Kaplow's model that could lead
to rejecting a standards approach in the fiduciary context is the frequency of the
conduct in question: transactions in which a fiduciary issue could arise, such as
acquisitions, are fairly common occurrences. But to the extent that the particulars
of the complaints in acquisition cases vary significantly and are often idiosyncratic,
rules would still be less preferable to standards in this setting. Thus, the reasoning
for invoking the frequency criterion for a rule is inapposite in this context as well,
and Kamar's objection to the emphasis on standards in Delaware fiduciary law is
not theoretically well grounded.
369 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 469 (1987). Ian Ayres made a suggestion,
analogous to Kamar's, with respect to legislation rather than judicial interpretation,
that Delaware might continuously update its code not only to create difficulties
for competitors, but also to generate additional litigation. Ian Ayres, Supply-Side
Inefficiencies in Corporate Charter Competition: Lessons from Patents, Yachting
and Bluebooks, 43 Kan. L. Rev. 541, 558-59 (1995).
370 See, e.g., Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194 (Del. 1991).
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value. But the trade-off will not reach the point at which a firm will be
indifferent to staying in Delaware or changing domicile. A competitive
market for lawyers reduces the Delaware bar's ability to create a legal
regime that increases litigation, and, hence, attorney income, at the expense
of shareholder wealth. For example, a study of the legal profession, though
not fine-tuned to Delaware corporate practice, finds that lawyers do not earn
abnormal returns when income is adjusted for years of education.371
Moreover, public corporations, which comprise the bulk of Delaware's
chartering business, have in-house counsel who monitor legal costs and often
put litigation out to bid and use multiple law firms. Such individuals operate
under budget constraints and would not maintain a Delaware domicile if
it were imposing undue costs from "excessive" litigation. For Kamar's
argument to be sound and for sophisticated in-house counsel to be able
to justify expenditure of additional resources on excessive litigation by
selecting a Delaware domicile, the costs would have to be offset by ajudicial
bias in favor of managers, which would reduce the probability of firms'
liability to shareholders in Delaware to an insignificant figure compared to the
liability level in other states where litigation is not excessive. As previously
noted, however, shareholder suits are not dismissed more frequently in
Delaware than in other state courts.372 Indeed, Kamar does not contend that
Delaware law is weighted in that fashion, and it would be difficult to make such
a claim. William Cary's argument to that effect has been refuted by subsequent
commentators analyzing judicial decisions in Delaware and federal courts;373
and indeed, if Cary were correct, the empirical evidence on the shareholder
wealth effects of state competition could not have been as favorable as it is.
D. Is State Takeover Regulation Evidence that a National Regime Would
Be Superior to State Competition?
In the 1980s, when hostile takeovers emerged as the mechanism of choice
for a control change in which incumbent managers were replaced, the
vast majority of states enacted laws that attempted to lower the success
of a hostile bid. Because shareholders receive substantial premiums in
hostile takeovers, most commentators hypothesized that the objective of
such statutes is not to enhance shareholder welfare, but to entrench
37! See Sherwin Rosen, The Marketfor Lawyers, 35 J.L. & Econ. 215 (1992).
372 See supra note 356.
373 E.g., Loewenstein, supra note 308.
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management.374 Indeed, some antitakeover statutes make explicit a non-
shareholder-wealth-maximization objective. Such laws, known as "other
constituency statutes," permit management to consider interests other than
that of the shareholders (that is, factors besides the offered price) in deciding
whether to oppose a bid.375 Some commentators, however, contended that
takeover defenses benefit shareholders by solving a coordination problem that
limits their bargaining ability to extract the highest price from the bidder.376
In a recent article, Lucian Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell focus on the
takeover statute phenomenon to challenge the efficacy of state competition.377
Taking the side of the proponents of takeovers and opponents of takeover
statutes,378 they consider the widespread adoption of takeover statutes as
374 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 80, at 220-22.
375 For an analysis of these statutes, see Roberta Romano, What Is the Value of
Other Constituency Statutes to Shareholders?, 43 U. Toronto LJ. 533 (1993). I
found these statutes had no significant stock price effect on the specific legislative
event dates and within two-day event intervals. Id. at 537. John Alexander et aI.,
however, found a significant negative price effect for firms without poison pills or
antitakeover charter amendments for two of the statutes that I examined, when a
longer event interval of two days before and three days after was used, and for
a third statute, enacted by Indiana in 1989, that was improperly included in their
sample, because Indiana had an other-constituency statute in effect since 1986.
John C. Alexander et aI., Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes and Shareholder
Wealth: A Note, 21 J. Banking & Fin. 417,427 (1997). I found a negative effect
for the earlier Indiana statute, see Romano, supra, at 538, but it is not a "clean"
statute in that it was passed in a bill containing another antitakeover law, a control
share acquisition provision. I did not find any difference for firms with or without
defensive tactics in place, but I did not investigate this effect for each state statute
separately as did Alexander et aI., and therefore the two studies' results regarding
the interaction between defensive tactics and other-constituency statutes are not
directly comparable. In addition, my sample consisted of relatively large firms,
as it was constructed solely from NYSE listings, while Alexander et aI. included
firms traded on the American Stock Exchange and NASD's Automated Quotation
System ("NASDAQ"), which are, on average, smaller than NYSE firms given the
exchanges' different listing requirements. Because at least one study has found that
it is small firms that experience negative price effects from takeover statutes, see
M. Andrew Fields & Janet M. Todd, Finn Size, Antitakeover Charter Amendments,
and the Effect ofState Antitakeover Legislation, 21 Managerial Fin. 35 (1995), the
difference in the two studies' samples may explain the difference in the statistical
results.
376 See, e.g., William J. Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents,
and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983 Am. B. Found.
Res. J. 341.
377 Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 179.
378 Id. at 1182. As discussed in infra note 393, Bebchuk has advocated enactment of
takeover statutes that require shareholder approval for a bid to proceed and his
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evidence that competition is a "race to the bottom" that produces laws favoring
managers' interests over those of shareholders. Although I have discussed the
significance of takeover statutes for assessing the efficacy ofstate competition
in detail in prior work,379 this section responds to Bebchuk and Ferrell's
restatement of this objection to competition.
It should, however, be underscored that despite Bebchuk and Ferrell's
critique, no advocate of charter competition contends that state competition
is perfect nor ignores the phenomenon of state takeover laws. Rather, the
position of proponents of competition is that on average it benefits investors
and that its legal product is far superior to what a centralized regime would
produce. Entering into the positive assessment of the efficacy of competition
are three factors: (1) the view that the data on competition's enhancement
of shareholder value outweigh any potential negative effect of the behavior
of the states on takeovers; (2) the stark differentiation between the product
of laws involving takeovers and other corporate code provisions; and (3)
the consideration that in contrast to Delaware, the national government
would have little incentive or ability to be responsive to changing business
conditions. Not only would there be reduced incentives to respond due
to the absence of competition, but there also would be little financial
incentive to respond, as the revenues from the incorporation business, which
averaged 17% of total taxes collected by Delaware from 1966-1998,380 would
be an insignificant percentage of the federal budget.381 Bebchuk and Ferrell
criticism of the output of state competition in this area can thus be understood,
at least in part, as an objection that not all states adopted his preferred statute, or
solely his preferred statute (since the adopters often enacted additional takeover
statutes as well), rather than as an objection to all takeover regulation.
379 E.g., Romano, supra note 22, at 52-84.
380 Roberta Romano, The Advantage of Competitive Federalism for Securities
Regulation (forthcoming 2001) (table 4-1).
381 This is not to say that there would be no financial incentive for the federal
government to respond, as members of Congress are responsive, for instance, to
campaign contributions, but that is a far more expensive and less reliable incentive
device for investors than the incentive mechanisms of state competition. In addition,
Congress acts more slowly than state legislatures, as the U.S. political system is
founded on extensive checks and balances that impede legislative innovation.
For example, congressional reversals of Supreme Court decisions invalidating
federal statutes averaged 2.4 years from opinion to reversal, whereas the Delaware
legislature took only 1.5 years to respond with legislation to a controversial decision
on director liability, Romano, supra note 22, at 49. In addition, state takeover laws
are often enacted within a few weeks or months of proposal. See, e.g., Roberta
Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 Va. L. Rev. Ill, 128,
131-32 (1987) (discussing political process in Connecticut).
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minimize the import of all three of these factors regarding the relative efficacy
of state competition. But for state competition to be preferable to a single
national regime, the key issue is not perfection, but the relative performance
of institutions.
J. Delaware and Takeover Regulation
Most of the controversy among corporate law commentators over
the efficacy of takeover defenses is not whether takeovers benefit
shareholders-the data on this are unequivocal-but whether the net
effect of defenses-increased competition among bidders (that is, takeover
auctions)-benefits shareholders. The debate, in essence, is whether the
increased premium shareholders would receive in an auction would be more
than offset by the reduced probability that a bid would be received in the first
place, as bidders would engage in less search for targets if their likelihood of
success were reduced because other bidders, free-riding on the first bidder's
search, could offer a higher price. Whether bidders would, in fact, reduce
their search-that is, whether they would not be adequately compensated in
an auction-has also been a subject of debate.382
Corresponding to the scholarly debate over the efficacy of auctions,
the empirical literature evaluating takeover defenses has produced mixed
results. Consistent with the position that restricting hostile takeovers is
against shareholder interest, some event studies find that the enactment
of antitakeover laws produced negative stock price reactions, although
others find the price effect is statistically insignificant.383 Similarly, other
takeover restrictions undertaken at the firm level, such as antitakeover charter
amendments and adoption ofgolden parachutes, often do not have a significant
negative price effect and, on occasion, even have a significant positive
effect.384 In addition, the evidence on whether there is a tradeoff between
382 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in
Tender Offer Defense, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 51 (1982) (supporting takeover auctions by
providing examples of how a first bidder can recoup the risk of lost information
costs).
383 The most comprehensive study, which aggregates the effect of forty statutes, finds
a small but significant negative stock price effect, see Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul
H. Malatesta, The Wealth Effects ofSecond-Generation State Takeover Legislation,
25 J. Fin. Econ. 291 (1989), although many studies of individual statutes do not
find significant stock price effects, see Romano, supra note 22, at 60-67 (reviewing
results of empirical studies on takeover statutes).
384 E.g., Harry DeAngelo & Edward M. Rice, Antitakeover Charter Amendments and
Shareholder Wealth, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 329 (1983) (insignificant effect); Scott C. Linn
& John J. McConnell, An Empirical Investigation of the Impact of 'Antitahwver'
Amendments on Common Stock Prices, 11 1. Fin. Econ. 361 (1983) (positive
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higher premia in auctions and fewer initial bids is inconclusive: while auctions
do increase target premiums, the rate of takeover auctions does not appear to
differ across states with and without takeover statutes, and there are conflicting
findings concerning whether the number oftakeovers has been reduced by the
presence of a takeover statute or defensive tactics and whether premiums
are higher for firms with defenses or incorporated in states with takeover
statutes.385
Bebchuk and Ferrell's critique of state action on takeovers is supported
empirically by the subset of findings that takeover statutes (and some
takeover defenses) have negative wealth effects. However, their analysis
overlooks key differences between Delaware's takeover statute and those of
other states and between the political process in the enactment of a takeover
statute compared to other corporate law provisions. Their analysis also
neglects the dynamics of the national politics, which must be factored in if
one is to consider the alternative to state competition-a national regime.
These omissions render implausible their conclusion that the enactment of
takeover laws requires a "reassessment" of state competition for corporate
charters and, by implication, the suggestion that competition should be
scrapped in favor of a national regime, as they expressly identify their
or insignificant effect); Gregg Jarrell & Annette Poulsen, Shark Repellents and
Stock Prices: The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments Since /980, 19 J. Fin.
Econ. 127 (1987) (insignificant effect for fair price amendments, the majority of
sample); James A. Brickley et aI., Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover
Amendments, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 267 (1988) (insignificant effect); Richard Lambert &
Donald Larckner, Golden Parachutes, Executive Decision-making and Shareholder
Wealth, 7 J. Acct. & Econ. 179 (1985) (significant positive effect); but see Sanjai
Bhagat & Richard Jefferis, Voting Power in the Proxy Process: The Case of
Antitakeover Charter Amendments, 30 J. Fin. Econ. 193 (1991) (after observing
that returns around proxy mailings are higher for firms where no antitakeover
amendments are proposed than for firms that make such proposals, they find a
significant negative effect from a broad set of antitakeover amendments when
adjusting for anticipation of such a proposal in a cross-sectional regression based
on firm-specific characteristics).
385 See, e.g., Jo Watson Hackl & Rosa Anna Testani, Note, Second Generation State
Takeover Statutes and Shareholder Wealth: An Empirical Study, 97 Yale L.J. 1193
(1988) (states with second generation statutes had smaller increase in number of
takeovers, controlling for incorporations, than states with no such statutes, but bid
premiums did not vary across regulating and non-regulating states, and auctions
were not more frequent in states with statutes); Robert Comment & G. William
Schwert, Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrence and Wealth Effects of
Modem Antitakeover Measures, 39 J. Fin. Econ. 3 (1995) (takeover rates not lower
for firms covered by takeover statutes or poison pill defenses).
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position with William Cary, who advocated replacing state competition with
a federal regime.386
In particular, the critical factor that Bebchuk and Ferrell do not adequately
address in maintaining that state takeover laws should be considered
paradigmatic of all corporate code provisions is that Delaware, the state
with the largest stake in the chartering business, stands out as an anomaly in
the pattern of takeover legislation on which Bebchuk and Ferrell's argument
relies. For instance, in contrast to its position as an innovator of corporation
code provisions, Delaware has persistently been a laggard behind other
states in the takeover statute context.387 Its first-generation takeover statute
was enacted in 1975, seven years, and seven states, after the first such state
law was enacted.388 It did not adopt a second-generation statute until after
these statutes were upheld by the Supreme Court in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
386 Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 179, at 1170; Cary, supra note 71. In a more recent
article, Bebchuk and Ferrell propose permitting firms to choose their takeover
regime, with a federal option in addition to their incorporation state, a proposal that
parallels my proposal to open securities regulation up to competition. Bebchuk &
Ferrell, supra note 306. This proposal is not an alternative to state competition, but
it is an endorsement of competition, as firms would choose their takeover regime
from among different sovereigns. It is thus a proposal that cedes the debate over
corporate charters to the side in favor of state competition. The specifics of the
proposal are, however, puzzling for two reasons. First, as discussed in the text, there
is no guarantee that Congress would enact a takeover statute whose substantive
content is identical to Bebchuk and Ferrell's proposal, and there is considerable
evidence that in all likelihood, it would not do so. Second, under existing Delaware
law, firms can voluntarily adopt Bebchuk and Ferrell's preferred takeover regime,
but none appears to have done so. Bebchuk and Ferrell presumably believe that
this state of affairs is a function of managers' trumping shareholder preferences
under state competition; the alternative explanation, and, in my judgment, the more
compelling one, is that their proposal is not as desirable as they claim. Although
institutional investors make numerous proposals regarding takeover defenses, none
has suggested that targeted firms adopt the London regime. Because the optimal
takeover regime is uncertain given the unresolved empirical literature on the tradeoff
between premiums, auctions, and bid probabilities, had Bebchuk and Ferrell truly
wanted to enhance shareholder choice through federal intervention-their stated
goal, see id. at 113-rather than to direct the substantive content of federal takeover
law to the rule that they hypothesize is optimal, they would have recommended
instead a federal procedural requirement that shareholders have initiation rights to
create and remove takeover defenses, which would let shareholders select their
own takeover regime.
387 See Romano, supra note 21, at 237-40 (Delaware is either the first or one of the
first states to adopt major corporate law innovations apart from takeover statutes).
388 Romano, supra note 22, at 59.
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Corp. of America,389 in contrast to twenty other states that had acted prior to
the decision.390
More important, Delaware's takeover statute is considerably less
restrictive of bids compared to those of most, if not all, other states.
For example, bidders are exempt from the statute entirely if they obtain
85% of the shares in their offer, and its restrictions on bidders have a
shorter duration, three years, compared to those of other states, such as New
York's five years.391 Greater flexibility and protection for hostile bidders was
also a defining characteristic of Delaware's first-generation takeover statute,
which did not have a hearing requirement, the prime method by which those
early statutes sought to defeat hostile bids, and in contrast to most states'
first-generation takeover laws, it was optional.392 Correspondingly, in contrast
to the second-generation antitakeover statutes of other states, the Delaware
statute did not have a negative stock price effect.393 While Bebchuk and Ferrell
389 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
390 See Romano, supra note 298, at 461-64.
391 See, e.g., id. at 464 n.6.
392 See, e.g., Romano, supra note 22, at 59. First-generation statutes were structured
as securities regulations, reviewing and postponing the consummation of hostile
bids, similar to the federal takeover law and struck down as burdens on interstate
commerce in Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624 (1982); second-generation statutes are
structured as corporate governance measures and are typically optional statutes.
These statutes were enacted in a few states immediately following the Edgar v.
MITE decision and in virtually all states after the Supreme Court upheld Indiana's
second-generation statute, a control share acquisition law, in CTS v. Dynamics
Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
393 See John S. Jahera & William N. Pugh, State Takeover Legislation: The Case of
Delaware, 7 J.L. Beon. & Org. 410, 416-19 (1991) (finding insignificant or positive
returns over eight two-day event intervals); Karpoff & Malatesta, supra note 383,
at 315 (finding an insignificant price effect over two-day event interval). It is at
the least curious for Bebchuk and Ferrell to conclude from Delaware's enactment
of a takeover statute, which is considerably less restrictive of bidders than other
statutes and had no negative stock price effect, that state competition is an abysmal
failure and to imply that it ought to be scrapped for national regulation. Bebchuk's
own proposal for a takeover statute, a law requiring a majority vote of the target
shareholders to approve a takeover before it can proceed, is indistinguishable from
the control share acquisition statutes adopted by numerous states, which permit a
bidder to acquire shares (or equivalently, to vote the shares it acquires) only upon
a vote of the majority of the other shareholders in approval of the transaction.
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in
Corporate Takeovers, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1695 (1985); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§
1701.0, 1701.831 (2001); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 23-1-42-1 to 23-1-42-11(2000). Yet
in contrast to the Delaware statute that had an insignificant positive price effect,
the Indiana control share acquisition statute that tracks Bebchuk's recommended
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belittle these key features of Delaware's takeover legislation, they provide
no evidence, nor do they maintain, that the optimal regime entails no such
legislation, which is the conclusion implied by their position that an analysis
showing Delaware's statute to be more facilitative of bids than other states'
laws is evidence that state competition works poorly.
Finally, John Coates has sought to measure the extent to which the
default rules of a state corporation code restrict hostile bids by delaying
their success. He concludes that Delaware is the least restrictive of any
state (it has the lowest score on a scale in which the lower the score, the
shorter the time a bid can be delayed, and hence the easier it is for a hostile
bidder to succeed).394 While firms can and do change the Delaware default
rules, shareholders have to approve the changes if the provisions are in the
corporation's charter or are able to reverse them if they are in the bylaws.
Consistent with the data on Delaware's takeover statute and corporation
code defaults, Robert Daines finds that Delaware firms are more likely to
receive a takeover bid than firms of other states.395 The gulfbetween Delaware
and other states regarding takeover legislation is considerable, and it has real
consequences, notwithstanding Bebchuk and Ferrell's attempt to minimize
the difference. This is an important finding, because Delaware is the leading
incorporation state and its laws govern the majority of large publicly-traded
corporations, entities for which Bebchuk and Ferrell's concern regarding
managerial opportunism is highest, as these firms are the least likely to have
controlling shareholders (i.e., managers owning a substantial percentage of
the firm).
One reason why Delaware's statutory output is different from other
states regarding takeover regulation is that its political dynamics differ
dramatically from the politics of other states. There are more bidders, as
well as more targets, incorporated in Delaware than in other states, and no
one target corporation can have significant legislative influence in obtaining
a favorable law, as has been true in the passage of takeover laws in almost
all other states.396 Bidders tend to focus their energies on lobbying in states
takeover law ironically had a significant negative price effect. See, e.g., Karpoff
& Malatesta, supra note 383, at 315; William N. Pugh & John S. Jahera, State
Antitakeover Legislation and Shareholder Wealth, 13 J. Fin. Res. 221 (1990). The
price effect of the Ohio statute was, however, insignificantly negative. Id.
394 See Coates, supra note 294.
395 Daines, supra note 142.
396 For lists of the specific takeover targets that were the source of state takeover laws,
see Henry N. Butler, Corporation-Specific Antitakeover Statutes and the Market
for Corporate Charters, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 365; Romano, supra note 298, at 461
n.11. This is one of the reasons why states have multiple takeover laws. A law is
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where the rewards are greater-where there is a higher number ofprospective
targets-and where their efforts are more likely to payoff-where they have
local contacts; both of these factors are true of Delaware. In addition, in
contrast to other states, in Delaware all changes to the corporation code are
broadly vetted by the corporate bar, and the legislature only considers revisions
approved by the bar committee.397 The diversity in representation in corporate
clients across the bar has ensured that all parties have input into the drafting
process.
Bebchuk and Ferrell overlook the distinctive features of Delaware politics
and maintain instead that corporate managers only lobby for rules favorable
for targets when it comes to takeover legislation.398 Although this is not an
implausible initial hypothesis, as many individuals care more about adverse
outcomes than favorable ones,399 the members of the corporate bar, and not
corporate managers, are the key players in the Delaware legislative process.400
If legal counsel were to lobby for laws that benefit managers at the cost of
reducing share values, the value of their human capital would be diminished,
as Delaware could lose its primacy among incorporation states. Attorneys
in other states do not have an equivalently valuable asset to deplete; and
since they typically represent solely targets, whereas Delaware lawyers tend
to represent both sides of deals, non-Delaware lawyers have an additional
reason to support laws favoring target management: after an acquisition, the
combined entity most often uses the acquirer's counsel, not the target's. It is
simply not in the Delaware bar's self-interest to eliminate the possibility of
successful hostile bids.
Furthermore, given contemporary compensation contracts that provide
executives with considerable sums of cash upon control changes,
tailored to help a specific target stop a particular bid, and when the next in-state
target faces a bidder that has adapted itself to the existing defenses, including the
prior takeover legislation, that target needs a new form of defense to be codified to
protect it. Targets tum to legislatures because in the context of a well-priced bid,
their shareholders will not approve the adoption of the defenses they are able to
obtain from the legislature.
397 See Justice Andrew G.T. Moore, II, State Competition, Panel Response, 8 Cardozo
L. Rev. 779, 780-81 (1987). Takeover laws in other states often are adopted
under unusual circumstances compared to other provisions in corporate codes-in
specially called legislative sessions or without review by the relevant bar committee
or public hearings-as legislatures act to assist a local target's effort to thwart a
takeover by a foreign (out-of-state) bidder. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 381.
398 Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 179, at 1176-77.
399 See, e.g., Hardin, supra note 147, at 82-83.
400 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 397; Macey & Miller, supra note 369.
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the scenario that Bebchuk and Ferrell postulate concerning managers'
incentives-avoiding acquisition at all costs-is dated. Managers are far
more likely to use defenses to increase the bid price than to thwart bids,
because they obtain increased equity compensation upon takeovers as stock
options accelerate and often increase in amount upon the bid.401
In addition, while the line between target and acquirer is not always
sharp, there are firms that have extensive acquisition programs, and the
vast majority of firms that have made an acquisition, and, in particular, a
hostile one, are incorporated in Delaware.402 The incentive of these firms'
managers is to ensure that Delaware's legal regime does not restrict takeovers,
as it has the largest pool of targets and not, as Bebchuk and Ferrell assert, to
lobby for antitakeover legislation. By focusing exclusively on the domicile
of the manager, Bebchuk and Ferrell have lost sight of the fact that acquirer
managers recognize that Delaware is the home of the vast majority ofpotential
targets, and for such managers, having a law facilitating bids is more important
than concern about their own firm's vulnerability to a bid under such a statute
as that can be handled by firm-level defenses.
Finally, in contrast to other states, no domestic Delaware corporation
employs a significant workforce in-state that could offset the magnitude of
franchise tax collections and provide clout to obtain takeover legislation.
Consequently, concerns other than stock-price maximization, such as
protecting target firm jobs, which tend to make legislators partial to
managers', rather than shareholders', position regarding the success of
a bid, do not affect the making of acquisition law in Delaware as much as
they do in other states.403
401 Executive Compensation Issues in M&A Panel, University of Miami School of
Law Center for the Study of Mergers & Acquisitions Fourth Annual Institute
(Feb. 11, 2000) (comments by Barbara Nims, Esq., Davis Polk & Wardwell, and
members of audience).
402 For example, of all tender offers for which at least one finn was traded on a
national exchange from 1958-85, the database used for predicting the adoption of
a takeover statute in Romano, supra note 381, at 143, there were 49 NYSE-listed
hostile bidders incorporated in Delaware, compared to a maximum of 6 in any
other state, and 95 NYSE-listed acquirers incorporated in Delaware, compared to
a maximum of 14 in any other state.
403 State legislatures often enact takeover statutes because they are concerned with
local employment levels, even though little evidence exists that, on average, hostile
takeovers result in the loss of production level jobs, see Roberta Romano,
A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and Regulation, 9 Yale J. Reg. 119,
137-42 (1992). For example, the Connecticut legislature speedily called hearings
on legislation designed to protect a local finn from a hostile bid, because it was
alleged that the takeover would result in substantial layoffs. Connecticut did not
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Bebchuk and Ferrell suggest that shareholders are easily exploited by
managers who select takeover regimes that enable them to expropriate
shareholder wealth, but this is simply not so. Not only does the enactment
of multiple statutes indicate that such legislation does not stop bids, but
the experience in one state that adopted a uniquely restrictive statute is
instructive. When Pennsylvania passed a takeover disgorgement statute that
was considered to be more Draconian than any other antitakeover law,404
institutional investors pressured managers to opt out of the statute, and a
majority of firms did so (of 199 publicly traded firms whose choices could
be identified, 127 opted out of all or part of the statute, while 72 did not).405
Moreover, other states did not copy the Pennsylvania statute. Managers do not
operate in the environment that Bebchuk and Ferrell imagine, which would
permit them to ignore with impunity investors' wishes regarding takeover
regulation.
In contrast to the situation in Pennsylvania, investors have not pressured
managements to opt-out of other takeover statutes, including Delaware's,
whereas they routinely press managers to rescind or subject to shareholder
approval firm-level defenses, such as poison pillS.406 The most plausible
explanation of this behavior is that while they disagree with managers
concerning specific defensive tactics, they do not perceive that takeover
statutes significantly affect the initiation or outcome of a takeover bid, rather
than the characterization ofBebchuk and Ferrell, that they are helpless victims
of managers' expropriative regime choice.407 This contention is supported
enact the statute, despite earlier predictions that it would, after the state United
Auto Workers ("UAW") union indicated that it did not support the legislation; it
appears that the local finn's managers were less "pro-union" than the bidder, which
reached an agreement with the UAW to, among other matters, remain neutral if the
UAW sought to unionize the local plant after the takeover. See Dan Haar, House
Rejects Takeover Measure; Vote Denies Echlin Protection Against SPX's Hostile
Bid, Hartford Courant, Mar. 26, 1998, at D l.
404 This interpretation is supported by evidence of a significant negative stock price
reaction to the legislation. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul H. Malatesta,
State Takeover Legislation and Share Values: The Wealth Effects ofPennsylvania's
Act 36, I J. Corp. Fin. 367 (1995); Samuel H. Szewczyk & George P. Tsetsekos,
State Intervention in the Market for Corporate Control: The Case ofPennsylvania
Senate Bill 1320, 31 J. Fin. Econ. 3 (1992).
405 See Romano, supra note 22, at 68-69. The percentage opting out is higher for
the larger finns (74% of exchange-listed Pennsylvania corporations opted out
compared to 60% of finns traded on NASDAQ or over-the-counter).
406 See Gillan & Starks, supra note 292, at 286 (of 2042 shareholder proposals offered
between 1987 and 1994, 249 were directed at repealing poison pills while only 17
were directed at opting out of takeover statutes).
407 Given the small but statistically significant negative price effect picked up in
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by Robert Comment and G. William Schwert's finding that state takeover
laws do not reduce the number of bids.408 Indeed, notwithstanding Bebchuk
and Ferrell's picture of a "fortress" corporate America constructed with the
assistance of state legislatures,409 as takeover statutes proliferated across
states, so did the number of acquisitions. The thesis that Delaware has a
relatively mild takeover statute is, accordingly, not an "excuse" for state
competition, as Bebchuk and Ferrell assert,410 but, rather, compelling evidence
that the state most concerned about charter competition is the most responsive
to shareholder desires.
2. Would National Takeover Legislation Be Superior to the Output of State
Competition?
Because there would be no competing regimes, whose takeover rules
could differ, the national government might not feel as pressured to
revise its takeover law repeatedly to thwart hostile bids, but it also
would not be as constrained regarding the level of protection it chooses
by the presence of alternative opportunities facilitating bids compared
to states in a competitive federal system. In fact, the idealized system
of national regulation that Bebchuk and Ferrell advocate in place of state
competition is a pipe dream. The congressional legislative process regarding
takeovers is similar to that of most states, resembling more closely the
Pennsylvania than Delaware dynamics,411 and therefore the political failure,
which is the linchpin of Bebchuk and Ferrell's critique of state competition,
that an entrenchment-motivated management controls the legislative process,
will not miraculously disappear when Congress is the object of lobbying.
The Williams Act, for example, is widely recognized as favoring incumbent
management over bidders by increasing the cost of a bid through delay,412
and it is much more effective at delaying a bid and inducing an auction than
any of the second-generation state statutes. Hence, it is highly improbable
that Congress would adopt the form of takeover regulation that Bebchuk and
Karpoff and Malatesta's comprehensive event study of takeover statutes cited in
supra note 383, this explanation of investor behavior regarding takeover statutes
would mean either that the market has changed its assessment of the significance
of the statutes, or the takeover environment itself has changed (either a learning
or a real economy effect due to, for instance, the evolution of poison pill defenses
into a more prominent strategic position than the older statutory defenses).
408 Comment & Schwert, supra note 385.
409 Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 179, at 1180.
410 Id. at 1198.
411 Romano, supra note 298, at 475-85.
412 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 80, at 224-25.
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Ferrell believe is optimal. It is also worth noting that firms in states that
have enacted statutes indistinguishable from Bebchuk's proposed regulation
experienced significant negative stock price effects from the legislation.413
The difference between Congress' likely response and Bebchuk and
Ferrel's proposal is not simply speculation. Bebchuk and Ferrell praise as
preferable to the output of state competition, and, hence, as a standard
for federal regulation, the takeover rules in the London Code of Conduct,
established by the City's Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, which regulates
takeover bids in the United Kingdom.414 The London Code requires bidders
to buy all target shares and prohibits defensive tactics without shareholder
approval once a bid has commenced. Congress, however, expressly did not
adopt the takeover rules embodied in the London Code, although it surely
could have done so. In fact, the Williams Act expressly permits partial bids
(which the London Code bans). Moreover, Congress never even considered
restricting defenses when enacting the Williams Act, which instead increased
management's defensive arsenal by providing a basis for litigation (bidders'
failure to comply with various aspects of the Act). Indeed, while over 200 bills
regulating takeovers were introduced in Congress from 1963 through 1987,
five years before the enactment of the Williams Act to the Supreme Court's
decision upholding state takeover regulation, which turned takeover lobbying
efforts to the lower-cost forum of states and away from federal legislation,
of 67 bills directed at contested bids, 30 were directed solely at regulating
hostile bids, while 11 were directed solely at regulating defensive tactics
or greenmail.4J5 The remaining 26 bills included elements of both forms of
regulation, but often had provisions permitting firms to opt out of restrictions
on management defensive tactics but not out of restrictions on hostile bidders.
In other words, the type of legislation ofmost interest to members ofCongress
is decidedly against facilitating hostile bids or allocating greater authority to
shareholders than to managers over the bidding process, which is Bebchuk
and Ferrell's objective for federal legislation.
The contrast between the provisions of the London Code and the
Williams Act and the content of proposed federal legislation make clear
413 See supra note 393.
414 See Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 179, at 1192.
415 Romano, supra note 298, at 470-73. The majority of the bills were directed at
regulating tender offers generally (86 bills), restricting acquisitions in specific
industries (49 bills) or by foreign purchasers (49 bills), and discouraging takeovers
by increasing the tax on such transactions (28 bills). Id. at 472. One would be
hard-pressed to characterize these bills as being even remotely related to the type
of regulation that Bebchuk and Ferrell seek from the federal government.
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that the congressional political process bears no resemblance to Bebchuk
and Ferrell's perception of it, which is the premise for their preference
for national legislation over state competition.416 It also indicates that their
subsequent proposal for a federal takeover law option that would duplicate the
London Code and eliminate defenses is utterly unrealistic as to what would be
the output of any federal takeover legislation, whether optional or mandatory.
Equally important, the provisions of the London Code that Bebchuk and
Ferrell praise are beside the point in the U.S. takeover context. The London
Code provision that bans midstream defenses without shareholder approval,
absent from state corporation codes, has little practical significance for U.S.
corporations. The only defense that U.S. firms can today adopt midstream is
a poison pill, which can also be adopted before a bid is in the offing and hence
is not effectively prohibited by the London Code provision. This is because
institutional investors vigorously oppose midstream charter amendments
that erect takeover defenses, and accordingly, since the late 1980s, U.S.
corporations have not been able to propose successfully defensive charter
amendments such as classified boards or elimination of cumulative voting.417
In addition, the use ofa poison pill defense to thwart a bid is limited, as a pill can
be eliminated by a successful proxy fight, and state courts have not permitted
managers to adopt provisions midstream that impede proxy fights.418
The other London Code provision, the 100% offer rule, is of even less
significance than the restriction on defensive tactics as evidence of a political
failure in state takeover law. Several states have, in fact, enacted takeover
statut~s with identical effect, the requirement that bidders make 100%
416 It should be noted that the London Code is not, as Bebchuk and Ferrell maintain, a
market-based regulatory choice, and hence the optimality of the London Code is as
questionable as the state laws that they find wanting. Although the Takeover Panel
is not an official state organ or self-regulatory body, the official self-regulatory
bodies that have monopoly licensing power over market professionals require their
compliance with the Code of Conduct, and it is therefore decidedly not voluntary.
Moreover, the Bank of England was a key force behind the Takeover Panel's
creation and appoints many of its members. See Brian R. Cheffins, Company Law:
Theory, Structure, and Operation 407 (1997).
417 See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow ofthe Pill: A Critique
of the Scientific Evidence, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 271, 325, 334 (2000) (shareholders did
not approve midstream defenses throughout the 1990s).
418 See, e.g., Quicktum Design Sys. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 721 A.2d 1281 (Del.
1998) (striking down deadhand pill that impaired proxy fight). While proxy fights
are not likely to take much longer than the success of a tender offer itself,
depending upon a firm's specific charter and bylaws and state law defaults, John
Coates estimates that proxy fights can take from six to eighteen months. Coates,
supra note 294.
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offers.419 Many finns have also adopted such provisions in their charters, with
or without specific state authorization.420 In addition, with the development of
junk-bond financing in the 1980s, partial takeovers, although pennitted, have
become a largely irrelevant factor in the U.S. acquisition market. Finally, and
most importantly, the research on premiums and success rates of full and
partial bids indicates that partial bids do not produce a prisoner's dilemma in
which shareholders are forced to tender into a low-ball bid (because they fear
a majority will tender and they will receive less in a second-stage freezeout
if they do not), which is the rationale for prohibiting such bids: blended
premiums in two-tier bids are not significantly different from the premiums
in 100% offers; when there is competition between 100% and two-tier offers,
the one with the highest value calculated by the blended premium wins; and
partial bids offering small premiums are rejected at high rates.421
Bebchuk and Ferrell focus on takeover statutes as the core of the case
against state competition, because much state activity in corporate law is
legislative and, as discussed earlier, the diffusion process of code refonns is
considered a sign of robust competition. But corporate counsel have never
considered takeover statutes to provide particularly effective defenses; the
statutes serve principally to assist targets that have not adopted adequate
defenses prior to the emergence of a hostile bid. Rather, counsel consider
the poison pill to be a finn's most effective defense. Cognizant of this
fact, Bebchuk and Ferrell do criticize the Delaware judiciary for pennitting
the use of poison pills, adding this to their list of complaints against
state competition. But not all commentators have accepted Bebchuk and
Ferrell's negative assessment of defenses such as poison pills; as previously
noted, some have viewed defenses as a useful bargaining mechanism to
obtain higher prices.422 From such a perspective, judicial approval of poison
419 See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. I3-A, § 910 (redemption rights statute) (2000).
Other statutes have a similar effect: by restricting what bidders for less than 100%
of the stock (or who obtain less than 100%) can do, they are intended to result in
the offer of only bids for 100% of the shares. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Corps.
& Ass'ns §§ 3-601-3-604 (2001) (fair price provision); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §
203 (2001) (business combination freeze statute); and Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc., 648 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996) (reading appraisal statute to require payment of
premium in second-step merger after a takeover bid that is higher than offering bid
and thereby imposing huge penalty on partial offers).
420 See, e.g., Linn & McConnell, supra note 384; Jarrell & Poulsen, supra note 384.
421 See Robert Comment & Gregg A. Jarrell, Two-Tier and Negotiated Tender Offers:
The Imprisonment of the Free-Riding Shareholder, 19 J. Fin. Econ. 283 (1987).
422 In this regard, it should be noted that Bebchuk and Ferrell mischaracterize positions
in the literature. They state that "there is a large body of literature that argues that
managers should be completely prohibited from engaging in defensive tactics-a
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pills is not a failure of state competition. Bebchuk and Ferrell also overstate
the latitude that Delaware courts permit managers to exercise with respect to
defensive tactics. Not only have Delaware courts required a pill to be redeemed
when it has ceased to serve its function-increasing the bid price-and is
being used solely to entrench management,423 but they also have repeatedly
refused to permit managers to adopt poison pills that cannot be eliminated
by shareholder action (such as deadhand pills that prevent shareholders from
electing new directors who will redeem the pill in a hostile bidder's favor) or
otherwise impede the proxy process midstream.424
literature which includes contributions by leading advocates of state competition"
and cite in support of this statement articles by Ronald Gilson and the author
of this article. Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 179, at 1184, 1184 n.49. Neither
Gilson's article nor my article advocates that management should be prohibited
from engaging in all defensive tactics.
423 See City Capital Assoc. v. Interco, 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988). Although the
Delaware Supreme Court has indicated that if the Chancery Court in Interco
substituted its own judgment for what was a "better deal" over that of the board of
directors, then the analysis was improper under the Unocal standard, see Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989), it did not
indicate that it would have reversed on the substantive result nor would its more
recent interpretations of the Unocal standard indicate otherwise. The Court has
adopted the standard that a defense cannot be "preclusive" of a bid, see Unitrin,
Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995), and the Chancery Court in
Interco found the failure to redeem the pill in that case was preclusive of the bid.
424 See, e.g., Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20 (Del. Ch. Feb.
11, 2000) (striking down a bylaw amendment that required supermajority vote of
shareholders to amend bylaws); Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del.
Ch. 1988) (striking down bylaw amendments that impaired consent solicitation);
Quickturn Design Sys. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998)
(striking down deadhand pill that impaired proxy fight); Carmody v. Toll Bros.,
723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998) (same). It should further be noted that the Delaware
courts, notwithstanding Bebchuk and Ferrell's contention, see Bebchuk & Ferrell,
supra note 179, at 1179, do not unambiguously permit a "Just say no" defense.
In both of the cases that they cite for this proposition, although the efficacy of
management's action can certainly be debated, the target management had proposed
an alternative plan to the hostile bid, a merger in one case and a stock repurchase in
the other. See Paramount Communications, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (merger); Unitrin,
651 A.2d 1631 (stock repurchase plan). Moreover, even ifthey are correct regarding
court approval of a "Just say no" defense, in practice this is not a viable strategy
for management. Shareholders who lose out on a substantial premium and receive
no cash payment (as in a stock repurchase defense) or follow-up bid are disgruntled
investors who can make life difficult for managers, especially as it is understood that
they will be receptive to opposition to management proposals, including director
nominees. even Martin Lipton, a prominent takeover lawyer, who interprets the
Delaware decisions as permitting a "Just say no" defense, recognizes that such a
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In contrast to the Delaware courts, federal district courts making
state law rulings have permitted managements to craft poison pills that
shareholders cannot eliminate after a successful proxy fight.425 It is ironic
that district courts, the rulings of which Bebchuk and Ferrell would surely
disapprove, as they hinder shareholders' ability to receive bids, are the very
same courts that would be interpreting the national takeover law that Bebchuk
and Ferrell advocate in place ofcompetition, in contrast to the Delaware courts,
whose rulings on the identical issue Bebchuk and Ferrell would presumably
approve since they protected shareholders from management exploitation
through unredeemable poison pills. Yet the Delaware courts, which are the
courts found to be falling short by Bebchuk and Ferrell as having favored
managers over shareholders, would losejurisdiction over management actions
were Bebchuk and Ferrell's normative position favoring national takeover
regulation adopted.
A closing important point needs to be made regarding state competition,
national (noncompetitive) regulation, and Bebchuk and Ferrell's critique. If
Bebchuk and Ferrell are correct and takeover statutes are paradigmatic of
the output of state competition, that is, that it is a system of corporate law
rules that enables management to exploit shareholders, then besides their
explanation's inconsistency with the empirical literature on competition
(positive findings of event studies of reincorporations and comparative
work on Delaware firms' performance), it is difficult to explain the most
salient features of comparative corporate governance in which the United
States excels over virtually all other regimes. Not only are U.S. capital
markets the thickest in the world, but also U.S. corporations have the most
dispersed shareholder base, they operate under corporate laws with greater
protection of public and minority shareholders, and are subject to more
takeovers, compared to corporations in any other country.426 In addition,
defense is not likely to be available in practice, Martin Lipton, Takeover Response
Checklist, 72 Aspen L. & Bus. I, 6 (Jun. I, 2001); hence it is difficult to view
such action by the court as significant evidence for construction of a case against
competition. Bebchuk and Ferrell's final criticism of the Delaware courts, as
creating undue uncertainty over takeover law, is derived from Ehud Kamar's more
general thesis regarding Delaware law, which was critiqued in supra Part IV.C.2.
425 See, e.g., Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Techs. Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga.
1997) (upholding deadhand pill under Georgia law); Amp Inc. v. Allied Signal
Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15617 (B.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 1998) (upholding deadhand
pill under Pennsylvania law).
426 See, e.g., La Porta et aI., supra note 64; La Porta et aI., supra note 66. The
United Kingdom does as well as the United States in these comparative studies,
suggesting that an important source for cross-country discrepancies is the common
law tradition. A distinguishing feature of the common law tradition, compared to
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cross-country data further suggest that improved allocation of capital (a real
economy effect) is positively related to shareholder protection under corporate
law and the extent of capital market development.427 State competition for
corporate charters is the most distinguishing feature of the U.S. legal regime,
which has produced such large benefits for investors, as all other countries
except Canada and Australia have national corporate law systems, and those
two countries do not have charter competition.428 The existence of the SEC
cannot explain these facts. The dominance ofU.S. capital markets as the largest
and most liquid equity markets predated the creation of the SEC. Moreover,
the empirical literature finds an absence of value added by what the agency
has done. The comparative governance data cannot be squared with Bebchuk
and Ferrell's gloomy assessment of state competition.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has maintained that international securities regulation should be
opened up to jurisdictional competition, in which issuers choose a statutory
domicile for securities law purposes whose rules will govern all the issuers'
securities relations with investors regardless of where the investors are
located or the shares traded. Such a regime would be superior to the existing
territorially-based system, for it would better track investor preferences and
provide regulators with increased incentives to revise their regulations when
they have fallen out-of-step with investor needs. It would, no doubt, take
that of civil law, is its decentralized political tradition of limited government, see,
e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be
Right, 30 J. Legal Stud. 503 (2001); the U.S. corporate law regime epitomizes that
tradition. It should further be noted that while La Porta et al. stress the similarities
in market depth and ownership structure between the United States and United
Kingdom, British scholars have emphasized the differences in legal institutions and
the timing of the dispersion of stock ownership across the two nations, see, e.g.,
Brian Cheffrins, Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in
the United Kingdom, 30 J. Legal Stud. 459 (2001). Cheffrins suggests that private
organizations in the United Kingdom fulfilled the role played by the legal system
in the United States during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, institutions
whose decentralized structure, in contrast to the national corporation statute, might
have approximated the competitiveness of the U.S. charter market.
427 See Jeffrey Wurgler, Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital, 58 J. Fin.
Econ. 187 (2000).
428 See Romano, supra note 22, at 122-28 (discussing why charter competition has not
emerged in the Canadian context).
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considerable effort to craft the multilateral accords necessary to achieve
full implementation of international regulatory competition, but with the
growing use of electronic trading, geographic boundaries are increasingly
becoming obsolete as a source of regulatory authority and issuer domicile
has become the most feasible alternative jurisdictional basis.
The proposal for regulatory competition advocated in this article will
undoubtedly have the greatest implications for non-U.S. issuers, who would
be able to access the U.S. capital market without having to comply with SEC
requirements, although some of these firms may, for a variety of reasons,
including committing to subscribe to higher disclosure levels than required
by the home regulator, still choose to opt into the SEC's regime. This is
because in contrast to foreign issuers, U.S. issuers have already incurred the
start-up costs of complying with the more elaborate SEC requirements and
thus they would experience a more limited savings from experimenting with
another jurisdiction offering a more refined set of disclosure requirements.
However, if the SEC's disclosure regime is not cost justified, as the data
suggest, a competing regulator will emerge, from among the fifty U.S. states
or other nations, with a superior regime that will attract not only non-U.S.
and new U.S. issuers, who have not yet incurred the start-up costs of SEC
compliance, but eventually the mature issuers as well, who are competing
for capital with new issues. This is the central lesson to be drawn from the
evidence of responsive state behavior in the U.S. charter market.
Critics of regulatory competition in securities law have contended that
it will lead to a race to the bottom, with firms rushing to register in states
with the lowest disclosure requirements, or that it will result in a socially
sub-optimal disclosure level because corporate information of a proprietary
nature entails interfirm externalities and will not be disclosed voluntarily.
As this article has contended, the parade of horribles is unsupported and
unsupportable. First, evidence from institutional equity and debt markets, as
well as cross-country listing practices indicate that the voluntary disclosure
choices of firms are frequently higher than mandatory requirements. When
competition has been permitted in sectors of the securities markets and in
corporate law in the United States, we have not found firms opting for
minimum disclosure regimes or for states whose corporation law permits
the exploitation of investors, and there is no plausible reason to expect any
different behavior under full international securities regulatory competition.
Second, there is no evidence that the focus ofSEC disclosure requirements,
or their implementation by issuers, entails the revelation of information
bearing on interfirm externalities nor could such a mandate be feasible:
firms would either find a way not to disclose proprietary information or
they would exit from the regime by going private. A prime illustration is
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the business segment reporting requirements, which are typically considered
to be an exemplar of interfirm externalities disclosure. These requirements
provide great leeway to firms in the allocation of costs across segments and
the definition of business lines, such that the disclosures are not especially
informative: there was, for example, no price effect when firms began
disclosing the data. Moreover, the formal models of disclosure regulation
in the presence of interfirm externalities suggest that it would be difficult,
if not impossible, for a regulator to ascertain the appropriate disclosure
requirements that would increase, rather than decrease, social welfare.
Finally, if investors, rather than issuers, are the selectors of the disclosure
regime, as would occur under competition, then the problem of interfirm
externalities is mitigated because the majority of shareholders are large
institutions who hold portfolios of many firms and would therefore be able
to internalize the costs and benefits of such disclosures.
Other critiques of regulatory competition based on a positive interpretation
of the empirical literature on the effect of the federal securities laws, and
a negative interpretation of state charter competition, upon investor welfare
are inapposite. The best available evidence on the U.S. federal securities
laws indicates that the SEC's regime has not been particularly effective, as
its expansions of disclosure requirements have not had a significant positive
impact on investor wealth. In my view, the data decisively trump the
presumption conventionally accorded to the status quo (the SEC's exclusive
jurisdiction over U.S. securities transactions). In addition, the evidence on the
U.S. charter market indicates that state competition has benefited investors.
This experience provides a benchmark for projecting what would be the
most likely outcome under a competitive system of international securities
regulation: investors would reap the benefit of improved incentives for
entrepreneurs and regulators to select regimes that maximize share value.
VI. CODA: REPLY TO Fox II
Rather than publish the paper that he presented at the conference, Merritt
Fox is publishing in this issue another article responding to my position in
support of regulatory competition.429 Much of Fox's article is a restatement
of the arguments he made in his prior publications,43o to which this article has
429 Merritt Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate, 2 Theoretical Inquiries L. 563 (2001).
430 Fox, supra note 3. For example, Part liLA. 1. of Fox, supra note 429, on the Dye
model of disclosure regulation is nearly identical to his earlier article's criticism
of the model; this will be evident to any reader who rereads supra Part III.B.I.
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responded. Accordingly, in this coda, I have chosen to address only the new
arguments presented in Fox's article.431
It bears noting, however, that in his response, Fox still does not provide
a scintilla of data for his claim that the SEC's mandatory disclosure regime
has a connection to his rationale for its position as the sole securities
regulator-the disclosure of interfirm externalities. There is a straightforward
explanation for this omission: no evidence is provided in support of such a
regulatory rationale because none exists. As I have detailed in this article, the
SEC does not perceive its regulatory objective to assist firms' competitors
nor did Congress so perceive its objective when it assigned the SEC the
task of implementing a securities disclosure regime. Congress located the
federal regulatory regime for concems regarding competition in the domain
of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and the Federal Trade
Commission, and not in its national securities disclosure policy.
A. Are the Effects on Competitors of Interfirm Externality Disclosures
Only Positive?
In repeating his claim that information relating to interfirm externalities can
only have positive effects on competitor firms, Fox criticizes an example
that I provide of a disclosure that is a negative externality for competitors,
regarding a patent for a new product: he contends that the example "involves
no negative externality" because it "confuses" the "act" and "fact" "of
of this article after reading Part lILA. 1. of Fox, supra note 429, and Fox, supra
note 3. This is also true of the discussion of segment reporting in Part m.C.3.
of Fox, supra note 429, and the contentions in Part IV. of Fox, id., regarding
the significance of a change in variance of stock returns, the inappropriateness of
examining stock prices to determine the impact of the 1933 Act, and the probative
content of stock exchange manuals and an article by SEC attorneys on disclosure
practices for assessing George Benston's finding that the 1934 Act had no effect
on stock prices.
431 Fox's response also contains several claims that he has not made specific arguments
that I attribute to him. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 429, nn.5, 7-9, 11. Conscientious
readers who review Fox's prior publications at the pages that I cite in the footnotes
in this article, in conjunction with my discussion in the text accompanying those
footnotes, will be able to determine for themselves whether my characterization
of his position is accurate. In reviewing Fox's objections to my references to his
position, I found one reference that was incorrect, which involved his citation of an
article by John Coffee, on institutional investors and portfolio diversification and
I have corrected it: my discussion in supra note 140 of his position on portfolio
diversification now reflects that Fox was referring to Gilson and Black's textbook,
and not Coffee's article.
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disclosure" and will lead to a positive externality.432 I selected this example
because it is a disclosure that the SEC currently permits firms to exclude
from their filings for protection of proprietary information-information
regarding the development of new products and lines of business43'-and
therefore contains information that the SEC believes would involve interfirm
externalities. In a footnote, Fox repeats the criticism distinguishing the "act"
and "fact" of disclosure for my second example of a negative externality,
a firm's disclosure of plans to expand plant capacity,434 as well. It should
be noted that I specifically selected this additional example because Fox
previously identified as a relevant disclosure related to interfirm externalities
the disclosure of a firm's "future capital spending plans,"435 and he further
asserted that disclosure of such information would "seriously hurt the issuer
through the advantages it confers on other firms"-that is, that such disclosures
only entail positive externalities. Confronted with the illustration of such a
disclosure's possible negative effect, he now suggests that the example he
cited of a relevant disclosure is not actually what he meant.
The objection Fox directs to both examples of the patent and plant
expansion is that the disclosures in question merely affect the timing of
the negative externality-that is, he contends that the cash flow declines
for competitors that follow these disclosures would inevitably occur were
no disclosure made, because the decline is due to the substance of the
disclosure (the patent or the expansion) and not the disclosure itself. Hence,
in Fox's view, this means that the disclosure itself does not entail a negative
externality. This criticism is without merit. First, Fox's contention of the
inevitability of the cash-flow decline, independent of the disclosure, is
432 Fox, supra note 429, at 573.
433 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
434 Fox, supra note 429, at 574 n.29. Fox further attempts to dismiss this example by
asserting that a "private" firm would also make the disclosure and hence it is "not
relevant." This objection regarding what a nonregulated firm would do is beside
the point. Rather, the example is relevant because if the government mandates
disclosure of information regarding new business plans and products undt:r Fox's
rationale of mandating disclosure to assist competitors, it will not be able to
determine a priori whether the information so disclosed will entail positive or
negative externalities and, hence, whether its mandate will improve social welfare.
Moreover, despite Fox's claim that both private and public firms will disclose the
information, because a private firm is not subject to the SEC's antifraud regime,
revelation of expansion plans by such a firm will not have the same credibility
with competitors as a similar disclosure when made by a publicly-traded firm, see
Kahan, supra note 116, and thus may well not be disclosed.
435 Fox, supra note 3, at 1354.
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not necessarily the case for the proposed plant expansion example. If the
disclosure is made to deter entry that would otherwise be profitable, in the
absence of the disclosure, the competitors would enter the market, conduct
that might alter the profitability of the firm's expansion plans as well as
the competitors' investments, and the cash-flow effects might therefore
differ from those that occur if the disclosure of the proposed expansion
is made before the rival firms' investments. This difference between the
examples may explain why Fox directs his text's attention at the patent
example and places his criticism of the expansion example in a footnote.
He also acknowledges in his footnote that the consequence for social
welfare of the disclosure in the proposed plant expansion example "may
be" negative.436 This recognition undermines his contention regarding the
uniform direction of the price effects ofdisclosed interfirm externalities-that
they always increase social welfare-which is the foundation for his critique
of regulatory competition.
Second, the timing of a disclosure is typically the entire ball game
with respect to competitive effects, which are the crucial effects from the
perspective of Fox's interfirm externalities rationale for disclosure mandated
by a single regulator. For example, accountants who are sympathetic to Fox's
view of the efficacy of a disclosure regime that enhances competition state
that:
The key factor in determining whether information .,. creates
competitive disadvantage is timing. Products in development
eventually come to market. Strategies become obvious from actions,
and information about them can then no longer lead to competitive
disadvantage. At some age disclosure simply loses its capacity to
create competitive disadvantage. A given category of disclosure
can be competitively disadvantageous or competitively meaningless
depending on when the disclosure is made.437
436 Fox, supra note 429, at 574 n.29.
437 Robert K. Elliott & Peter D. Jacobson, Costs and Benefits ofBusiness Information
Disclosure, 8 Acct. Horizons 80 (1994) (emphasis added). The three categories of
business information that they consider to have potential competitive disadvantages
and therefore are identical to Fox's category of interfirm externalities (disclosures
that benefit competitors while harming the discloser) are "information about
technological and managerial innovation," "strategies. plans and tactics," and
"information about operations." The examples that Fox criticizes regarding new
products and expansion plans fall into Elliott and Jacobson's first and second
categories, and examples that Fox would appear to prefer, which I noted in the
article and discuss more fully in this response, fall into their last category.
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This is true of information entailing either a positive or a negative
externality. To use the example in Part m.B.I.d. of this article of disclosure
of a proposed plant expansion, if, for instance, the firm does not disclose its
plans for a significant expansion of capacity in advance of the undertaking,
competitors may make additional plant investments and the profitability of all
firms' investment strategies are likely to be different from what they would
have been were the expansion plans disclosed in advance. Similarly, firms'
research and development activities will be affected by their knowledge of
the presence or absence of a rival's patent successes, and hence there will
be real cash flow effects from the timing of the disclosure of a patent that
do not depend simply on the patent's presence, as Fox presumes.
Consider, moreover, information that Fox would presumably distinguish
from a patent, information regarding the extent of a firm's revenues
or cost margins (its monopoly profits) revealed by segment reporting,
the disclosure of which Fox has previously asserted involves positive
interfirm externalities,438 and which should thus induce new entrants into
the discloser's business. This disclosure is not subject to Fox's distinction
between "act" and "fact," because (at least according to Fox) the firm's rivals
or potential competitors will never obtain the precise information regarding
the firm's rents without the segment reporting disclosure. Notwithstanding
the segment revenue disclosure example's avoidance of Fox's "act" and
"fact" distinction, this disclosure entails the identical structure for which
Fox criticizes the article's examples: the disclosure's impact on firm cash
flows is, at best, only a timing effect. This is because competitors can observe
indirectly abnormal profits accruing to firms by means of observing dominant
market shares. Assuming no barrier to entry (which must be the case for
Fox's rationale regarding the disclosure of interfirm externalities to be able to
benefit competitors-they must be able to enter into the business that a firm's
disclosure indicates is profitable), rivals will eventually enter the industry
until the rate of return is normal; the segment reporting disclosure will only
accelerate such entry. From the point of view of any particular firm, however,
the timing of entry-and hence the timing of disclosure-may well make the
difference between the firm's individual profitability or loss.
The segment revenue example suggests that Fox's distinction between the
"act" and "fact" of disclosure, which is his sole objection to the examples
in the article as illustrations of negative externalities, is neither as clean,
438 Fox, supra note 3, at 1354 ("examples [of disclosures with positive interfirm
externalities] include profits and sales of each significant individual line of business
conducted by the issuer").
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nor as critical, as it might appear, for the primary impact on competitors
of proprietary disclosures is one of timing. This is inherent in the nature
of the disclosure process. Namely, one cannot in many, if not most, cases
meaningfully distinguish between the impact on other firms of a firm's "act"
of disclosing private information and the substance of the disclosure. For
Fox's distinction to have force, capital markets would have to be strong-form
efficient, such that private information is impounded in stock prices prior
to its public disclosure. The best available data indicate that this is not the
case: only public information is incorporated into stock prices.439
Fox further uses his distinction between the "act" and "fact" of disclosure
to assert that the patent disclosure is not a negative externality because the
"act" of disclosure, despite its "obviously reduc[ing] the share values of [the
firm's] competitors," will likely lead to a "positive externality" (that is, it will
have a positive effect on competitors), as it will make them know "sooner
what they will be facing in the future. "440 This contention twists the definition
of a positive externality to include any conceivable information and price
effect, including a negative effect. But the definition of a positive externality
is disclosure of information that increases the cash flows of another firm, and
not information that decreases those cash flows. The rivals may "get out" of
the business "sooner" because of the patent disclosure, so that their losses
may be lower than they might have been with no disclosure, but they are still
experiencing a decline in cash flow from the disclosure. This is, by definition,
a negative externality. Fox's characterization of the example of disclosure of
a patent as a positive, and not a negative, externality for rival firms, to put
it mildly, renders the concept of a positive externality meaningless. It is also
at odds with his criticism that a disclosure whose significance is simply the
timing of the information's release is not an externality. If the disclosure has
the supposed positive impact of making competitors"get out [of the business]
sooner" than they would have in the absence of the disclosure, then the impact
of the disclosure is an effect of the timing of the disclosure and not of the
disclosed information itself.
But even if one accepts Fox's objection to the patent and plant expansion
examples, I could just as easily have provided an example of information
generating a negative externality that cannot be characterized as due to
the "act," as opposed to the "fact," of disclosure. A good illustration is
the disclosure of a firm's operating costs, or profit margins, the impetus
behind segment reporting requirements. Fox believes such disclosures will
439 See, e.g., Ross et aI., supra note 6, at 324, 328-35.
440 Fox, supra note 429, at 574.
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necessarily produce a positive externality that will encourage competitors to
enter as they are informed of profitable opportunities, since he claims that all
corporate disclosures have "at least some positive externality" that "can help
competitors"441 and has specifically identified "profit margins" from segment
reporting information as an example of the disclosures of concern to him.442
He does not, however, offer any rationale for his contention that the effect of
such disclosures is one-sided.
In fact, contrary to Fox's position, disclosure about a firm's cost of
operations or profit may very well indicate the strength of the firm's cost
advantage, or the weakness of the market in which it operates, information
that, in contrast to the examples in Part III.B.I.d. of this article, is not likely
to be disclosed voluntarily in order to preempt competition. Such line of
business disclosures, will, however, adversely affect current and potential
competitors, because the disclosure will discourage firms from entering
and reduce existing rivals' stock prices and their access to capital, as their
investors realize their internal rates of return are lower than expected or
than their rivals'. In such a circumstance, the information regarding the
cost or profitability of the line of business has a negative, not a positive,
impact on the rival firms' cash flows, as it pushes them out of, not into,
the business line. The disclosures thus constitute a negative, and not a
positive, externality. Fox's hypothesis that disclosing information regarding
a firm's profit margins can only increase its competitors' cash flows is
plainly mistaken.
Fox's intuition is undoubtedly correct that detailed information about
costs is not likely to be disclosed voluntarily. This is because investors
are interested in predicting a firm's future cash flows, while competitors
are not,443 and information of relevance to competitors will only be disclosed
when there is an overlap between the two groups' information demands, that
is, when information that meets investors' needs coincides with information
of use to competitors. Competitors have a pretty good idea regarding rivals'
revenues from their own revenue information, as well as their access to data
on market shares, and hence, in contrast to investors, they would benefit from
more precise cost, not revenue, disclosure. But for cash flow estimation,
greater precision in revenue information serves as well as more precise
cost information, and hence firms can satisfy investors' disclosure needs
in this regard without assisting competitors. According to Fox's rationale
441 Id. at 591.
442 Fox, supra note 3, at 1354.
443 See Elliott & Jacobson, supra note 437.
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for a mandatory disclosure regime, then, precise cost, rather than revenue,
disclosures should be required. This is, however, emphatically not the current
regime, which is what Fox claims to be rationalizing. In 1997, for example,
the FASB amended its segment reporting rules, going beyond the SEC's
requirements, in order to render the disclosure more informative, but at odds
with Fox's rationale and consistent with my critique of it, the mandates were
directed at more precise disclosure of revenue, not cost, information.444
The FASB 's action on the segment reporting rule underscores my criticism
of Fox's position: the focus of the regime is not directed at requiring firms
to disclose information of relevance to competitors. The issue of what
information would be disclosed under regulatory competition entails a
different inquiry, however, because, as discussed in Part III.B.2. of this
article and more briefly in this coda, when diversified investors choose the
444 Financial Accounting Standards Bd., Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
Statement No. 131: Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and Related
Information (June 1997). In contrast to the SEC's categorical segment reporting
requirements, which the prior FASB standard had followed, SFAS No. 131
requires firms to report segment information the way they internally account
for it. The change was promoted by financial analysts, who found the prior
reporting inadequate because the reported segment data were typically unrelated
to management's discussion of business operations, which reflected their internal
data. E.g., Michael Ettredge et aL, The Effect of SFAS No. 131 on Numbers
of Reported Business Segments 5 (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author). Consistent with Fox's view and his depiction of his clients' concerns while
in practice, corporations opposed changing the segment reporting requirements,
voicing concern that more disclosure could be "competitively harmful." But what
was the actual impact of the rule change on actual disclosure practices? Ettredge et
aL examine whether the revision lived up to analysts' expectations, that is, whether
it increased the number of segments reported by firms that could previously exploit
the vagueness of the segment definition by lumping together dissimilar lines (the
expected adaptive strategy. noted by Kitch, discussed in this article at supra notes
172-73 and accompanying text). They find that the new standard was minimally
successful in achieving its goal, as it resulted in a barely detectable increase in
the number of reported segments. Ettredge et aL, supra, at 22. In addition, firms
in more concentrated industries reported a smaller increase (larger decrease) in the
number of segments./d. at 20. To the extent that firms in less competitive industries
are more likely to have monopoly profits, one would expect them to experience a
greater competitive disadvantage from detailed segment disclosure. These findings
bolster the cogency of Kitch's insight, which I emphasized in supra Part III.B.3.
of this article, that Fox's regulatory goal is futile: whatever their complaints to
regulators regarding the impact of proposed disclosure requirements, companies
will successfully go to great lengths to avoid disclosing proprietary information
that adversely impacts them.
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disclosure regime, if Fox is correct and there are net benefits from disclosing
proprietary information, then those investors can seek its disclosure, since
they will hold shares in numerous firms and will thereby share in the
benefits of disclosures that accrue to a firm's competitors, and in contrast to
the present state of affairs, firms that choose to continue to operate under
a regime in which they do not make such disclosures would face a higher
cost of capital.
B. The Impact of Diversified Investors on Fox's Rationale for a Single
Regulator
Fox contends in his latest article that institutional investors will internalize
the costs and benefits of disclosing interfirm externalities (which means
that a single regulator is not necessary under his rationale for disclosure
regulation) only if "every investor" in the economy is an "index investor"
holding the "same percentage of each issuer as every other investor does"
in its portfolio.445 This contention is mistaken. Under regulatory competition,
the disclosure regime will be selected by the marginal, informed investor.
Because the majority of investors in equity are diversified institutions, and not
the individuals whose portfolios, as Fox contends, are often not indexed,
institutional investors have the highest probability of being the marginal
investors whose disclosure preferences will dictate the choice of securities
regime.
Just as Fox agrees that not all investors need to be informed for stock
prices to be efficient, not all investors must hold shares in all firms for
a competitive securities regime to include the disclosure of externalities:
for a midstream choice, it depends on the holdings of the investor whose
vote is pivotal, and for an initial choice, on the marginal investor in the
public offering. Since the majority of shares are held by institutional funds,
several of the largest of these funds are indexed, and even active stock
pickers among institutions have holdings in numerous firms in the same
sector (there are, for instance, numerous sector funds), it is most plausible
to assume, without any data to suggest otherwise, that the decisive investor
will be interested in the effects of disclosure policy on many firms besides
just the issuer, that is, that it will consider the effect of disclosing interfirm
externalities in its regime choice.446
445 Fox, supra note 429, at 589.
446 This point regarding the interests of diversified shareholders holds equally for
IPO investments. Fox still misunderstands this point, as he repeats once again,
id. at 586-88, the objection in his earlier article that the investors in an IPO will
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Moreover, I raised the presence of institutional investors to make a
straightforward point that Fox overlooks: even were we to accept Fox's
rationale for mandating disclosure, it would still not be a self-evident
justification for a single regulator. It is so only if the decisive investor is
undiversified, such that its choice is equivalent to that of an issuer, which
considers only the private costs and benefits of a disclosure policy. But
given the composition of equity investors, the marginal investor in the
vast majority of publicly traded firms will be a diversified institution. Fox
offers no evidence that the marginal investor will not consider the effect
of a disclosure policy on all of its holdings, and thus, if positive interfirm
externalities outweigh negative ones, as Fox maintains, the marginal investor
will prefer a regime that requires the disclosure of such information.447
not consider the impact of a disclosure regime on all of their investments and
therefore will not require the new issue to submit to the disclosure regime directed
at externalities that Fox contemplates. If interfirm externalities are only positive
as Fox contends, then diversified institutional investors will insist that all firms in
which they invest, including new issues, be registered under regimes that require
the disclosure of such information. As the point is rather straightforward, Fox's
repeated objection that IPO investors will consider the firm's disclosures in isolation
of all other investments may be due to his oversight of the fact that the disclosure
regime that the IPO firm chooses will continue to regulate its ongoing disclosures
when the shares trade in the secondary market after the offering concludes.
447 Fox notes in support of his objection that the proxy proposals of activist institutional
investors are firm-specific and not directed at policies intended to enhance the value
of all firms, id. at 589. This objection is off the mark. Shareholder proposals brought
by these public pension funds are expressly directed at improving the value of the
targeted firm. See Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional Investor
Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 Yale J. Reg. 174
(2001). The decision of investors with regard to what shareholder proposal to
make is thus not interchangeable with the decision they would make regarding the
optimal disclosure regime for their investments. Moreover, Fox's objection may
well be wrong. Some commentators have contended, exactly contrary to Fox's
assertion, that the proposals are in fact intended to have, and do have, spillover
effects to boost the performance of the stock market overall and not simply specific
firms, because the proposal proponents are indexed. See, e.g., Del Guercio &
Hawkins, supra note 140, at 300. They suggest that the publicity of undertaking
such proposals is a strategic tool the activist funds exploit precisely for the purpose
of obtaining spillover effects-that is, the threat of publicity "might also motivate
other companies to proactively improve their corporate governance structures
without being explicitly targeted"-and provide as evidence of an externality
reports that CalPERS is contacted by non-targeted firms' managers in order to
stay off their target list. [d. These anecdotes of spillover effects in the shareholder
proposal context indicate that institutional investors consider the impact of their
actions on more than one firm, which is all that is necessary for my point that the
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C. The Interfirm Externalities Rationale and Analyst Activity
In trying to show that the SEC's disclosure policy is, in fact, directed at
disclosing interfirm externalities, Fox states that "analysts pour over SEC-
issuer disclosure filings as soon as they become available...448 This activity is
not, however, evidence that SEC mandates reveal information of relevance to
the profitability ofcompetitors. Analysts examine a firm's filings to learn about
the filing firm and not with the principal goal of learning about competitors.
Fox's reference to analysts' use of filings is in response to my statement that
firms' disclosures are generic and boilerplate with respect to information that
would benefit competitors. Fox's citation of analysts, rather than rival firms,
as the ones who use SEC filings for information proves my point rather than
refutes it. Disclosures that do not reveal information to competitors, who
have their own proprietary information about a business sector's revenues,
may well provide information to outsiders, such as analysts, about the
particular firm as well as its industry.449
In this regard, Fox's reference to the behavior of analysts bolsters
Jonathan Macey's thesis regarding who benefits from the SEC's disclosure
regime-market professionals rather than insiders, who would otherwise be
well-positioned to trade on private information against professionals.450 But
Fox's rationale for the SEC disclosures in question, as well as his objection
to regulatory competition, is not that the disclosures benefit analysts, but that
they benefit competitors.45 \
incentives of institutional investors differ from issuers regarding the content of a
securities regime to be correct and for Fox's criticism of it to be misplaced.
448 Fox, supra note 429, at 594.
449 Fox makes another curious claim concerning analysts' use of data regarding the
disclosure of depreciation after the 1934 Act: that despite depreciation's lack
of bearing on real cash flows, its disclosure enabled analysts (and investors)
to make "meaningful new inferences" about "cash flows" for the small set of
firms not disclosing depreciation prior to the Act. Id. at 593. Notwithstanding
Fox's assertion, disclosure of depreciation does not provide "meaningful new
information" for predictions of cash flows, evidenced by the fact that accounting
depreciation methods, as earlier noted, are not related to actual cash flows. See,
e.g., Beaver & Dukes, supra note 166. I know of no study, nor does Fox cite any,
showing that stock prices are correlated with accounting depreciation, which would
be the other type of empirical evidence that could support Fox's contention.
450 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Insider Trading 68 (1991).
451 As a consequence, Fox's response to my illustrations in supra Part III.B.3. of this
article that indicate the absence of information of significance to competitors in
actual filings, that the type of information required to be disclosed in the SEC rules
"would appear to be useful to competitors" and .. suggest that some of the information
... is in fact useful to these other firms," Fox, supra note 429, at 594, undercuts,
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D. Fox's Objection to the Admati and Pfleiderer Model of Disclosure
Regulation
As discussed in Part m.B.I.e. of this article, Admati and Pfleiderer model
the mandatory disclosure of interfirm externalities and show that mandatory
disclosure is not always a welfare improvement over voluntary disclosure
even if the externality is always positive, despite Fox's presumption to the
contrary. Fox contends that their model is not relevant because it is directed
at disclosure of financial and not real externalities, in modeling the benefit
of disclosure as "mak(ing) it possible for investors to make more accurate
valuations of one or more other firms. ,,452 Fox is incorrect; the model is
relevant. Moreover, this objection to the model creates a serious analytical
problem for Fox's position on regulatory competition, for much of his critique
of regulatory competition is premised on the very features of the Adrriati and
Pfleiderer model to which he is objecting.
In particular, Fox considers the SEC's line-of-business reporting
requirement, as well as its adoption of a sales disclosure requirement
following the 1934 Act, as examples of mandated interfirm externalities,
and he characterizes the empirical evidence that such disclosures reduced
stock variances as demonstrating that the disclosures created meaningful
information as they made prices more accurate.453 I have, of course,
contended that this is not evidence of disclosure of meaningful information
because there was no stock price effect, which is the conventional definition
for information to be considered meaningful for investors.454 But setting
rather than bolsters, his position. This is because his position is that the rationale
for a single regulator and the current mandatory disclosure regime is to disclose
interfirm externalities, that is, to assist competitors, not investors. The possibility
that the current regime might sometimes provide "some" information that "appears"
to be "useful" to a competitor-Fox's response to my illustrations---contradicts his
thesis, for it demonstrates that the mitigation of interfirm externalities is utterly
tangential to the SEC's disclosure requirements and has little connection to the
SEC's implementation of its regulatory function. If this were not the case and the
SEC deemed its mission to be that which Fox ascribes to it, information of value
to competitors would be the focus of firms' filings and not simply an occasional
byproduct. In short, as the discussion in supra Part m.B.3. of this article makes
clear, there is no evidence that the SEC disclosure regime has as its function the
rationale that Fox posits for it.
452 Fox, supra note 429, at 585.
453 ld. at 592.
454 Fox introduces a further argument in his response regarding the insignificant stock
price effects of the 1934 Act, that because the event study methodology cannot
pick up an extremely minute price effect, the Act could have increased stock prices
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aside the interpretive disagreement between Fox and myself regarding that
data, information that produces a change in the variance of stock returns
without affecting the stock price does not involve a real externality-real
externalities, by definition, affect firm cash flows and thus affect prices. Thus,
such disclosures, at best, pertain to a financial externality. This is the very
type of disclosure that Admati and Pfleiderer are modeling. Fox's view of
the segment reporting and sales data, that they are exemplars of his concept
of an interfirm externality that has been mandated by the SEC, is therefore
identical to the disclosures in the Admati and Pfleiderer model, which he is
now dismissing as irrelevant. He cannot have it both ways. Either a model of
financial externalities is relevant to his position or the data on SEC disclosures
do not support his position.
More important, even if Fox were to adopt a consistent position on the
relevance of the SEC disclosure data to his normative position regarding
the import of real, as opposed to financial, externalities, the Admati
and Pfleiderer model would still, in my judgment, be highly relevant
to the key issue in contention between Fox's position and regulatory
competition-that is, his claim that mandatory disclosure is always superior
to voluntary disclosure-notwithstanding that they model financial rather
than real externalities. Their model shows that in the context of financial
externalities, Fox's absolutist position is mistaken: welfare can be decreased
by a mandatory disclosure regime. There is no reason to believe that the
ambiguity regarding the efficacy of government mandates would vanish
were their model revised to impose real rather than financial externalities
(that is, were a cash flow effect being modeled) and every reason to believe
that the case against Fox's view would be increased. This is because the
modeling of the impact of a real externality is more complex than a financial
externality, and as the article has discussed, the more complex the model, the
more open-ended the analytical results become. It is instructive, although
by .05% without its identification by Benston. [d. at 610. He contends that this
speculation "devastates" the conclusion that the legislation did not affirmatively
benefit investors, id., after he admits that "[t]he lack of statistical significance means
that these results provide no affirmative evidence that the benefits from Exchange
Act mandatory disclosure are greater than its costs," id. at 609. Fox's speculation
regarding a minuscule positive price effect of the 1934 disclosure mandates is
nothing more than that, pure speculation. There is absolutely no basis for claiming
that there was such a hypothesized effect, particularly as no study of any SEC
disclosure mandate has ever identified a positive price effect. Fox is grasping at
straws. It is simply implausible to maintain that every SEC mandate induced a
price effect of no more than .05%, as against the more straightforward explanation
of the data, that the required disclosures provided no benefit to investors.
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obviously not determinative, that they obtain the same result as the Dye
model, which does depict real externalities (and whose simpler model of
financial externalities produces a result of no difference between voluntary
and mandatory disclosure, which also offers no support for Fox's position).
The same is true of the third model that I was recently able to locate of
disclosure policy in the context of interfirm externalities. Suil Pae models
whether mandatory disclosure regulation can improve social efficiency in
the context of production decisions, in a market where demand is uncertain,
consisting of duopolists who will not voluntarily disclose private demand or
cost information.455 This is a model involving real externalities. In the absence
of mandatory disclosure, the firms play a preemption game in which they
decide whether to produce before or after they receive their private demand
information (which is not disclosed). This decision is based on a trade-off
between preempting the rival (obtaining a larger market share) and making
a more informed output choice (conditioning output on demand), and the
choice varies depending on two industry characteristics: the size of the market
and the degree of uncertainty over demand. Mandatory disclosure alters the
trade-off such that waiting for demand information is less attractive, and in
equilibrium, the firms produce prior to the arrival of their private demand
information, when they would have waited were disclosure not mandatory.
As a consequence, expected profits and consumer surplus change, resulting in
strictly lower payoffs than in the voluntary disclosure equilibrium.
Mandatory disclosure in Pae's model-a Cournot market under demand
uncertainty-therefore may not achieve its intended purpose of improving
social welfare; it will do so only under the restrictive condition that firms wait
for their information to arrive in both voluntary and mandatory disclosure
regimes. Because firms' incentives to wait under both regimes depend on the
industry characteristics, Pae concludes, similar to the conclusions ofDye and
of Admati and Pfleiderer, that there are very substantial information demands
on regulators for the policy to work: "regulators must acquire sufficient
information about those [industry] characteristics" if a mandatory disclosure
is not to "run the risk of reducing social welfare. "456 Like those other models,
one can argue over the realism ofPae's model's assumptions. Moreover, Pae's
model is far more stylized than the Dye and Admati and Pfleiderer models and
has a structure less transferable to conventional securities disclosure settings
given the duopoly market and type of disclosure that, in my judgment, limits
455 Suil Pae, Information Sharing in the Presence ofPreemptive Incentives: Economic
Consequences ofMandatory Disclosure,S Rev. Acct. Stud. 331 (2000).
456 Id. at 334.
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its usefulness for evaluating the efficacy of a mandatory disclosure policy
compared to the other two models. But there is a striking uniformity across
the three models of disclosure in the context of interfirm externalities: all of
the models indicate that mandatory disclosure regulation does not guarantee
an increase in social welfare over that attained when disclosure is voluntary
and, indeed, may well lower it.
E. Does Fox's Interfirm Externalities Rationale for the Current
Disclosure Regime Mesh with His Policy Recommendations for
International Securities Regulation?
Fox emphasizes throughout his latest article, consistent with his prior work,
that the purpose of securities regulation, the disclosure of information
regarding interfirm externalities, is not to improve investors' financial
decisions, but, rather, to enable competitors to make better decisions on the
allocation of real assets. There are significant problems with this position,
and I will note two beyond the obvious difficulties with the thesis already
discussed in the article, namely, that the SEC does not perceive its mission
as policing issuers' competitors' decisions regarding the allocation of real
assets, as opposed to assisting investors' decisions regarding the purchase
and sale of financial assets, and thus in practice such disclosures are not
required under the SEC's regime.
First, there is a mismatch of regulatory objective and the tools with
which to implement it. Namely, if improved product market decisions are
the purpose of the U.S. mandatory disclosure regime under the federal
securities laws, then the wrong agency is administering the statute. Fox
should be directing his advocacy efforts at having the administration of
the securities laws transferred to the Federal Trade Commission, for it is
surely better positioned, given its administrative expertise, than the SEC to
determine what will facilitate competition. In fact, during the 1970s, the FfC
maintained its own segment reporting requirements, which differed from the
SEC rules, to assist its efforts at policing anticompetitive behavior, a policy
consistent with Fox's concerns, although the information was revealed solely
to the agency and not to the rival firms.457
Second, Fox restricts his mandatory disclosure regime to domestic
457 The agency collected line-of-business data from 1974-1977, eventually publishing
the data in aggregate form, keeping all firm-specific information confidential, and
had in place strict confidentiality rules regarding the access and use of the data by
agency employees. See, e.g., FfC Line of Business Program: Notice of the 1977
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corporations, asserting that the bulk of firms' shareholders are domestic and
national regulators can best choose the mandatory disclosure level for their
countries.458 This regime not only entails regulatory competition of the worst
possible sort,459 but it is a policy recommendation inconsistent with the logical
implication ofhis analysis, which is the need for a mega-regulator at the global
level. For under his analysis, the crucial capital allocation decisions depend
on managers' (and possibly investors') being able to interpret accurately
the significance of interfirm externality disclosures regarding competitors'
disclosures on industry or sector profitability. Because firms' competitors in
both product and capital markets include foreign, and not simply domestic,
corporations, when disclosure regimes differ by nationality, not all firms
obtain the necessary proprietary information about their rivals. In particular,
some nationals will be advantaged over others, and the optimal real asset
allocations that Fox anticipates will not be undertaken (because there will not
be mandatory disclosure of all existing positive externalities). Fox's solution
therefore will not achieve his stated objective of the efficient allocation of
capital, and if his thesis is correct, his solution may well hinder it, given that
it will increase the disclosure discrepancies across firms active in the same
equity markets.
F. Conclusion
Fox concludes his response by stating that: (1) "the case that issuer choice
will lead to market failure is overwhelming"; (2) that empirical studies of
the securities laws provide "no affirmative empirical evidence in support of
either proposition [that those laws increased or decreased social welfare]";
and (3) that I "should stop battling these hard facts. "460 The reader can decide
who has mistaken the "facts."
Fox now apparently concedes that there is no empirical evidence that
the federal securities laws increased social welfare, while asserting that
the data do not show those laws decreased social welfare.461 I have not
Annual Line of Business Report, 50 Fed. Reg. 29,482 (July 19, 1985); FfC Line
of Business Reports Program: Revision of Confidentiality Rules and Procedures,
51 Fed. Reg. 12,743 (Apr. 15, 1986).
458 Fox, supra note 13.
459 As I mentioned in my prior article, regulatory competition restricted by a firm's
geographical location introduces significl!nt friction into inteIjurisdictional moves
and therefore reduces the feedback regulators receive regarding desirable regulation
from issuer inflows and outflows. Romano, supra note 2, at 2408-09.
460 Fox, supra note 429, at 610-1 I.
461 ld. "The empirical studies on whether the imposition of the U.S. mandatory
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maintained that the empirical literature decisively shows the federal regime
decreased social welfare, but, rather, that it demonstrates the point that Fox
now acknowledges, that the regime did not increase social welfare, and that
a cogent and plausible case can be made that it decreased welfare because it
requires disclosures, unrelated to interfirm externalities, which would not be
undertaken by the market's cost-benefit calculation. In my view, this is more
than sufficient for concluding that the status quo in securities regulation should
not be privileged and that we should instead seek to introduce competition into
this regulatory field, which is the norm in corporate law, the area most related
to securities law because of their shared objective (at least according to nearly
all commentators albeit not Fox), protection of the interests of investors.
What I advocate regarding securities law reform is the working hypothesis
in a capitalist economy-a preference for market solutions where there is no
showing of externalities or, to be more precise, no showing of externalities
that can be adequately mitigated by regulation.
Indeed, there is no justification, given Fox's interfirm externalities
rationale, for Fox's own proposal that the SEC's mandates should apply
solely to domestic issuers and not all issuers trading in the United States.
It is, in fact, contradictory to have the securities regime vary with a firm's
nationality and not territorially, if enhancing competitiveness through the
disclosure of interfirm externalities is the goal of the securities regime. That is
because foreign firms listing on U.S. exchanges compete in the same product
and capital markets as domestic issuers, yet they would not have to disclose
information regarding their own costs and profitability, thereby impeding
the efficient capital allocation that is to be effectuated by the mandatory
disclosure regime under Fox's analysis.462 It is similarly inconsistent for Fox
to permit foreign issuers to continue to list on U.S. exchanges under the SEC's
regulation and not their home regulator's, since according to his rationale,
only the home regulator knows what is the appropriate disclosure level for its
nationals, yet he would not prohibit such a choice.
Fox's concluding assertion that "the much admired U.S. regime of
mandatory disclosure should be retained"463 reflects a persistent mistake
motivating his criticism of regulatory competition, which perhaps explains
his implacable hostility to experimentation with a market-oriented approach
to securities regulation for U.S. issuers. Namely, the implicit premise of this
disclosure in the 1930s in fact led to an increase or decrease in social welfare
provide no affinnative support of either proposition." (emphasis added).
462 Fox, supra note 13.
463 Fox, supra note 429, at 611.
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assertion is that without the SEC as the exclusive regulator of U.S. issuers,
firms would engage in perfunctory disclosure, the content of which bears
no resemblance to the existing regime. Regulatory competition would not
eliminate all of the disclosure now required by the SEC nor, in all probability,
many of the items that are the subject of the SEC mandates that Fox considers
to be "much admired." The elements of the SEC regime that investors deem
valuable would continue to be disclosed. This is a core claim of both of
my articles on regulatory competition, which have detailed the content of
voluntary disclosure practices and the choices made under competition in
corporate law, a setting similar, and integrally related, to securities law. What
regulatory competition would eliminate is the SEC's regulatory monopoly
over U.S. issuers (and non-U.S. issuers choosing to list on U.S. stock
exchanges), and by doing so, it will facilitate implementation of the disclosure
regime that investors value most highly. This distinction is at the heart of the
difference between my policy proposal and that ofFox.
